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Interpreting the Labour Party consists of twelve essays on the principal
thinkers and schools of thought concerned with the political and historical
development of the Labour Party and Labour movement. It is an
examination of the major methodologies and approaches in Labour studies
and a critical evaluation and appreciation of much of the most interesting
scholarship in this area of study. The essays are written by contributors
who have devoted many years to the study of the Labour Party, the trade
union movement and the various ideologies associated with them.
The book begins with an in-depth analysis of how to study the Labour
Party, and goes on to examine key periods in the development of the
ideologies to which the party has subscribed. This includes the ideology of
inter-war Labourism, the rival post-war perspectives on Labourism, the
New Left, and the ‘contentious alliance’ of unions with Labour. Key
thinkers analysed include Henry Pelling, Ross McKibbin, Ralph Miliband,
Lewis Minkin, David Marquand, Perry Anderson and Tom Nairn. Each
chapter situates its subject matter in the context of a broader intellectual
legacy, including the works of, among others, Sidney and Beatrice Webb,
Theodore Rothstein, Stuart Hall and Samuel Beer.
The book will be of interest to undergraduate students of British politics
and political theory, and to academics concerned with Labour politics and
history, trade union history and politics, research methodology and
political analysis.
John Callaghan is Professor of Politics at the University of Wolverhampton. Steven
Fielding is Professor of Contemporary Political History in the School of English,
Sociology, Politics and Contemporary History and Associate Director of the
European Studies Research Institute at the University of Salford. Steve Ludlam is a
Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics at the University of Sheffield.
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The start of the twenty-first century is superficially an inauspicious time to study labour
movements. Political parties once associated with the working class have seemingly
embraced capitalism. The trade unions with which these parties were once linked have
suffered near-fatal reverses. The industrial proletariat looks both divided and in rapid
decline. The development of multi-level governance, prompted by ‘globalisation’ has
furthermore apparently destroyed the institutional context for advancing the labour
‘interest’. Many consequently now look on terms such as the ‘working class’, ‘socialism’ and
the ‘labour movement’ as politically and historically redundant.
The purpose of this series is to give a platform to those students of labour movements
who challenge, or develop, established ways of thinking and so demonstrate the continued
vitality of the subject and the work of those interested in it. For despite appearances many
social democratic parties remain important competitors for national office and proffer
distinctive programmes. Unions still impede the free flow of ‘market forces’. If workers are
a more diverse body and have exchanged blue collars for white, insecurity remains an
everyday problem. The new institutional and global context is moreover as much of an
opportunity as a threat. Yet, it cannot be doubted that compared to the immediate post-
1945 period, at the beginning of the new millennium what many still refer to as the ‘labour
movement’ is much less influential. Whether this should be considered a time of retreat or
reconfiguration is unclear – and a question the series aims to clarify
The series will not only give a voice to studies of particular national bodies but will also
promote comparative works that contrast experiences across time and geography. This
entails taking due account of the political, economic and cultural settings in which labour
movements have operated. In particular this involves taking the past seriously as a way of
understanding the present as well as utilising sympathetic approaches drawn from
sociology, economics and elsewhere.
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Interpreting the Labour Party is an attempt to take stock of how some of the British
Labour Party’s leading interpreters have analysed their subject, deriving as they do
from contrasting political, theoretical, disciplinary and methodological back-
grounds. The book explores their often-hidden assumptions and subjects them to
critical evaluation. In introducing this collection, we position the various chapters
within a wider context and draw out some of their most striking implications.
It is important to remind ourselves from the outset that all students of the
Labour Party – including the authors of this Introduction and those reading it –
adhere to some prior analytical–interpretive framework deriving from diverse 
theoretical positions. This is not something for which anyone should be criticised,
for as E. H. Carr stated many years ago (1964), without some such intellectual set-
ting the apparently highly potent ‘fact’ can have no meaning. It could be argued,
indeed, that ‘the facts’ themselves are often the product of persuasive theories and
interpretive arguments. While these propositions might seem uncontroversial
when stated in general terms, once applied to a particular subject, in which 
analysts have invested much time and energy, their implications can arouse con-
troversy. For if scholars are able to agree on certain ‘facts’, few of them are willing
to concede without a fight that their reading of those facts is in any way flawed.
The study of the Labour Party is especially prone to interpretive dispute because
it is inherently politicised. Many of those who have written about Labour – for
example, Henry Pelling – have at one time or another been party members who
identified with one or other of its ideological factions. A number have belonged to
groupings, usually, like Perry Anderson and Tom Nairn, to Labour’s Left, which
have hoped to replace the party in the affections of the working class. More than a
few of them – like Ralph Miliband and David Marquand – have been, at different
periods in their lives, on both sides of the fence. Those writing from such commit-
ted positions have sometimes conceived of the party in teleological terms. That is,
they thought it to be an ineluctable force whose destiny was to fulfil a historic mis-
sion, the nature of which could be anything from narrowly electoral to broadly
anti-systemic. Such an approach is less obvious today, when so few believe in the
prospect of establishing a social democratic – let alone a socialist – Britain. Indeed,
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those who retain some hope that socialism remains possible – in particular those
dubbed ‘Milibandian’ – consider that Labour was never that type of party. In con-
trast, some observers have eschewed overt political involvement, although their
work should not be considered inherently more reliable because of that. For it is
impossible not be influenced by the political conjuncture in which one lives, just
as it is difficult to see beyond the intellectual, cultural and academic verities of
one’s day. The appearance of objectivity can never be more than superficial:
indeed, it might be suggested, there are none more ideological than those who
claim to disavow ideology altogether.
This volume aims to provide insights about what have often been the hidden
assumptions of some of Labour’s leading interpreters and seeks to explain how
they have coloured our picture of the party. The approaches considered here are
invariably the result of complex aggregates of theories, methods and empirical evi-
dence. There is often much overlap between different interpretations, for while its
authors may make use of broadly the same component parts the novelty of their
arguments often lies in their application or arrangement of those elements. Even
the same combination of parts can contain important differences of emphasis and
so produce contrasting conclusions. In such subtle ways do the motives, political
affiliations and moods of the authors express themselves. Moreover, while such
factors are sometimes made explicit, there are other influences at work in con-
structing a particular perspective which are frequently left covered over. The ruling
beliefs of the day, the endemic assumptions and intellectual habits of an individ-
ual, a generation or a school of thought, may simply be taken for granted. Some, if
not all, of these predelictions may not be referred to in the text, escaping the criti-
cal attention of both author and reader.
To reiterate, everything written about the Labour Party, whether by scholars,
activists or journalists, has strong normative underpinnings. Any full appreciation
of the party therefore requires some assessment of the intellectual means through
which it has been perceived. When all is said and done, Labour’s historic purpose
has been to challenge or at least temper, in one way or another, the power of the
most dynamic economic and social system in history – capitalism. If such a sub-
ject does not arouse partisanship, nothing will.
Rationale for the collection
The chapters gathered here were selected from papers presented to the second con-
ference of the Political Studies Association’s Labour Movements Group, held in
Manchester in July 2001. This gathering grew out of the group’s commitment to
create arenas in which researchers, drawn from different academic disciplines and
contrasting research agendas, can share their work. It already has a large and
diverse membership, composed of adherents to a variety of political, disciplinary
and methodological perspectives united in the desire to better understand the
Labour Party and the wider labour movement, both in Britain and elsewhere in the
world. The group is always keen to attract new members, and its website is an
invaluable research resource (Labour Movements Group 2002).
2 Introduction
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As with this collection, the main purpose of that conference was to highlight
how students of the party have analysed their subject. In particular, the organisers
hoped to traverse one of the disciplinary divisions that have hitherto hampered the
development of a more rounded appreciation of the party: that which demarcates
historians from political scientists. This is no new concern. During the early 1960s
the first conferences of the Society for the Study of Labour History attracted the
participation of political scientists as politically diverse as Robert McKenzie and
Ralph Miliband. Despite this, the society went on to embrace traditional historical
concerns and methods, leaving little room for such figures (Fielding 2002). More
recently, in their individual contributions to the Labour literature members of the
Labour Movements Group have brought together the concerns of history and
political science to illuminating effect. Despite the advantages of this approach,
however, it remains a minority pursuit.
The divide between history and politics has resulted in work that, whatever its
intrinsic merits, is often more limited than it might otherwise be. In particular,
many political scientists have fallen foul of the assumptions that theoretical elab-
oration is intellectually superior to empirical research and that all contemporary
trends are somehow novel (Callaghan 2002). In contrast, most historians have
eschewed the insightful theoretical labours of political scientists and been guilty of
promoting a view of the past as a foreign country set apart from the travails of the
present day. It could be argued that it would be best to locate analysis of the Labour
Party in what Colin Hay (chapter 12) suggests should be a ‘post-disciplinary’
labour studies that incorporates insights from economics and sociology, along
with those of history and politics. This is undoubtedly correct, but for the time
being the proper harmonising of the work of historians and political scientists
would be a major step forward.
Drawing the two disciplines together would be especially helpful at this present
juncture. At the time of writing, Labour is widely referred to as ‘New’ Labour. This
term has given rise to a keen debate about the extent to which the contemporary
party forms either a break or continuum with what is described as ‘Old’ Labour
(Bale 1999; Fielding 2003; Ludlam and Smith 2001). While it is not their main pur-
pose, the chapters that follow help frame this debate in both historical and theo-
retical terms, though of course that does not mean they arrive at a common
conclusion about the significance of present-day events.
The chapters
As this collection makes clear, academic analysis of the Labour Party – like the
party itself – has never stood still. Over the years, historians and political scientists
interested in the party have amended their analytical agendas in response to wider
intellectual trends as well as to Labour’s own capricious electoral course. This
point is elaborated in chapters 1 and 2. Nick Randall (chapter 1) notes the wide
variety of approaches to studying ideological change in the Labour Party and iden-
tifies five principal explanatory strategies: materialist; ideational; electoral; institu-
tional; and those which synthesise some or all of these. Limitations in many widely
John Callaghan, Steven Fielding, Steve Ludlam 3
ITLP_A02.QXD  18/8/03  9:53 am  Page 3
read texts are discussed and, echoing the final chapter, by Colin Hay, Randall con-
cludes by calling for a multidimensional approach that would reject, among other
things, what he considers the artificial opposition of structure to agency.
Lawrence Black (chapter 2) considers the ‘new political history’ by way of a
comparison with earlier ‘realist’ analyses of the party which explained its historical
development with almost exclusive reference to the social nature of the electorate.
He argues that the former view does more than counter social explanations by
restoring agency to the party, along with other more directly political factors. For
the ‘new political history’ also questions what it is that the category ‘politics’ might
encapsulate and how it can be represented and contested. The proximity and
ordering of party–voter relations are thus problematised, and Black reflects on the
imperfect and distorted perceptions which often characterise how academics have
understood these relations.
Reflecting the preoccupations of many of those who currently study Labour, the
main focus of this collection falls on the party’s postwar interpreters. Yet, even
given that shortened time frame, there have been many contrasting currents in
interpretation that have ebbed and flowed in their influence, as intellectual fash-
ions and political events left their mark. The rest of the chapters of this book can
be seen as falling into two main categories. The first involves an assessment of those
who can be usefully described as New Left analysts: in their different ways they
have promoted a very influential and deeply critical analysis of the Labour Party.
This work has broadly assumed that Labour – at least during the 1950s–1970s –
impeded the transformation of capitalism into socialism. The most ambitious of
these New Left theorists were Perry Anderson and Tom Nairn, who situated
Labour in the extremely broad historical context of capitalist development and
class formation in Britain since the English Civil War. This analysis was strongly
informed by the postwar perception of Britain’s industrial decline and its relation
to an imperial and post-imperial global financial role serving the interests of the
City of London. Madeleine Davis (chapter 3) focuses on the New Left’s idea of
‘labourism’, a venerable notion given new life by this analysis. Mark Wickham-
Jones (chapter 6) looks at one of the assumptions underpinning that concept:
Labour’s supposed isolation from the rest of European social democracy. Both,
however, consider the shifting political projects of the New Left in relation to its
developing analysis of the Labour Party over the last forty years.
As other contributions show – for example, chapter 8, by John Callaghan –
Anderson and Nairn have been hugely influential. Even so, it was Ralph Miliband’s
Parliamentary Socialism, first published in 1961, which best captured the New
Left’s frustration with Labour. Miliband’s biographer Michael Newman (chapter
4) traces the intellectual roots of this powerful critique. He reveals that its argu-
ment was widely misinterpreted by contemporaries largely because the author was
himself uncertain whether Labour would ever become the vehicle for his kind of
socialism. Miliband eventually concluded that the party was fated to remain
‘labourist’ after despairing of the 1964–70 Wilson Government’s policies. From the
mid-1960s he therefore dismissed Labour as wholly dependent on capitalism and,
indeed, came to see its ability to win the support of most working-class voters as
4 Introduction
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one means by which the status quo was maintained. As Newman also shows, the
party’s move to the Left during the 1970s and 1980s forced Miliband to revise this
view, although he nevertheless remained highly sceptical of the party’s potential to
engineer fundamental social and economic change.
Since the 1970s David Coates and Leo Panitch have produced numerous works
in the ‘Milibandian’ mould that have made a significant impact on perceptions of
the Labour Party. Their contribution (chapter 5) mounts a robust defence of the
continuing relevance to both historical and contemporary analysis of this still-
controversial perspective. They indicate the extent to which Milibandians have
extended their inspiration’s original insights by incorporating within their own
work the concerns of international political economy. This has imbued them with
a perspective far wider than that possessed by most students of the party, who tend
to focus on the internal party mechanics and remain trapped within national
boundaries. Thus, Milibandians can now claim to possess a unique insight on the
wider implications of ‘New’ Labour policy, based as it is on certain contestable
assumptions regarding ‘globalisation’.
The second category consists of chapters on figures whose work, while couched
in less obviously theoretical terms, proceed from a contrasting set of assumptions
that might be regarded as broadly social democratic in orientation. Henry Pelling
was one of the leading postwar historians of the Labour Party who wrote a number
of founding texts during the 1950s and 1960s. In relation to the more overtly the-
oretical work of Miliband that resonated among the radical student audience of
the 1960s and 1970s, Pelling appeared the epitome of dull empiricism. Alastair
Reid, in chapter 7, rescues Pelling from such a dismissive appraisal and shows how
far he defined his early work through an engagement with prevailing ideological
currents which traced their origins to the basic concerns of Marxist scholarship.
Pelling, who sympathised with the Labour leadership’s social democratic outlook,
came to conclusions at variance with those of others who, like Miliband, were crit-
ical of the party leadership’s apparent lack of desire to transform capitalism into
socialism. Steven Fielding and Declan McHugh (chapter 9) subject to critical
appraisal the work of another – but later – social democratic interpreter. David
Marquand’s The Progressive Dilemma, first published in 1991, has had a profound
influence over recent perceptions of party history. Indeed, it has been used to jus-
tify ‘New’ Labour’s attempt to increase its appeal to middle-class voters by dis-
tancing the party from the trade unions and public ownership. The authors view
Marquand’s analysis as indicative of a particular moment in the development of
social democratic thinking, which has hitherto been less critical of the party’s
character. They also question some of Marquand’s historical assumptions, which
are derived from one side of a debate about the inevitability of Labour’s rise to the
status of a national party during the first two decades of the twentieth century.
Without some understanding of the party’s unique and complex relationship
with the working class in general and the trade unions in particular, a full appreci-
ation of Labour in Britain is impossible. John Callaghan (chapter 8) analyses Ross
McKibbin’s approach to that relationship which roots the evolution of the Labour
Party, and the limits to its growth, in the consciousness and cultures of organised
John Callaghan, Steven Fielding, Steve Ludlam 5
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(and unorganised) labour in the first decades of the twentieth century. McKibbin
supplies a richly suggestive explanation of why this truly proletarian party was
unable to break the electoral hegemony of the Conservative Party until the Second
World War. Class and class consciousness are central to this account, although in
ways which frustrated ‘the forward march’ of Labour. Callaghan shows how McK-
ibbin’s work draws upon and develops assumptions concerning the ‘special path’
of working-class development in Britain, and highlights the absence from this
body of theory of the sort of rigorous comparative analysis which such arguments
presume.
Two chapters deal directly with interpretations of the unions–party link – the
labour alliance that has had such a profound influence on Labour’s development.
In chapter 10 Steve Ludlam outlines the two principal scholarly approaches that
have characterised the bulk of postwar work on this link: that of pluralistic 
theorists and social democrats; and that of Marxist theorists and socialists. He
illustrates their main features, and some of their limitations, through an analysis
of the unions–party link during the particularly tense period between 1974 and
1983. Thus, Ludlam calls for the disaggregation and sectoral understandings of ‘the
unions’, and for an awareness of the purchase of underlying axioms of liberal polit-
ical economy. Lewis Minkin’s work on the unions–party link is almost unique in
its focus. Eric Shaw (chapter 11) performs a great service to students of the party
by clarifying Minkin’s explanatory mode, analytical categories, and conceptual
framework. In doing so he shows how Minkin exposed the fallacies of rational
actor models that underpinned the myth of ‘baronial’ union leaders’ domination
of the party, and constructed instead a sociological model that reveals the ‘“rules”,
roles and relations’ which explain how the ‘contentious alliance’ functions.
In the final contribution (chapter 12) Colin Hay, one of the leading interpreters
of ‘New’ Labour, sketches out an ambitious theoretical framework within which
students of the contemporary party might locate their analysis. This takes account
of what Hay terms the ‘new political science’, at the heart of which is ‘reflexivity’,
that is an approach more self-critical about its analytical hypotheses than has hith-
erto been the case. It might be thought that if past students of the party had prac-
tised such reflexivity collections such as this would be unnecessary. Hay’s chapter
is not, however, meant to establish an agreed agenda for future work on Labour, as
no collective programme emerged from the conference. As the reader will have
been able to discern, each contributor to this collection, just like those whose work
they analyse, has his or her own particular point of view. However, the editors
would wish to endorse at least the broad thrust of Hay’s perspective. A greater
openness to alternative points of view, a more developed self-critical awareness
and a willingness to lay one’s theoretical cards on the table would indeed be very
welcome. The editors wish, in addition, to stress the need to break down appar-
ently ‘common-sense’ terms such as the ‘trade unions’, ‘labour movement’ and
especially, of course, the ‘Labour Party’. Rather than simply taking them for
granted, it would be useful for analysts to think first about what they might mean.
Finally, while Hay’s own chapter illustrates that theoretical work can greatly 
illuminate our appreciation of the party, students need to pay due account to 
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historical context, however inconvenient the messy details of Labour’s past may
sometimes appear.
This collection does not claim to be comprehensive. The work of the historian
K. O. Morgan and the earlier historian and theorist G. D. H. Cole, for example,
might well have found a place within its covers. There is no contribution on the
feminist interpretation of the Labour Party either. It is, however, broadly represen-
tative of current scholarship and the diverse postwar corpus of work on the party
in which the authors have been schooled. In holding up to critical evaluation those
such as Anderson and Nairn, McKibbin, Marquand, Miliband, Minkin and Pelling,
we are, in a rather perverse way perhaps, merely paying tribute to their work and
acknowledging our intellectual indebtedness to them.
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The Labour Party is habitually considered the most ideologically inclined of all
British political parties, and ideological struggle has been endemic within the party
since its foundation. It is no surprise, therefore, that studies of the party have
endeavoured to understand why Labour’s ideology has shifted repeatedly through-
out its history. This chapter considers those efforts.
A large and varied literature is available to explain Labour’s ideological move-
ments. Many works address the Labour Party itself. Others examine ideological
change in parties in general. Yet others analyse change in social democratic parties
in particular. To assess all three strands in the literature requires the application of
some form of classification. At the risk of oversimplification, the approach adopted
here will be to classify works according to the principal explanatory strategies they
adopt. Five strategies are identified and outlined: materialist; ideational; electoral;
institutional; and those which synthesise some or all of these four. The five strate-
gies are assessed, and the chapter concludes by outlining an alternative model of
Labour’s ideological dynamics that might be usefully applied to the study of the
New Labour.
Outlines of explanatory strategies
Materialist strategies
The first set of explanatory strategies proposes that Labour’s ideological shifts are
a product of economic and social determinants. Here three main strands of analy-
sis emerge.
The first strand focuses on the pressure of capitalist interests. Claims that
Labour’s ideological movements are responses to the structural power of capitalist
interests have appealed particularly to Marxist scholars such as Miliband (1972)
and Panitch (1976), but are best developed by Coates (see chapter 5 of this collec-
tion, by David Coates and Leo Panitch). For Coates (1975: 154), ‘the major block-
age on the ability of the Labour Party to reform capitalism into socialism by the
Parliamentary process, or even to sustain major programmes of social reform,
comes from the institutions and representatives of corporate capital’. Forced to 
1
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co-operate with capitalist interests that control production, investment and
employment decisions, Labour governments ‘have been clawed to death by the
opposition of organised capital’ and have surrendered their radical ambitions
(Coates 1996: 71). It has also been argued that this structural power of capitalist
interests extends to ideological shifts during Labour’s periods of opposition. Thus
Wickham-Jones (1995) claims that anxiety over business antagonism prompted
Labour to pro-actively moderate its economic strategy after 1989.
The second strand focuses on changes in the character of capitalism. The link-
ing of ideological movement to changes in the character of capitalism has a distin-
guished lineage. Eduard Bernstein, a German socialist, claimed at the end of the
nineteenth century that prosperity had curbed capitalism’s propensity to generate
crisis, and brought the proletariat material advances that drew it away from revo-
lutionary ambitions (see Bernstein 1961). These trends, coupled with growth of
the middle classes, Bernstein concluded, required social democrats to moderate
their ideological appeals.
Similar arguments recur in relation to Labour. For Crosland (1963: 63) capital-
ism had been transformed by the mid-1950s, demanding ‘an explicit admission
that many of the old dreams are either dead or realised’. Prosperity had remedied
the abuses and inefficiencies of the capitalist system. In addition full employment,
the transfer of economic power to the State, trade unions and managers rendered
the ideological totems of the past redundant. Nationalisation and material redis-
tribution were anachronisms; creating genuine social equality and a classless soci-
ety should become Labour’s new mission.
Such claims also re-emerged in later years. Writing in 1989, the authors of New
Times argued that ‘much of the labour and democratic movement still rests upon
a world which is fast disintegrating beneath its feet. It still lives in the last house of
a terrace which is slowly being demolished and redeveloped’ (Hall and Jacques
1989: 24). On this account an epochal shift from Fordism to post-Fordism was
generating a new economic, social, political and cultural order which necessitated
ideological renovation of Labourism. But most arguments of this genre thereafter
were typically more pessimistic, proposing that changes in capitalism created new
and fundamental constraints upon social democracy. For Smith (1994) such trans-
formations of the economic environment drastically limited Labour’s ideological
options. Similarly, Crouch (1997) viewed ideological revision as inescapable given
the redundancy of demand management and Fordist production, the internation-
alisation of capital and the emergence of new occupational groups. John Gray,
however, provided the most vivid exposition of how the new international econ-
omy impelled ideological change. For Gray (1996: 32), ‘[e]conomic globalisation
removes, or weakens, the policy levers whereby social democratic governments
sought to bring about social solidarity and egalitarian distribution’, prohibiting full
employment through deficit financing, constraining redistribution via taxation
and restricting welfare state expenditures.
A third materialist explanatory strategy focuses on changes in the class struc-
ture, in particular changes in the class composition of the British electorate and
their electoral implications for Labour. For Hobsbawm (1981), the ‘forward march
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of Labour’ had been halted by the early 1980s, given social changes to Labour’s core
electorate. Technological change, the rise of monopoly capitalism and improved
living standards reduced the numbers and solidarity of the British working class,
requiring Labour to reconsider its ideological position. Others drew attention also
to the decline of Labour’s core voters (working-class union members and council-
house tenants) after 1964 (Heath and McDonald 1987), a trend subsequently con-
firmed up to the 1997 election (Heath, Jowell and Curtice 2001).
Such analyses of social change have been closely associated with accounts of atti-
tudinal change within the electorate, with claims regarding embourgeoisment
being particularly prominent. The basic argument here is that as manual workers
achieve relatively high incomes they adopt characteristically middle-class lifestyles.
Assimilated into middle-class society, these embourgeoisified proletarians become
increasingly moderate politically, demanding parallel ideological responses from
social democratic parties.
Within the general literature on political parties, Kirchheimer’s 1966 ideologi-
cally bland catch-all parties are triggered by embourgeoisment, but within the lit-
erature on Labour the classic statement is Abrams, Rose and Hinden’s Must Labour
Lose? (1960). After the 1959 election they concluded that ‘the Labour Party’s tradi-
tional sources of support in the environment, in traditional values and party loy-
alties have been weakening’ (1960: 97). Whereas the Conservatives succeeded in
identifying themselves with the affluent society and its ascendant occupational
groups, Labour was handicapped by its image as the representative of the working
class. Electoral revival therefore demanded ideological renewal.
During the 1980s these arguments returned. For example, Radice (1992) located
Labour’s problems in its anachronistic image as a working-class party unattractive
to upwardly mobile families, particularly those in southern England. Similarly, for
Crewe, the non-manual workforce had expanded, but in addition social mobility
placed increasing numbers of voters in cross-pressured class locations, leading to
a haemorrhage of Labour supporters among the new skilled working class. Thus
Crewe (1992: 96) argued: ‘If Labour is ever again to form a secure majority gov-
ernment it must pitch camp on the “affluent centre ground”.’
Ideational strategies
A second approach to understanding Labour’s ideological shifts is to refer to
ideational factors. Here two broad sets of explanations emerge.
The first strand has been concerned with dominant ideas. The ‘Labourist’ cri-
tique of the party has identified a dominant bourgeois intellectual tradition in
Britain which constrains and moderates Labour ideologically. For Anderson
(1992: 33), for example, Britain’s exceptional path of development (the absence of
a genuine bourgeois revolution; its pioneering role as the first industrial nation; its
extensive imperial possessions and a stature as an undefeated nation in two world
wars) ‘produced a proletariat distinguished by an immovable corporate class con-
sciousness’, intent on pursuing its ends within the existing social order. This under-
pinned Labour’s reformist trajectory and generated a traditionalist and empiricist
intellectual paradigm which left radical ideas stillborn inside and outside the party.
10 Labour’s ideological trajectory
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Saville (1973: 225) similarly laments the British Left’s incapacity ‘to develop and
maintain a critique of contemporary society that seriously grappled with its 
dominant ideas’.
Others, however, attempt to understand more discrete historical episodes of
ideological movement by reference to dominant ideas. Hay and Watson (1998)
propose that Labour adopted a particular set of arguments about globalisation, and
it is these dominant ideas rather than the purported economic changes in them-
selves that underpin recent ideological changes. Heffernan also argues that domi-
nant political beliefs proved critical during the 1980s: as ‘[n]eo-liberal political
attitudes . . . pervaded the body politic, colonising intellectual territory inch by
inch’, so Labour was impelled to recast its ideology in keeping with its new ideo-
logical environment (1997: 46).
The second strand in the ideational approach concentrates on the role of intel-
lectuals. Here Desai (1994) offers the most systematic analysis. To Desai, political
circumstances after the 1930s allowed intellectuals a powerful voice in the party.
On this account the revisionism of the 1950s originated among the intellectuals of
the Fabian Society, Socialist Commentary and Encounter and prospered because
these intellectuals enjoyed the patronage of the leadership, an intellectual ascen-
dancy within the party and a close alliance with union leaders. However, it is Driver
and Martell (1997, 1998) who most clearly identify the role of intellectuals in the
genesis of New Labour. They have noted the influence of communitarian political
philosophers including Etzioni, MacIntyre and Sandel. Moreover, they highlight
the ideational influence of Ulrich Beck, Zygmunt Bauman and Anthony Giddens
in the development of New Labour’s welfare and social policies. Indeed, Giddens,
as the principal theoretician of the ‘Third Way’, is perhaps the chief inspiration for
New Labour’s most recent ideological departures.
Electoral strategies
The electoral imperatives for ideological movement constitute a third approach. In
the literature on political parties, Downs (1957: 295) provides the classic state-
ment: ‘parties in democratic politics are analogous to entrepreneurs in a profit
seeking economy . . . they formulate whatever policies they believe will gain most
votes’, leading them to contest the electoral middle ground where most voters are
located. Accordingly, Labour’s ideological shifts can be viewed simply as successive
attempts to capture this electoral middle ground.
Alternatively, Przeworski (1985) argues that the de-radicalisation of social
democracy emerges from the structure of choices generated by electoral politics.
For Przeworski pursuing politics through parliamentary institutions necessitated
that social democrats reconcile themselves to the absence of a proletarian numer-
ical majority in each Western nation. This required social democrats to seek multi-
class alliances and abandon radical class-based politics. Furthermore, such
alliances ruptured the proletariat–party link. Recruiting middle-class allies diluted
the class identity of social democracy’s working-class constituency: working-class
support was lost and the predisposition to ideological moderation was further
reinforced.
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In the literature specifically devoted to Labour, electoral pressures are taken
almost as given, albeit rarely understood, via the systematised approach of Downs
and Przeworski. For some, however, Labour’s ideological movements are viewed
almost wholly in terms of responses to electoral pressures. For example, for Taylor
(1997) the party’s policy review, undertaken after its 1987 election defeat, sought
to secure electoral victory by formulating a set of alternative policies and demon-
strating its competence to form a government. For Leys (1997: 17), similarly, ide-
ological changes after 1989 were ‘overwhelmingly driven by the need for electoral
recovery’.
Institutional strategies
A fourth strategy concentrates on intra-party agents and actors. Here we
encounter embourgeoisment again, with claims that embourgeoisified social dem-
ocratic leaders are responsible for ideological change. The most renowned account
is that of Michels (1959: 163), for whom the ‘iron law of oligarchy’ held that sophis-
ticated organisation (an inevitable response to the recruitment of a mass mem-
bership) guaranteed the leadership’s dominance over and separation from the
membership, impressing ‘upon the most revolutionary of parties an indelible
stamp of conservatism’. Yet, this became inevitable with the deproletarianising of
the party’s most capable members who, upon elevation to the party hierarchy,
accustomed themselves to bourgeois salaries, lifestyles and outlooks and aban-
doned their militancy.
Similar arguments occasionally surface in the literature on Labour. For example,
Guttsman (1963) considers that after 1918 Labour moderated its position as it
attracted individuals from the intelligentsia and the new middle class. Bauman
(1972) drew similar conclusions, observing how after 1922 Labour became reliant
upon the political expertise of the professional classes. This, coupled with the
embourgeoisment of the working class itself, meant that ‘the Labour Party began
to adopt a conservative attitude towards the structure and the social hierarchy
within which the advancement both of the workers as a class and of workers and
their sons as individuals was being accomplished’ (1972: 286).
Biographies, autobiographies and memoirs of leading party members also focus
pre-eminently on the intra-party dynamics of ideological change. For example,
Brivati (1996: 138) contends: ‘It was Gaitskell more than any single individual who
ensured that the British labour movement did not take the Bevanite road.’ How-
ever, many non-biographical accounts of Labour’s ideological movement also
stress intra-party factors. For example, Haseler (1969) accounts for revisionism in
the 1950s by reference to right-wing dominance of the parliamentary Labour Party
(PLP) and the unions, and Gaitskell’s own predilections as leader. Both Hatfield’s
1978 study of Labour’s leftwards shift in the early 1970s and Wickham-Jones’s
1996 analysis of the development of the ‘alternative economic strategy’ draw atten-
tion to the machinations of factions and individuals within the National Executive
Committee. Similarly, Hughes and Wintour (1990) account for the policy review
by reference to the decisions of key individuals in the party’s highest echelons.
The party leadership’s role in ideological change has also exercised the party’s
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left-wing critics. Miliband in particular proposes that right-wing leaders betrayed
the radicalism of the party’s rank and file and the British working class. For
Miliband (1972: 373) the party’s ‘leaders are not socialists who for some reason or
other have lost their way and who can be brought back to the true path by persua-
sion or pressure. They are bourgeois politicians with, at best, a certain bias towards
social reform.’ Miliband conceded that the Left could win concessions. However,
the leadership’s ‘absolute determination to “fight and fight and fight again” to save
the party they love – to save it from socialist policies that is’ – guaranteed that
accommodations were temporary and that radical commitments quickly evapo-
rated (Miliband 1977: 47).
Finally, there are those who have drawn attention to the impulses for ideologi-
cal moderation that follow entry into the corridors of political power. In particu-
lar, Tony Benn, Richard Crossman, Barbara Castle, Brian Sedgemore and Michael
Meacher ‘have popularized a left-wing version of Yes, Minister, in which a devious
and conspiratorial Whitehall bureaucracy represents a formidable obstacle to the
achievement of Labour’s socialist programme’ (Theakston 1992: ix).
Synthetic strategies
The approaches considered above are not mutually exclusive. Indeed there have
been attempts to synthesise them. For example, within the general literature on
political parties Panebianco (1988) proposes that ideological change arises from
both exogenous and endogenous factors. For Panebianco, such dynamics have
three distinct phases. First, the party is thrown into crisis by an environmental
event, for example, electoral defeat. This triggers a second phase where the coali-
tion leading the party is discredited. Finally, a new governing coalition emerges
which, to consolidate its control of the party, seeks to change party rules and goals.
Within the literature on social democracy three synthetic accounts which seek
to explain differing patterns of ideological change in West European social demo-
cratic parties stand out. For Koelble (1991), social democratic parties are faced
with new economic conditions, social change and a New Right critique of their
governmental practice. However, Koelble proposes that responses to these condi-
tions are mediated by party structures; particularly the extent to which activists
and unions hinder leadership-led ideological innovation.
Kitschelt (1994) argues that a new dimension of libertarian–authoritarian party
competition has emerged, while the traditional socialist–capitalist axis of electoral
competition has ratcheted rightwards. For Kitschelt party responses to this envi-
ronment are determined principally by institutional factors, particularly the
organisational flexibility of the party, the degree of leadership autonomy and the
political sentiments of members. However, Kitschelt also introduces ideational
factors, suggesting that choices of political strategy are constrained by the party’s
existing political traditions.
Finally, Hamilton (1989) formulates a complex model that considers character-
istics of the state, the labour movement and the economic, political and electoral
environments, and intra-party factors. This is best illustrated by Hamilton’s expla-
nation of Labour’s ideological shifts between 1951 and 1964. At that time party
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divisions, the intensification of the Cold War and Gaitskell’s election as leader all
facilitated ideological revision. In addition, an increasingly affluent society was
emerging. However, two factors are deemed pre-eminent. Firstly, winning floating
votes required ideological moderation. Secondly, revisionists skilfully manipulated
the oligarchic characteristics of party institutions to win the institutional
supremacy necessary to revise Labour’s ideology.
Many accounts focusing on Labour also combine explanatory themes. For
example, for Thompson (1993) electoral pressures and cultural changes, particu-
larly a shift from collectivism to consumerism that eroded the labour movement’s
solidarity, triggered ideological change in the 1950s. For Shaw (1994), however,
Labour’s ideological shifts since the 1980s are explained by three sets of variables.
Shaw argues that the political environment, particularly the rise of the Social
Democrat Party (SDP), the vigorous competition for working-class votes and an
ideologically buoyant New Right demanded ideological movement. These vari-
ables found parallel pressures in the economic environment, particularly globali-
sation, the redundancy of Keynesianism and the curtailed economic jurisdiction
of the nation state. Finally, intra-party dynamics, particularly the marginalising of
the Labour Left, facilitated ideological change.
Assessing the explanatory strategies
The merits of these explanatory strategies can now be considered. In the space
available here only a very general assessment can be undertaken. Nonetheless, it
should be recognised that many of these studies offer important insights for our
understanding of Labour’s ideological trajectory. Yet, equally, a number of general
problems are evident.
The accounts offered above operate with very different explanatory ambitions.
Several, implicitly or explicitly, endeavour to provide a comprehensive theory of
Labour’s ideological shifts. Yet such general theories struggle to provide convinc-
ing explanations of the more discrete episodes of ideological change. For example,
Marxist scholars have viewed Labour’s ideological shifts as instalments in the
party’s fundamental predisposition towards reformism. However, this focus leaves
them poorly equipped to explain the admittedly exceptional but significant peri-
ods when Labour’s ideology has been reshaped to express more radical ambitions.
In addition we also find that many accounts focus on a relatively narrow range
of ideological issues, often economic management and public ownership. Yet it is
not clear that factors which explain revision of part of Labour’s ideological com-
mitments can explain the broader range of ideological revisionism. For example,
economic globalisation may have driven recent ideological changes, but that analy-
sis surely has greater explanatory purchase in relation to the party’s economic
strategy than it enjoys in relation to ideological changes in areas such as defence,
law and order or constitutional matters.
In addition a further general difficulty emerges in the relationship between
structure and agency. Materialist, ideational and electoral explanatory strategies
account for Labour’s ideological trajectory in factors exogenous to the party. But
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these explanations operate at considerable distance from the institutional
processes and agents within the party. Consequently there is a tendency for such
works to degenerate into determinist, even teleological, explanations in which
actors within the party are seemingly without consequence.
Yet institutional accounts typically bend the stick an equal distance in the oppo-
site direction. Here the interaction of intra-party actors becomes the focus of
analysis. But attention to the micro-practices of ideological change typically lacks
an understanding of how exogenous constraints and opportunities interact with
the ideological intentions of these actors. Accordingly, we are often left with the
impression that ideological movement is an autistic process engineered exclusively
within the hermetically sealed portals of the party’s headquarters, the Palace of
Westminster, Downing Street and Whitehall.
Beyond these general considerations, difficulties also arise which are specific to
each of the main explanatory strategies discussed above.
I considered above claims that Labour’s ideological movements are responses to
capitalist pressure. Four observations are pertinent.
● It is unclear that Labour’s objectives and the preferences of capital need always
irrevocably conflict.
● Such accounts arguably overstate the potency of British capital, which has only
exceptionally achieved the common consciousness, coherence and conspirato-
rial capacities necessary to enforce demands on Labour.
● Such arguments are frequently ahistorical. In particular, the Attlee Govern-
ment failed to assuage capitalist fears yet succeeded in enacting significant
social reforms.
● Even if these considerations are dismissed, an alternative strategy is available to
Labour. Thus Labour could respond to capitalist demands not by capitulation
but by demonstrating the promise of a radical programme to strengthen the
British economy (Hay 1997).
Claims that Labour’s ideological shifts are responses to changes in the character
of capitalism are also contentious. If we momentarily accept that globalisation has
transformed the economic environment it nevertheless seems unduly determinis-
tic to propose that acceptance of neo-liberal economics followed with inevitabil-
ity. Indeed, Labour’s alternative economic strategy was a response to these
developments, and since it was never unequivocally implemented in office it seems
precipitate to foreclose it as a rational alternative. Equally, although continental
social democratic parties have also redesigned their economic strategies the
approach of some of them suggests scope for ideological discretion. The Parti
Socialiste, for example, has approached globalisation more critically than has New
Labour, seeking to protect workers from its pernicious effects (Goes 2000).
If, however, we adopt a sceptical approach to globalisation (for example, along
the lines of Hirst and Thompson 1996), there is evidence that leftist governments
do not automatically incur the wrath of financial markets, and also that globali-
sation is not a novel process. Indeed, it might be argued that the UK economy has
always been internationally orientated and vulnerable to external shocks. If this is
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accepted then the economic constraints currently faced by Labour are little dif-
ferent from those faced by the 1964–70 and 1974–79 Governments. This suggests
that New Labour’s accommodation to neo-liberalism can be no more directly
read off the economic environment than can Old Labour’s dirigiste economic
strategies.
Finally, Coates and Hay (2000) have shown that since 1997 Labour ministers
have presented globalisation not as a deterministic process to which political actors
were inevitably forced to concede (as was argued in opposition) but as a contin-
gent tendency to be promoted and defended against critics and sceptics. This
implies that compliance with the constraints of globalisation is a process that is as
much a matter of intellectual conviction as it is an accommodation to material
‘realities’.
Explanations focused on changes in class structure are also problematical.
Claims that embourgeoisment drives ideological reappraisal share similar myths
of a golden past and insistences upon novelty and determinism. As Goldthorpe,
Lockwood, Bechhofer and Platt (1968) originally demonstrated, and as Tiratsoo
(1991: 50) has argued in relation to the 1950s, the case for a ‘fundamental trans-
formation in working class attitudes at this time is remarkably thin’. Enthusiasts for
the embourgeoisment thesis overlooked the substantial number of the working
class who denied Labour their votes in the past. Furthermore, as Tiratsoo has
noted, Conservative electoral victories between 1951 and 1959 were narrow in
terms of votes and originated in the collapse of the Liberal vote. Equally, more
recent changes to the British social structure may also have been overestimated.
Thus Heath, Jowell and Curtice (1992) found ‘trendless fluctuation’ rather than
decisive evidence of class dealignment during the 1980s. Moreover, while they
recognised that the growth of the middle class did present problems for Labour,
they suggest it explained only half the decline in Labour’s vote, the remainder
being found in the shortcomings of Labour’s general electoral strategy, its image
and its reputation for fratricide, in addition to its ideology. Indeed, as their most
recent work reminds us, ‘support for radical values cannot be read off mechani-
cally from social change’ (Heath, Jowell and Curtice 2001: 29).
Nor are ideational explanations without problems. In particular, there is a ten-
dency to overestimate the torpor of British intellectuals (Thompson 1965). The
fortunes of British intellectuals have ebbed and flowed (Shils 1972) and at several
historical moments intellectuals have provided radical ideas which Labour has
adopted. Indeed, it is to be doubted that Labour’s relatively radical ideological
prospectuses of 1945, 1974 and 1983 can be wholly accounted for without
acknowledging the contributions of intellectuals such as Keynes, Beveridge, Stuart
Holland and E. P. Thompson.
As Labour is an electoral organisation it would be foolish to deny that electoral
pressures affect the party’s ideological dynamics. Yet electoral fortunes are deter-
mined by various factors aside from ideology. Those minded to employ electoral
verdicts as the basis for ideological revision therefore face untangling the contri-
bution of ideological commitments from party campaigning, image, leadership
and its capacity to counter-attack its opponents.
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It is also not obvious that Labour should respond to electoral unpopularity by
ideological reappraisal. In the past this imperative did not always present itself. For
example, the Wilson Report (1955) blamed Labour’s election defeat of that year
upon an organisation which remained ‘at the penny farthing stage in a jet-pro-
pelled era’. In this the party was merely assimilating contemporary psephological
wisdom which held that ‘irrational forces’ among the electorate required parties to
improve organisational capacities to mobilise an already faithful core electorate.
However, even when this electoral strategy was abandoned it did not follow that
the party should adopt a Downsian strategy. Politics is a process of persuasion, and
opportunities arise for reshaping public opinion through argument (Dunleavy
1991). Thus, alongside preference-accommodating electoral strategies, in which
ideologies are transformed to correspond with the beliefs of the electorate, prefer-
ence-shaping strategies are available which preserve existing ideological commit-
ments and meet the hostility of public opinion with efforts to erode the public
distaste for these commitments.
Yet even when Labour has adopted a preference-accommodating strategy there
have remained areas of its ideology that were not revised in accordance with this
broad strategy, perhaps because these issues lacked electoral salience. For example,
if we account for the shift from Old to New Labour in terms of preference accom-
modation, the party’s embrace of European integration is puzzling since, as Tony
Blair has acknowledged, the ‘opinion polls probably would push us toward a scep-
tic approach’ – an approach which he has denounced as ‘folly’ (The Economist, 8
April 1995).
Przeworski’s 1985 account is also contentious. Firstly, Przeworski employs a
highly restrictive definition of the working class that seems essential if his electoral
trade-off is to function. Secondly, Przeworksi’s model isolates working-class inter-
ests and delineates them as distinct from those of other classes. Yet it is unclear that
full employment and an extensive welfare state, for example, are beneficial exclu-
sively to the working class. Thirdly, Przeworksi relies for a class trade-off not on
concrete statistical evidence but on estimates which, as Sainsbury (1990) has sug-
gested, are somewhat eccentric. Indeed, her analysis of the Swedish Social Democ-
rats suggests that it is possible to construct social democratic positions which
appeal to both workers and non-workers.
Institutional explanations of the party’s ideological trajectory are also problem-
atical. Accounts referring to embourgeoisment of party members are as culpable
of sociological determinism as those referring to the electorate. Indeed, embour-
geoisment actually promoted the rise of the Labour Left in the 1970s as an influx
of young, educated, public service professionals, radicalised trade unionists and
feminists formed ‘a more assertive rank and file . . . less deferential to parliamen-
tarians (Right and Left!), more determined and persistent in its desire to achieve
radical change’ (Seyd 1987: 53).
The Left’s analysis of leadership dominance enjoys somewhat firmer founda-
tions. Successive studies have shown how party leaders have enjoyed a pre-emi-
nence in party affairs through patronage, loyalty, control of disciplinary and
decision-making procedures and habitual support from the trade unions, the NEC
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and the PLP. Equally, the claim that Labour leaders accept radical commitments
under duress and then abandon them at opportune moments enjoys some confir-
mation. For example, most of the party’s leadership were never reconciled to the
alternative economic strategy (Wickham-Jones 1996) or to unilateral nuclear dis-
armament.
Studies of the party membership, however, undermine the claim that the lead-
ership has habitually betrayed the radical instincts of the rank and file. Certainly
constituency Labour Parties’ (CLP) preferences have been overridden by union
conference votes, frustrated by manipulation of conference procedures or wilfully
ignored by the leadership. Yet there are also occasions when constituency delegates
have willingly endorsed moderation of the party’s ideology (Hindell and Williams
1962).
Neither need we accept the Left’s view of ‘the party as a wasted lion led . . . by the
same old donkeys’ (Bale 1999: 196), since leadership pre-eminence is neither
absolute nor guaranteed. As Minkin (1978, 1991) has shown, party leaders have
been forced to accommodate trade union preferences on various occasions. Nor
should we neglect clear differences between leaders. For Gaitskell, Kinnock and
Blair, for example, party leadership demanded an ideological lead, intolerance of
dissent and full use of the resources available to the office in reshaping the party’s
ideology. Yet, others have been attentive to party unity and have inhibited ideolog-
ical change. Attlee, for example, between 1951 and 1955, was even-handed in frus-
trating the ideological ambitions of both the Bevanites and the revisionists.
Likewise, as Shadow Chancellor John Smith refused to abandon welfare benefits’
increases and redistributive taxation, while as leader his commitment to universal-
ism prevented ‘modernisers’ developing proposals for targeted welfare benefits.
Finally, evidence for Whitehall resistance is also equivocal. For every Benn,
Crossman, Castle and Meacher there are figures such as Attlee, Morrison, Healey,
Jenkins and Williams who lionise the neutrality and amenability of civil servants.
It is also noteworthy that accounts of civil service resistance exclude the 1945–51
Governments (Theakston 1992). Indeed, the disappointments of later Labour gov-
ernments can be accounted for by factors other than civil service opposition. For
example, if the civil service is blamed for the 1974–79 Government’s retreat from
Benn’s industrial strategy, we are apt to neglect the opposition of the Cabinet and
of capital to both Benn and his proposals.
Conclusion: towards an alternative model of Labour’s ideological dynamics
Tim Bale (1999: 192) has called for scholars of the party to develop accounts of
Labour’s past that are ‘theoretically rooted, but empirically convincing and con-
structed’. As should now be clear, there are shortcomings in existing accounts of
Labour’s ideological dynamics which make Bale’s exhortations particularly rele-
vant to this area of the study of the Labour Party.
If we are to follow Bale an alternative model of Labour’s ideological dynamics is
necessary. Such a model must recognise two important insights at the outset.
Firstly, ideological change must be unpacked into two distinct processes. Fre-
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quently ideological change is conceived as determining simply the contents of ide-
ological commitments. However, from the work of Heclo (1974) and Kingdon
(1984) we can see that before ideological commitments are reshaped there is a
prior dynamic which places particular axioms under question and therefore
shapes the agenda for ideological change. This dynamic need not be identical to
that shaping the content of ideological changes thereafter. For example, electoral
imperatives may prompt reassessment of an existing ideological commitment but
the substantive shaping of the new commitment may be better understood by ref-
erence to the institutional dynamics of the party.
Secondly, the ontological foundations of an alternative model – its theory of
reality – should be considered. Here critical realist theory overrides the rigid dual-
ism between structure and agency, identified above. (A full account of this per-
spective cannot be offered here; see Archer 1995; Bhaskar 1997; Marsh et al. 1997).
Suffice it to say that critical realism views the relationships between structure,
discourse and agency as irreducible and dialectical. Structures are viewed as
imposing objective constraints on and opportunities for political actors. Yet these
constraints and opportunities are also mediated by discourse, shaping political
agents’ interpretation of their social and structural environment and condition-
ing their calculations. Political actors remain ultimately ‘causal’, in so far as they
are responsible for their own behaviour, but their decisions are conditioned by 
the constraints and opportunities imposed and afforded by their structural and
discursive environment.
From these insights it follows that material factors cannot always be directly and
authentically experienced by actors within the party. Moreover, no material condi-
tion can impact upon the process of ideological change without a parallel process
of interpretation. As Kingdon (1984: 115) notes:
There is a difference between a condition and a problem . . . Conditions become
defined as problems because we come to believe that we should do something about
them. Problems are not simply the conditions or external events themselves; there is
also a perceptual, interpretative element.
Of themselves, therefore, material conditions rarely determine the content of ide-
ological changes. For example, a rising level of crime, recognised politically as a
problem, in itself dictates the adoption neither of punitive penal policies nor of
enhanced policies for crime prevention. As such, material conditions serve princi-
pally to shape the agenda of ideological change.
Belief systems and intellectual constructs are essential to the calculations of
actors within the party, allowing them to overcome conditions of imperfect knowl-
edge. However, such dominant beliefs should also not be viewed as direct deter-
minants of the content of ideological changes. Rather they establish constraints on
the politically feasible options available to intra-party agents. Dominant ideas pre-
serve particular issues and assumptions from contestation and inhibit alternative
ideas entering the agenda of ideological change. Likewise, given their comparative
advantage in the intellectual environment, agents face pressure to abandon inher-
ited positions running counter to the pattern of dominant beliefs.
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Political parties are office seeking, so that electoral considerations necessarily
intervene. Yet intra-party actors face acute difficulties in discovering and inter-
preting the public’s ideological preferences and in drawing ideological conclusions
from the electoral fortunes of the party. Furthermore, the imperative to refashion
elements of the party’s ideology depends on their overall salience within the
public’s ranking of the most important electoral issues. As such, public and elec-
toral opinion certainly sensitises intra-party actors to the need to reconsider the
party’s ideological position. Yet, in shaping the content of the ideological changes
that follow, public preferences usually provide only broad and vague recommen-
dations and do not preclude other non-electoral considerations.
It is among the institutions, mechanisms, processes and actors of the party that
ideological changes are initiated, alternatives considered, policy statements
drafted, amended and voted upon. As such, it is here that the content of ideologi-
cal changes should be seen as being principally shaped. Accordingly the prefer-
ences of agents, and the resources available to agents in this process, are of great
significance. However, these actors are not autonomous in respect of their envi-
ronment, nor are they bearers of structures; rather they interpret and respond to
their environment.
Finally, the specific contexts in which ideological shifts arise must be considered.
The material, ideational, electoral and intra-party environments are dynamic. For
example, beliefs rise, achieve dominance, then fall and fragment. Within the party
formal and informal relations of power may change. Moreover, the general strate-
gic outlook of the party may shift, with choices between electoral strategies of pref-
erence-shaping and accommodation being particularly significant.
Such a model may not provide especially parsimonious explanations. But it does
promise more nuanced accounts of ideological change, and it makes available to
convincing analysis a wider range of the varied ideological shifts of the party than
do existing theories. Indeed, such an approach may prove particularly valuable in
reaching fresh understandings of the most recent ideological transformation of the
party from ‘Old’ to ‘New’ Labour, a transformation that, as Kenny and Smith
(2001: 234) suggest, is ‘a complex political problem which requires a multidimen-
sional and disaggregated interpretation’.
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Like their subject, historians of Labour have tended to be attached to tradition and
sceptical of novelty – in short, rather conservative. Newer tendencies are nonethe-
less evident. These result, in part, from changes in Labour. New Labour’s constitu-
tional reforms, its engagement with issues of national identity and communication
skills have been concurrent with recent work on the party’s past in such areas
(Chadwick 1999; Ward 1998; Wring forthcoming). These historiographical shifts
have been accompanied in terms of method by what for the past decade or so has
been known as the ‘new political history’. This embraces work associated with the
‘linguistic turn’ and more generally a rethinking of the category of ‘the political’
(Lawrence 1998: chapter 3; Stedman Jones 1983a).
These developments have raised numerous questions about established ways of
understanding Labour’s history. It questions the extent to which politics can be
seen as the upshot of social forces – an assumption familiar in studies relating
Labour’s fortunes and character to (primarily) the industrial working class, one
famously advanced in Eric Hobsbawm’s essay ‘The forward march of labour
halted?’ (Hobsbawm 1981). This ‘electoral sociology’ approach is evident in argu-
ments about the growth of class politics as an ingredient in Labour’s rise, notably
in work by McKibbin, Hobsbawm (Kirk 1991) and Laybourn (1995). It features,
too, in debates about Labour’s ‘decline’ since the 1950s, in political science litera-
ture about class dealignment, fragmentation of values and the diminished size of
the working class. Common to both are the ideas that voters’ attitudes are essen-
tially shaped by economic and social structures, that they are politically socialised
by those structures and that successful parties must respond to such developments
(Hindess 1971).
Balancing this stress on the influence of social and economic change has been a
recent emphasis on political factors – party, policies and ideas. Curtice (1994:
41–2) has argued that the British party system was in important ways immune to
social change and that ‘rather than the helpless plaything of sociological forces,
post-war British politics has been vitally shaped by political choices’. Labour’s early
growth, post-war difficulties and renewal as New Labour were, then, much more
of its own making. By this model voters made an ‘instrumental’ or ‘rational choice’
2
‘What kind of people are you?’ Labour, the
people and the ‘new political history’
Lawrence Black
ITLP_C02.QXD  18/8/03  9:55 am  Page 23
of the party whose policy or governing performance was most likely to advance or
had best defended their interests. Akin to electoral sociology, a close relationship
between voters and parties is supposed. Attempts to interrelate expressive and
instrumental interpretations have made the manner in which Labour addressed
social change the factor that influenced attitudes towards the party (Fielding
1995a: 19–31; Heath, Jowell and Curtice 1985: 170–5).
The ‘new political history’ shares much with the latter approach. It emphasises
parties’ attempts to build constituencies of support by the interpretation they place
on change and ‘interests’. As Lawrence and Taylor (1997: 18) maintain, critical here
is that voters’ interests and identities are not assumed to pre-exist their political
expression and that parties should be seen as attempting ‘to construct viable forms
of social and political identity’. Schwarz (1998: 154) argues that ‘in part the job of
politics is to speak to those whose social positions are widely divergent and to proj-
ect an imaginary community in which the people would wish to imagine them-
selves’. Parties are not reactive, but active agents. Language is important in this, but
so are political communication, internal and informal party culture, and how these
define and construct a party’s audience – in short, political culture.
Besides theoretical shifts, regional studies stressing the specificity of social struc-
tures and the contingencies of local politics (like organisation or electoral margin-
ality), and excavating a sense of popular politics in practice have further suggested
that social explanations will not alone suffice in explaining political character and
patterns (Savage 1987; Tiratsoo 2000).
But the ‘new political history’ does more than counter social explanations by
restoring agency to party and political factors. Most ambitiously, at issue is what
the category ‘politics’ encapsulates and how it is represented and contested. Ger-
mane to this chapter, the proximity (besides the ordering) of party–voter relations
are problematised – although in the hands of Lawrence and Taylor (1997) electoral
sociology’s influence over historians is more rigorously critiqued than is rational
choice (despite this also supposing a close fit between voters and party). Equations
of the two are destabilised by seeing politics as a mutative category – whose meth-
ods, audiences and contexts were fluid. Situating ‘politics’ more broadly acknowl-
edges its limits, its often non-pivotal place in everyday life and the dissonance as
much as the dialogue between politics and the popular.
The ‘new political history’ alerts historians to the manifold relations between
politics and the people. If parties are more than reflectors of social change, voters
are more than passive receptors of ideas. The ability of parties to construct or
mobilise support was not limitless. Parties were not at liberty to construct politics
irrespective of their supposed audience and were also constrained by their lack of
resources and by the resistance of voters to party appeals. Close correlation
between party and people is further tempered by their partial knowledge of each
other. Berrington (1992) suggests that there was a ‘dialogue of the deaf ’ between
political elites and the electorate, each working with perceptions of the other
informed by myth, hunch and assumption.
Voting, then, might be regarded as a compromise, representing some, not all,
‘interests’. Hobsbawm (1982: 27) has argued that ‘modern political choice is not a
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constant process of selecting men or measures, but a single or infrequent choice
between packages, in which we buy the disagreeable part of the contents because
there is no other way of getting the rest’. (Hobsbawm adds that while his argument
‘applies to all parties . . . non-communist ones have generally made things easier
for their intellectual adherents by refraining from formal commitments on such
subjects as genetics or the composition of symphonies’.) For historians, votes are
then a weak guide to how well a party’s version of events is received, since many
voters have an imperfect knowledge of parties – and even where voters are more
conversant with parties votes cannot be read as a full endorsement of everything a
party stands for. Thus parties may enjoy electoral success with a fragile, rather than
mass, popular following. Organisation and communication were in this respect as
vital components of political discourse as were policy and rhetoric.
Given this relative autonomy of politics, it follows that what a party says about
social change is a more reliable guide to that party and its vision of its constituency
than to social change. Also, how parties conceived of the people was at least as
important to understanding politics as was what the people were really like. As
Lawrence (1997: 97) suggests, ‘the perception of social reality among an imper-
fectly informed elite [of politicians] mattered far more than the objective processes
of structural change taking place around them’.
This is not far removed from a ‘high politics’, or ‘primacy of politics’, approach.
In this the ‘centre of attention’, as one of its practitioners – Bentley (1996: 13) – has
outlined, are the preoccupations of leading politicians. This focus on the ‘people at
the top’, policy-making circles and parliamentary elites, while confined to a narrow
sample of opinion, was conscious, like the ‘new political history’, of the self-defin-
ing aspect to politics – that it was more than a signal of external social factors. It
was the intellectual universe and assumptions of politicians (including the notion
that politics was ultimately a meter of social change) that were vital.
As Morgan (1983: 285–7) comments, this approach ‘applied most naturally to
the established Gilbertian world of the Conservative and Liberal parties’. It was of
less value for understanding Labour, which conceived of itself as a grass-roots
movement, countering ‘from below’ this very establishment and privilege. In other
ways, institutional studies of Labour centring on the balance of power between
Left, Right and unions, or emphasising how Labour has become mired in ‘parlia-
mentarism’, have been similarly sourced (from party conference, parliament and
leading figures and thinkers) and have duplicated something of the ‘high’
approach.
One interpretation of Labour thus questioned is the left-wing critique that
Labour(ism) thwarted the radical potential of the working class. In accounts, like
Miliband’s 1961 Parliamentary Socialism, of Labour’s limited progress towards
socialism, popular opinion is a strong, silent presence. Pace Miliband, recent work
on Labour and popular attitudes, like Fielding, Thompson and Tiratsoo’s England
Arise! (1995: 211), has asked why the view ‘that the people’s politics may have
inhibited Labour’s attempt to build socialism has never been seriously counte-
nanced’ by historians. Such revisionism has been characterised by critics as ‘blam-
ing the working class for the failings of the Labour leadership’ (Thorpe 1997: 4).
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The ‘new political history’ is, then, useful in understanding Labour within a less
reductive framework than either the ‘high’ (emphasising elite influence) or ‘from
below’ (privileging subaltern forces) approaches and in more novel terms than the
Left–Right positions adopted within Labour. Attentiveness to the interactions of
popular and ‘high’ politics also entails a more catholic range of sources.
But for all that there remains common territory, as Pedersen (2002: 40–4) sug-
gests, between the ‘new political history’ of Lawrence and Taylor and recent devel-
opments in ‘high politics’. The focus on political culture stems from more than just
the linguistic turn or critiques of Marxist and social-based accounts of politics.
Moreover, anticipations of the newer approaches – notably alertness to the fragility
of voter–party relations (if uncertain of how to treat this) – are evident in older
accounts. I illustrate this by mining an intentional mix of historical works to probe
the novelty as much as the uses of newer approaches. In addition, proposing a
more contingent relationship between Labour and the people, something I con-
tend was more generic to politics than historians have generally allowed and more
than simply a function of differences between labour movement and working-
class culture, I argue that Labour has often imagined the people to be a brake on
its progress.
Labour and the people
Touring England in 1954, journalist and social commentator Harry Hopkins
encountered classic immigrant city politics in Liverpool: ‘rafts bound together by
strands of race, religion, sectional interests and jealousy, afloat on an ocean of
ignorance and apathy’. His critical observations on voters were shared by and
acquired from local politicians. Of a Labour MP on a depressed housing estate –
who otherwise could ‘not be accused of a lack of sympathy with the working-class
tenants’ – Hopkins asked: ‘Why not plant trees?’ The MP replied: ‘Trees? Oh, they’d
pull ’em up in no time. Why, you cannot even keep a light bulb in a corridor two
minutes’ (1957: 133–4, 124).
Such expressions of disappointment in the people, for their failure to live up to
the vision and hopes socialists had of them, were legion. Labour’s relations with
the people were troublesome for a party claiming to be The Voice of the People
(Labour Party 1956). As one local activist bluntly put it, Labour canvassers had to
‘learn to suffer fools gladly or they would go crackers’ (Lamb 1953: 190–2).
Disaffection with the people – the supposed agents of socialism or the benefici-
aries of Labour’s efforts – is recognisable in Bevin’s annoyance at their ‘poverty of
desire’ (Drucker 1979: 21) or Douglas Jay’s refrain that ‘the man from Whitehall
really does know better what is good for the people than the people themselves’
(1937: 317). It is also an age old disaffection. Bevin’s phrase was borrowed from
John Burns who in a 1902 pamphlet – ‘Brains Better than Bets or Beer’ – argued
that ‘the curse of the working class is the fewness of their wants, the poverty of their
desires’ (quoted in Waters 1990: 47).
Sometimes it wasn’t so much their lack of desire as what the workers did desire
that concerned socialists. The mass media (a particular villain) was held to be not
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only deceiving people, but pandering to their trivial interests. The Daily Chloro-
form and the Obscurer were popular papers in Tressell’s symbolically titled setting
for The Ragged Trousered Philanthropists, ‘Mugsborough’. In 1921, former Inde-
pendent Labour Party (ILP) activist Shaw Desmond’s equally instructively titled
Labour: The Giant with Feet of Clay quoted Robert Blatchford arguing that what
‘was troubling the factory girl was not the downtrodden proletariat or theory
behind International Socialism, but . . . what the Duke said to the Duchess in the
conservatory’ (1921: 38).
Labour was as uneasy as the Conservatives at the prospects of mass democracy
after 1918. Ramsay MacDonald had long worried at the fitness of Britons to par-
ticipate in democracy, believing them too swayed by emotion or mass psychology.
Social progress required reform of the people – ‘You can’t make a silk purse out of
a sow’s ear’ was how he put it in 1919 (quoted in Macintyre 1977: 483). Labour was
also disappointed not to reap greater electoral benefits from the expanded suffrage
– in The Faith of a Democrat (1928) Philip Snowden complained: ‘the people for
whom [the socialist] works and sacrifices are often indifferent and seldom show
any gratitude’ (quoted in Macintyre 1977: 479).
If The Ragged Trousered Philanthropists is any guide – as its enduring popularity
with the Left suggests it to be – such was their disdain at popular ignorance that
socialists were prone to doubt the entitlement to vote of many. ‘With feelings of
contempt’ for his workmates’ conversation, the socialist Owen berated Crass (for
admitting ‘I don’t never worry my ’ed about politics’): ‘You are not fit to vote’
(Tressell 1991: 21–7). Such prejudices were still aired privately after 1918. For a
member of the Socialist Vanguard Group, a 1940s’ Labour sect, it seemed contrary
to socialism that ‘the ignorant masses should be able to veto the decisions of the
more intelligent few’ (Hadfield 1946). More common were calls to make voting
compulsory, in despair at apathy. A Labour canvasser in Lowestoft during the
1950s felt that this would allow time for ‘the important work of political education’,
and dissentients concurred with the aim of establishing voting as a ‘social obliga-
tion’ (Lowestoft Labour Party 1958).
Even at the apogée of Labour’s success in the 1940s, England Arise! has argued,
popular attitudes proved resistant to the sorts of moral transformation the party’s
socialism attempted and envisaged. Popular pastimes were subject to criticism. In
the affectionate 1951 account This Football Business – applauding the ‘brilliant foot-
ball’ of ‘Middlesbrough and Spurs’ – Huddersfield MP (and fan) Bill Mallalieu out-
lined less sports-friendly thinking, prone to surface on the Left. Reviewing ‘the
spectators’, he noted that some thought ‘watching is a sign of decadence, that watch-
ing other people play instead of playing oneself is demoralising, that the post-war
increase in the number of spectators is a sign that Britain is riding down the circus
path of Ancient Rome’ (1951: 4–5). Mallalieu’s Bevanite colleague Ian Mikardo was
more forthright, condemning gambling (and by inference gamblers) in A Mug’s
Game (1950). Baker (1996: 99, 119) claims that the Attlee Governments ‘did not
always consider that which interested the working class’, like greyhound racing, ‘to
. . . be in the best interests of the working class’, and they ‘despaired of some aspects
of the way of life of those they “represented”; politically but not socially’.
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Nor did the Second World War always have the radical effect commonly sup-
posed. In Wesker’s 1960 play I’m Talking About Jerusalem, Ada announces that she
and Dave will give up politics after the war:
I’m not so sure I love them [the people] enough to want to organize them . . . Six years
. . . working with young girls who are . . . lipsticked, giggling morons . . . Dave’s expe-
rience is the same – fighting with men whom he says did not know what the war was
about. Away from their wives they behaved like animals . . . the service killed any illu-
sions Dave may have had about the splendid and heroic working class. (Quoted in
Hayman 1970: 25)
Evidence suggests that these critical impulses peaked in the 1950s. Denis Healey
asked an audience during the Suez crisis: ‘What kind of people are you to allow a
liar and a cheat to be your prime-minister?’(quoted in Epstein 1964: 140) Such
sentiments were most apparent in the Left’s unease at popular affluence – con-
sumerism, home ownership, television and ‘pop’ culture. For Dick Crossman, ‘the
luxuries, gadgets, entertainments and packaged foodstuffs which so many workers
enjoy in our affluent societies’ were ‘irrelevant . . . immoral . . . vulgar’ (quoted in
Dodd 1999: 171). No less than did poverty, affluence excited the Left’s disdain. Dis-
approval of poverty slid easily into condescension of prosperity, those experienc-
ing it and the popular tastes it was inferred to have revealed. J. B. Priestley’s
derogatory synonym for the consumer society, ‘admass’, was shorthand also for the
masses’ susceptibility to it. The equation was made countless times in Priestley’s
New Statesman columns: ‘If our papers are trivial . . . it is because our people are
trivial’ (quoted in Black 2003: see chapters 4, 5 and 8).
The Left struggled to articulate a politics of pleasure. Dodd (1999: 172–3) has
suggested, noting the popularity with the Left of Hoggart’s The Uses of Literacy and
its lament for passing working-class values, that Labour ‘preferred its supporters
. . . heroically labouring rather than frivolously playing’. The Left’s cultural and
leisure preferences, and its strictures on what the people needed, carried little
authority (and not a little authoritarianism) given the expansion of popular
choice. Need came more easily to its vocabulary than choice. ‘Wrong’ choices and
people’s right to make them (rather than the ‘right’ choices being an obligation)
were the price of highly prized liberties in a liberal, pluralist society, not least in a
Cold War context (Weight 1994).
From the socialist mind emerged a familiar figure – the ‘affluent worker’ – a con-
sumerist progeny of the Labour Aristocrat, born as the empire passed away, but still
a signifier of the corrupting effects of capitalism and the corruptibility of the people
(Black 2003 124–54). As a construction of the socialist imagination the ‘affluent
worker’ was a recurring demon. The secretary of Oldham Labour Party estimated
in 1908 there were ‘many hundreds of mill-workers in Oldham who own their own
houses, also have shares in mills and it is this class of workers that our opponents
play on’. To ‘know that the working class in Oldham are . . . the best paid in Great
Britain’ was to ‘understand why we don’t move so quickly’ (Olechnowicz 2000: 10).
The idea that materialism corrupted or waylaid workers from exercising their
rightful political consciousness was accompanied by a host of less attractive 
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characters making clear socialist suspicions of the people: in the 1950s, ‘Jimmy
Green’ (green by both name and political nature); and, between the wars, ‘Henry
Dubb’ (‘Quair’ 1953: 139). The gendering of these epitomes relays something of
the pre-1918 assumptions current in party culture, although women (notably as
consumers) were regularly singled out for criticism. Francis (1997: 217) argues
that Jay’s ‘Whitehall gentleman’ revealed ‘hidden assumptions about the essential
“infantilism” of women’. According to Macintyre (1977: 487–8) Dubb ‘represented
the apathetic mass whom Labour could never convert’, but also ‘consoled the elect
in their conviction that they were right and their audience manifestly dim-witted’.
Despite projecting a less-than-flattering image of cloth-capped voters, Dubb fea-
tured in Labour propaganda. ‘Labour’s Own Press Campaign’, securing Daily
Herald sales, showed Dubb being clubbed on the head by a press baron – the cere-
bral consequences of buying the baron’s paper (Labour Party and Trades Union
Congress 1929).
Disappointment at post-war social change was a leitmotif of activist nostalgia.
Arthur Barton depicted ‘Uncle Jim’ in his 1967 novel, Two Lamps in Our Street:
He saw slums wiped out . . . council houses multiplied . . . a forest of television aerials
and car of sorts at every other house . . . the bairns’ bairns come down the street in
pseudo-Edwardian finery where their ragged parents had played. And he puzzled over
the emptiness of heart and mind that a security beyond his modest hopes had brought
. . . An old fighter whose victory had turned sour . . . ‘What went wrong, hinney?’ he
asked. (Quoted in McCord 1979: 260–1)
Annoyance at what the people didn’t do, rather than what they did, remained
common. Labour’s Leeds Weekly Citizen’s columnist ‘Candida’ (1953) argued that
on price rises the Conservatives were able to ‘trick’ the people, because too many
‘expect so little of life and ask far, far too little’. It is in this context that Hobsbawm’s
review of Miliband’s Parliamentary Socialism in New Left Review should be read.
Agreeing that parliamentarism and its leaders (‘sheep in sheep’s clothing’) con-
strained Labour’s radicalism, he added that ‘a fundamental weakness of the move-
ment’ was ‘the damned modesty of the British worker’s demands’ (Hobsbawm
1961: 64–6).
If laments peaked in the 1950s, they were not extinct in later years. O’Farrell’s
blithe account (1998) of the 1980s’ Labour Party shows that a range of prejudices
and assumptions about lifestyle continued to flourish. Tony Benn was heard to
express ‘disgust at the vulgar decoration of recently purchased council houses’
(Dodd 1999: 171). All told, this mode of thought calls to mind Brecht’s 1952 poem
The Solution:
Stating that the people
Had forfeited the confidence of the government
And could win it back only
By redoubled efforts. Would it not be easier
In that case for the government
To dissolve the people
And elect another? (Quoted in Rosen and Widgery 1996: 95)
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Short of so doing, what could Labour do if the people didn’t behave as the party
hoped? As argued here, it could castigate them. Those blaming voters for Labour’s
election defeat in 1959 reminded Hugh Gaitskell ‘of Oscar Wilde’s remark: ‘“The
play was a great success, but the audience was a failure”’ (Labour Party 1959: 106).
The State, Jay’s Whitehall experts, offered another recourse from the people’s per-
ceived shortcomings. Orwell highlighted the dilemma this posed: ‘In the popular
regard Labour is the party that stands for . . . a free health service . . . free milk for
schoolchildren’, he noted in 1949, ‘rather than the party that stands for socialism’
(quoted in Shelden 1992: 436–7). His fear was that without deeper popular sup-
port, Labour would be tempted to introduce change summarily. To Michael
Young, the 1945 manifesto’s chief author, Labour did seem to be erring from its
supporters towards bureaucratic solutions, and he suggested a vacant cabinet seat
to represent the ‘unknown constituent’ (Guardian, 16 January 2002). Herbert
Morrison worried about the popular response to Labour’s efforts and whether
‘human imperfections will convert the dream of the reformers into just another
bit of bureaucratic routine’ (quoted in Fielding 1995b: 24). Public ownership,
notably in 1950s’ debates about commercial television, was in Labour’s mind a
device not only for economic democracy but for the cultural control and
improvement of the people – to protect them (and Labour) from their own tastes
(Black 2001).
England Arise! proposes that Labour was less bureaucratic than critics (Left and
Right) have suggested. However, the Left’s officiousness was not only a feature of
its statism. A 1919 ILP poster, for instance, illustrated socialist change in terms of
‘a grammar lesson’ – the shift from ‘my wealth’ to ‘our wealth’ – that required the
‘possessive case’ be ‘correctly used’ (Independent Labour Party 1919). Clever as this
was, the Left could easily come across as syntactic pedants or as self-righteous.
Equally, attempts to encourage participation in civil society came up against the
indifference of the majority and a generally unfavourable political culture. The fate
met by alternative left-wing offerings hints at this. Travel, sports or cultural proj-
ects – from Clarion cyclists to Wesker’s Centre 42 – invariably floundered against
commercial competition and majority opinion or functioned as marginal sub-cul-
tures alongside rather than counter to the mainstream.
Another response was to incorporate into its strategy the fallibilities Labour per-
ceived in its audience. Tiratsoo (2000: 295–6) argues that as early as the 1920s
Labour was aware of its limited appeal among urban workers and of the need to
compound this with other support. Shifts in Labour’s publicity (television, poll-
sters and modern marketing) from the 1960s took place as its circumspect opinion
of voters lessened resistance to new techniques. Much as Labour disliked it, so it
was argued, ‘the average Labour-inclined ITV-viewing voter has got to be got at in
the style to which he has become accustomed – simply, repetitively, irrationally’
(Rowland 1960: 351). The weaknesses Labour perceived in its audience were to be
an axis of its publicity (Black 2003: 155–87).
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Theories
The New Left also theorised Labour’s shortcomings in relation to those of the
working class. Perry Anderson’s article ‘Origins of the present crisis’ (1992: 33–7)
proposed that ‘in England a supine bourgeoisie produced a supine proletariat’,
with ‘an immovable corporate class consciousness’ but ‘almost no hegemonic ide-
ology’. This defensive consciousness and the paucity of theory were embodied in
Labour, and its limitations were then for Anderson those of the material with
which it worked. In short, ‘the density and specificity of English working-class cul-
ture . . . limited its political range and checked the emergence of a more ambitious
socialism’. Anderson’s approach has been influential, notably on Stedman Jones’s
early work. Stedman Jones held that ‘with the foundation of the Labour Party’, in
1900, ‘the now enclosed and defensive world of working-class culture had in effect
achieved its apotheosis’ (1983b: 238).
Concluding Classes and Cultures, McKibbin (1998: 534–5) echoes those themes.
The reforming scope of the Attlee Governments was ‘so circumscribed’, McKibbin
argues, because ‘the expressed wishes of Labour voters were not much less cir-
cumscribed’. Labour’s 1945 voters remained culturally conservative, more content
with commercial culture than alternatives, and had little interest in reforming ‘civil
society’. Labour’s failure was to not create a more conducive political culture –
either constitutionally or by challenging the institutions and the mores at large in
civil society.
Labour’s social base, in short, governed its actions. This framework leaves little
space for the frustrations expressed when Labour’s ambitions conflicted with its
constituency’s, outlined in this chapter. But it does explain why, elsewhere, McK-
ibbin (1990: 34–5, n.104) finds the ‘popularity’ of The Ragged Trousered Philan-
thropists ‘almost inexplicable’, given its critical tone towards working-class
attitudes. Yet this was the very source of its popularity – that Tressell’s socialist
character Owen voiced the doubts many on the Left harboured about the masses,
their tastes and struggles with these.‘Leninist tract’ Tressell’s work may be, but such
cultural elitism and moral (not to mention political) vanguardism were not con-
fined to Marxist circles.
The pervasiveness of these critical sentiments derives from their eclecticism.
Fabian faith in the dispassionate expert and non-conformism are well-established
parts of Labour’s cultural make-up. Collini (1991: 83) has traced ‘the slightly
patronizing tone and somewhat aggressive personal austerity’ that were ‘distinctive
features of many of the Labour Party’s intellectuals . . . until at least the 1950s’ to
ideas of altruism and service that from the late Victorian period ‘enjoyed a long life
among “progressive” members of the educated class’. Another Victorian liberal
inheritance was a belief in elite, ‘high’ culture above commercial, mass, popular
culture (Waters 1990: 191–5).
Orwell’s The Road to Wigan Pier (1937) mordantly imprecated the personal
foibles (like dress or diet) of socialists, which he felt derived from Liberal non-con-
formism. The Left, as Wilson (1983) has it, long wore questions of fashion uneasily
– whether discarding them as simply trivial and superficial or, donning the critical
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theory of the Frankfurt School, applying them in critique of mass culture. Its puri-
tanism meant that ‘the charge of socialist dreariness’ stuck. Socialist bugbears have
been various – Hollywood, alcohol, debt and suburbia, among others. Samuel
(1988) has highlighted attempts to escape materialist living, moral fads – the
‘simple life’, temperance, social purity – in socialist sub-culture, arguing that
socialists were a ‘people apart’, convinced that they knew better – moral absolutists
not pluralists. For Macintyre (1977: 484) Labour had a positivist view of human
evolution from a primitive to rational mindset, which would account for its
rhetorical references to the herd-like masses. For Fielding (2001) Labour’s politics
by mid-century adhered to a particular vision of the electorate – optimistic,
worthy, but highly partial and disabled by post-war social change. Widgery (1989:
115) complained that at the close of the 1970s the Left was defining ‘the political’
too narrowly, and lacked ‘cultural variety in communicating its ideas’ to appeal to
emotional besides economic interests.
Popular(?) politics
As the New Left demonstrated, Labour was not unique in exhibiting these critical
qualities. Across the Western European Left, post-war affluence was commonly
sniffed at (Sassoon 1997: 196). In America, too, Richard Ellis (1998: 73, 275) has
highlighted a recurring tendency towards ‘illiberal egalitarianism’ in Left, radical
movements from abolitionism through progressivism to the 1960s’ New Left.
Whilst reformers ‘blame oppressive institutions for the current degradation . . . of
people’, this ‘often seeps through to disdain for the people themselves, who appear
quite content to live lives that to egalitarians seem shallow and inauthentic, mate-
rialistic and selfish’. Thumbing one’s nose at the masses, however characteristic of
protest culture, rarely assisted a mass movement.
In Britain mistrust of voters was not hard to detect among Conservatives. In
1933 Austin Hudson, chair of the Conservative London Metropolitan Area,
bemoaned the party’s supposed supporters: ‘It is amazing to me to find the
number of wealthy men and women who would be prepared to lose quite large
sums of money at cards, yet who will not even subscribe £1 a year to assist those
. . . fighting a battle in which they are so vitally interested’. Hudson had ‘reckoned
without the apathy of the average “Conservative”‘ (The Times, 4 April 1933). In
Davies’s pithy account of popular politics in the Calder Valley during the 1997 elec-
tion – one voter tells: ‘I’ll be voting . . . I’ll decide how when I’ve got five minutes’
– a Conservative admitted that ‘calling the electorate naïve’ (which Davies felt
explained much about that party’s defeat) ‘was not, for an aspiring politician, too
clever’ (1998: 203, 277, 299).
If particularly pressing for Labour’s claim to be the people’s party, elitism and
disparagement of ‘the people’ were clearly endemic to British political culture. It
was ingrained in the benign façade of the constitution (Colls 1998). Bagehot’s The
English Constitution of 1867 held government to be best rendered by ‘the educated
“ten thousand”’, in comparison to whom the people were ‘narrow-minded, unin-
telligent, incurious’ (1983: 63, 246–51). Crossman (1963: 56–7) introduced a 1963
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edition of Bagehot. Though optimistic that the ‘passivity of the people’ might soon
pass, he noted post-war affluence had seen new concentrations of power occur
‘unnoticed by an indifferent electorate which behaves with that deference Bagehot
claimed to be the essential precondition of political stability in a free society’.
If, as Taylor (2000) proposes, Labour was more attached (as a moderniser) to the
constitution than has been assumed, it certainly absorbed some of its prejudices.
Morrison, with Crossman among the party’s chief constitutional reformers, dis-
closes some in his doting account Government and Parliament. In the section
‘Public opinion’, Morrison (1959: 169) inclined towards ‘a respect and not a con-
tempt for the general body of good citizens.’ But (echoing MacDonald’s misgiv-
ings) where the people became ‘swept by an emotion’ which ‘leads them to wrong
conclusions’ (regarding his decision as home secretary to end the Mosleys’s deten-
tion) Morrison turned to the ‘less sympathetic language’ of Liberal William Har-
court. Harcourt advised that, ‘to be firm when the vulgar are undecided, to be calm
in the midst of passion . . . are the characteristics of those who are fit to be the
rulers of men’.
If socialists were ‘people apart’, this was augmented by the otherness of politics
itself. For Berrington (1992: 72) this boiled down to the fact that ‘the politician is
a politician’ and thus ‘will be psychologically untypical of the electorate’, because
while ‘for ordinary voters, politics is often peripheral; for the MP it is the chief,
perhaps the only, interest in life’. As a function of the minority character of poli-
tics per se, this was true of elites and activists alike. Political sociologist Rose
(1965: 94) estimated that one in every 250 electors was a party activist. Based
around a study of Brighton’s Kemptown district, Forester (1973 and 1976: 99)
found ‘constituency Labour parties’ to ‘have only played a limited role in the com-
munity’. Roberts’s account of early twentieth-century Salford likewise stressed
politics’ limited presence. The ‘Conservative Club, except . . . at election times,
didn’t appear to meddle with politics at all’ and was more ‘notable . . . for a union
jack in the window and . . . brewer’s dray at the door’ (Roberts 1973: 16–17, 28).
Most paid scant attention to the Marxist ‘ranters’ because ‘the problems of the
“proletariat”, they felt, had little to do with them’. Despite this (and thereby
emphasising how Labour’s electoral support was not contingent upon a strong
appreciation of its policies) Labour’s support grew after the war and its 1923 
triumph was wildly celebrated.
The limits to formal participation curbs reading politics as a barometer of social
change or popular interests. Rose (1965: 93) hazarded that ‘the proportion of the
adult population actively participating in politics’ was ‘scarcely higher’ than it had
been before 1832. Labour might aspire to regard ‘electors, not as voting fodder to
be shepherded to a polling station . . . but as partners in a common enterprise’, as
Tawney put it (Forester 1976: 57), but apathy made this hard to manage. Labour
was frustrated by the ‘apolitical sociability’ – the notion that ‘it was the Labour
Party which dragged “politics” into everything, which took everything so “seri-
ously”’ – which McKibbin holds (1998: 96–8) was characteristic of middle-class
mores and an inter-war Conservatism that contrived to ‘not talk about politics
much’. Yet while McKibbin’s (revealing) opinion that ‘never to talk about politics
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or religion is . . . never to talk about two of the most interesting subjects in human
history’ might appeal to historians of politics – would, historically, most Britons
share such enthusiasm?
Historians might decode ‘apathy’ in terms of activists’ frustration or popular
mistrust of party (or, as McKibbin infers, in terms of Labour’s reticence). They
might also situate it in terms of the limits to popular interest in politics or to a par-
ticipatory political culture. In his account of inter-war leisure Jones (1986: 162–3)
notes how attempts to pose a popular alternative to the pub, football ground and
racecourse failed because ‘the majority of workers . . . had neither heard about
socialist recreational organizations nor bothered themselves with Labour’s atti-
tudes to the theatre or cinema’. Assessing Labour’s encouragement of involvement
in town planning decisions in the 1940s, Tiratsoo (1998: 152–3) has concluded
that it was not only ‘the character of the local planning process’, but that ‘popular
attitudes acted to constrain rather than facilitate Labour plans’.
Popular attitudes notwithstanding, parties often did not measure up to voters’
expectations. Local elections in April 1970 saw The Times’ letters’ page illuminated
by grumbling: ‘[A] lot is said about the apathy of the constituents. What about the
apathy of the candidates?’ A new voter (the voting age was cut to 18 in 1969) won-
dered, ‘with such apathy on the part of the parties . . . how can they . . . complain
about a similarly unimpassioned response on the part of the electorate?’ Birming-
ham Borough Labour Party’s chief organiser Richard Knowles found this ‘less than
fair’, and retorted that ‘the candidate and his friends are doing voluntary work for
the community’. An Edgware voter was ‘surprised that so many appear mystified
by this apathy’, as his ‘experience . . . living in London for . . . 70 years’ was that it
was ‘hard to find what difference either party makes to the day to day life of the pri-
vate citizen’ (The Times, 11, 13 and 14 February 1970).
Labour politicians discerned the gap between politics and everyday life. ‘We
must face it’, Gaitskell (1954: 3, 10) admitted, ‘politics is still looked upon in many
quarters as a slightly odd, somewhat discreditable . . . occupation.’ Bus conductors,
Labour’s soon-to-be-leader noted, announced Parliament Square by crying
‘[A]nyone here for the gas house?’Yet, ultimately, he ‘suspected that the public view
of [politics] as insincere . . . is due more than anything to a failure to realise the
nature of party system’. In other words, Gaitskell believed the limits to politics lay
in popular thinking not political discourse. Differences between political and pop-
ular interests had ramifications. Squaring the interests of members and voters was
a thankless task for party leaders. Jefferys (1999: xiv–xv) has noted that (excepting
MacDonald before 1931) the ‘popularity among the party faithful’ of Labour lead-
ers has been ‘in inverse relationship to the standing of a leader among the voters at
large’. Wilson and Blair commanded more popular support, but less party affec-
tion, than Foot or Hardie.
As evident are tensions between Labour as a people’s voice and as a socialist
voice or, as Lawrence (1998: 263) has pointed out, between a desire to represent the
people and to improve them. Belief in humans’ capacity to improve presupposed
a current need for improvement. Labour’s progressive dilemma was to articulate
reform without criticising (and risking losing the support of) those they hoped
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reform would benefit – this often made building alliances of support difficult. Pre-
scriptive and ethical language allowed the Tories to paint Labour as bureaucratic,
interfering or moralising, where they were able to pose as dealing with people as
they were not as they might or ought to be; though, as Green (1997) and Jarvis
(1997: 140) maintain, Conservatives were also uncertain and untrusting of the
fickle mass electorate – their popular support hard won more than innate.
Such criticisms were not the only or dominant attitudes within Labour, but a
significant undercurrent across time and all quarters of the party. Macintyre (1977:
488) notes such sentiments in the 1920s were less prevalent amongst Labour’s ex-
Liberal, Trade Union and left-wing cohorts. Nor were non-conformist impulses
absent from working-class culture. Rather this chapter, acknowledging that the
Left could be frustrated by popular opinion and apathy, emphasises its frustration
with what it alleged to be the people’s complacencies and ambitions (or lack of),
and contends that these disclose less about the electorate than about the ways
Labour imagined them.
That earlier studies, like Forester’s or Drucker’s mapping of Labour’s world,
anticipate more recent concerns in their awareness of the complexities of relating
parties and voters and how Labour’s own culture has shaped visions of the people,
suggests that the ‘new political history’ is not so novel. There is in it a strong trace
of what Green (1997: 177) refers to as ‘the primacy of politics’ – insisting on the
self-determining qualities of politics. Lawrence and Taylor (1997: 18) admit that
the ‘need for parties to mobilise and forge stable coalitions of interests is not an
idea which is absent from the electoral sociology model’, but that invariably this
‘assumed that voter interests . . . are predetermined . . . only requiring recognition
and expression by the parties’.
Traces of the newer approaches are evident in the old. Beer’s classic study
Modern British Politics argued parties ‘aggregate the demands of a large number of
groups in the electorate’ and, while ‘under pressure from such opinion’, also (with
the mass media) went ‘a long way toward creating these opinions’ (1965: 347–8,
406). Regarding parties akin to advertisers ‘bidding’ for consumers, Beer alleged
that voters ‘demands . . . did not arise autonomously from the immediate experi-
ence . . . but very largely from the interactions of that experience with interpreta-
tions offered by organizations, especially the political parties’. Miliband’s
Parliamentary Socialism (1961: 339), too, while in many ways a traditional ‘high’
study, argued that Labour’s difficulties at the end of the 1950s lay in its own ‘fear of
the electorate . . . never had Labour leaders been so haunted by a composite image
of the potential Labour voter as quintessentially petit-bourgeois and therefore liable
to be frightened off by a radical alternative’.
Whilst perhaps not so new, these approaches offer historians superior ways of
understanding Labour. Rather than supposing it some unique organisation, pecu-
liarly ‘British’ or warranting a specific approach (‘Labour history’) it situates
Labour in a broader re-thinking of political history.
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This chapter assesses the contribution made to analysis of the Labour Party and
labour history by thinkers of the British New Left. In part constituted in opposi-
tion to old left tendencies, including Labour, the British New Left took an inde-
pendent, broadly Marxist, position. Its thinkers thus offered theoretically
informed analyses of the party and its role – mainly, as will be seen, in terms of the
category labourism – that were highly critical. They were preoccupied in particu-
lar with the question of whether the Labour Party and movement could be the car-
rier of socialist ideas and policies, and, for the most part, concluded that it could
not. Despite this, New Left activists and thinkers were at various times involved in
practical political interventions which were aimed at pushing the party in a left-
ward direction. At other times (or even simultaneously) New Left intellectuals
insisted on the need for the creation of a new political vehicle, leftward of Labour,
and in competition with it. Yet attempts to create such a vehicle were only half-
heartedly pursued. Overall, then, it must be said at the outset that the New Left dis-
played a profound ambivalence in its attitude to Labour. Despite the prevalence of
analyses which were inclined to view the Labour Party’s role as functional for the
maintenance of British capitalism, and the Party as in some senses a positive obsta-
cle to change in a leftward direction, the New Left in its various manifestations
remained unable to offer any resolution of the strategic political problem posed for
socialists by the party’s existence and pre-eminence among the organisations of the
Left.
What must also be noted from the outset is that, given the ideological trajectory
the Labour Party has followed, and the balance of its electoral fortunes during the
period in question (from 1956 to the present), New Left interpretations of Labour
have been somewhat marginal in political terms. Yet, notwithstanding these
caveats, New Left critiques have furnished us with insights which continue to offer
a fruitful avenue for explanation and analysis of New Labour and the contempo-
rary British political scene. What is enduringly distinctive and valuable about New
Left critiques of Labour and labourism is that they have sought to place analysis of
the party, its history and its role within the broadest possible context. Also crucial
has been the theoretical context – writers of the New Left have been concerned to
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apply the gains of a broadened corpus of Marxist theory (especially Gramscism) to
their analysis of labour, and this too makes their contribution somewhat distinc-
tive. I argue in this chapter that New Left writers, influenced by a Milibandian per-
spective but also developing new ones, have made a useful and still relevant
contribution to interpretations of labour. I argue also that, notwithstanding this
contribution, the New Left has not proved able to offer any solution to the
intractable political problem the party poses for socialists – whether to work within
or outside it. This apparent conundrum can be understood only in the context of
an appreciation of the complex and contradictory nature of the New Left and its
legacy, and in particular of its inability to resolve the central question of agency.
The early New Left and Labour
The term ‘New Left’ is generally used to describe the diffuse and widespread radi-
calism which developed during the late 1950s and which culminated in the world-
wide wave of revolt best exemplified by the May 1968 events in France. As students
of the New Left have established, what the multiplicity of movements, initiatives
and writers who made up the New Left shared was a profound disillusionment
with existing forms of political activity, thought and organisation, whether of Left
or Right, and a corresponding desire to occupy a ‘new space’ in politics. Britain was
among the earliest to develop a New Left current (Chun 1993; Kenny 1995). Unlike
some of its counterparts elsewhere, here the New Left was predominantly an intel-
lectual tendency, institutionally identified with certain key publishing or academic
enterprises, and formed initially by the coming together of two more or less dis-
tinct generations of intellectuals. Real differences of emphasis attended the shift
from the ‘first’ to the ‘second’ New Left, but key questions for both centred around
the issue of radical agency, and in particular the relationship of intellectuals to
society and the labour movement.
In its early – ‘movementist’ – phase, the New Left actually embodied in its own
structure and practices the very questions about agency and the relation of intel-
lectual to political work which it sought to address. For a brief period it attempted
to be the organising and intellectual pivot of a genuine New Left movement,
which, it was thought, would occupy a new space in politics. This attempt, though
brave and valuable, was ultimately unsuccessful, because these crucial questions to
which the New Left gave form remained unresolved.
The strategy adopted in relation to the Labour Party by the early New Left’s
main protagonists was that of ‘parallelism’. This necessitated both a separateness
from and a dialogue with the party. One the one hand, it was considered vital for
the New Left’s political project to eschew any organisational links, party controls
and discipline, while, on the other, there was a clear recognition of the party’s hege-
monic status in working-class politics, and of the centrality of its role in left-wing
politics. As Hall (1989: 34) has recalled, the first New Left
remained deeply critical of the Fabian and Labourist cultures of the Labour Party, of
its ‘statism’, its lack of popular roots in the political and cultural life of ordinary people,
its bureaucratic suspicion of any independent action or ‘movement’ outside its limits,
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and its profound anti-intellectualism. We opposed the deeply undemocratic proce-
dures of the block vote and the Party’s empty ‘constitutionalism’. Yet we knew that the
Labour Party represented, whether we liked it or not, the strategic stake in British pol-
itics, which no one could ignore.
Here, as with its Marxism, the New Left tried to adopt a ‘third’ position, opposing
both the acceptance of capitalism implied by Gaitskell and Crosland, and the effec-
tive refusal by the Labour Left to accept that a new analysis was necessary for the
post-war situation. With its ‘one foot in, one foot out’ approach, the New Left
spoke of a ‘break back’ of their ideas into the party, which could lead to a peaceful
revolution. E. P. Thompson (1960: 7) spoke in terms of
interpenetrating opposites . . . it is not a case of either this or that . . . It is possible to
look forward to a peaceful revolution in Britain, not because it will be a semi-revolu-
tion, nor because capitalism is ‘evolving’ into socialism, but because the advances of
1942–8 were real, because the socialist potential has been enlarged, and socialist forms,
however imperfect, have grown up ‘within’ capitalism.
This dialectical approach was clarified by Saville (1960: 9) when he argued for the
translation of theory into practice, and the embracing of all forms of Left activity:
Such activities will, inevitably, take new organisational forms, sometimes wholly
within the Labour Party, sometimes without, sometimes half-in half-out – (i.e. involv-
ing many Labour Party people and seeking to influence the party, but not restricted to
or limited by it) . . . At the same time, a genuine forward move involves a) replacement
of the present leadership of the party, and b) the development of political forms which
will enable the Left to grow within the Labour movement.
This, then, was the strategy, but how did it work in practice? The unilateralist vic-
tory at the 1960 Labour Party Conference provides the clearest example of New
Left influence succeeding in altering party policy (though not for long). For some,
the lesson of this experience was that the New Left should involve itself more
closely with internal Labour Party matters, while by others it was seen as a ‘defeat-
in-victory’, which illustrated the capacity of the party machine to encompass and
neutralise new positions. For this group, the imperative to maintain independence
from the party and continue to build a base outside it was strengthened by this
experience.
Yet the New Left was reluctant to sponsor initiatives which would place it in
direct competition with the Labour Party. The one real attempt to build an alter-
native New Left political platform was made by Lawrence Daly’s Fife Socialist
League. Daly’s astonishing victory as an independent candidate in local elections
in Ballingry in 1958, followed by his decision to contest West Fife in the 1959 gen-
eral election, raised the possibility of constructing a distinctive New Left political
organisation, in direct competition with traditional parties. After some debate, the
New Reasoner group decided to support Daly, but very significantly not as exem-
plifying some general principle of support for Independent New Left electoral 
candidates. Its ambivalent attitude and half-hearted support for such initiatives
amounted to a failure of nerve which limited the effectiveness of the ‘parallel’
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strategy; and, in the context of the conflict at the core of the early New Left –
whether it was a journal of ideas or a movement of people – suggested a leaning
toward the former. Inability or unwillingness to create a genuine popular base of
its own, together with the decline of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
(CND) and, later, of the New Left clubs, and the gradual shift of emphasis toward
accepting the production of a journal as its major responsibility, led in practice
towards greater acceptance of the Labour Party as the only vehicle for socialist
transformation. The need to build both inside and outside the party was repeat-
edly stated, but there were few practical attempts, or even concrete plans, to do this.
With the decline of CND and the local clubs, the ‘movement’ phase of the New
Left was coming to an end, and its relationship with the Labour Party altered. Par-
allelism as a strategy was fatally weakened by the demise of the parallel organisa-
tions on which it depended. The accession of Harold Wilson to the leadership in
1962 also seemed to create more favourable conditions for the New Left to influ-
ence policy formation, and it revived hopes for a change in the direction of the
party. For the most part, these hopes were not to be realised. The story of the early
New Left’s struggle for the ‘soul of Labour’ was one in which it was continually out-
manoeuvred and failed to engage with a clear purpose or a real understanding of
the problem confronting it. For Raymond Williams (1979: 365), in retrospect, it
seemed that the mistake the New Left made was never to take the Labour Party
seriously enough:
There was a general sense that given its integration into the world of NATO capital-
ism, it was a negligible organisation: while the marches were so big, and left clubs were
springing up all over the country, this outdated institution could be left to expire . . .
There was no idea of the strengths of the Labour machine, or of the political skill
which the right was able to organise for victory within it.
Critiques of labourism
It was not until after the early New Left had declined that sustained and theoreti-
cally informed analyses of the Labour Party and movement began to be offered by
New Left thinkers. Ralph Miliband’s Parliamentary Socialism was published in
1961, Perry Anderson and Tom Nairn’s series of essays followed in 1964–65, and
other New Left figures including Williams and Saville also wrote regularly on the
subject in the pages of the New Left Review (NLR) or The Socialist Register. Though
the nuances of interpretation varied among these individuals, the use of the term
‘labourism’ to denote the limitations placed upon the party by its particular his-
tory, ideology and structure, and above all, what Miliband (1972: 13) called its
‘devotion to the parliamentary system’ was a common feature.
This was not, in itself, a wholly new way of looking at Labour. New Left critiques
of labourism in fact represented and continued a strand of Marxist thinking on the
party that can be traced back to its inception. John Saville was to acknowledge the
particular debt owed in this regard by the New Left to Theodore Rothstein, a
Lithuanian Jewish Marxist who spent much of his career as a political journalist
and writer in London and whose essays on the subject, written from 1905 onward,
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were published in 1929 as From Chartism to Labourism: Historical Sketches of the
English Working Class Movement.
Rothstein’s analysis foreshadowed many of the criticisms of the Labour Party
that were later to be made by New Left commentators. The major concern of Roth-
stein, as it was for them also, was with the weakness of revolutionary socialism in
Britain. As early as 1898 he had posed the question: ‘Why is socialism in England
at a discount?’, and he concluded that it was the specific character of ‘labourism’
that had much to answer for (1929: xxi). Encompassed in his analysis was a critique
of the reformism and economism of the trade unions, the prevalence of sectional-
ism within the working class, and also an interpretation of the role of the British
State and the bourgeoisie in informing and reinforcing what he saw as the ‘non-
political, opportunistic and counter-revolutionary’ consciousness of the working
class (1929: 276). Viewing the native socialist tradition as limited, an offshoot of
liberalism rather than a result of revolutionary sentiment among the working
class, he blamed the failure of Marxist ideas to take root, in part, on their foreign-
ness to the already established traditions of labourism. Rothstein was also deeply
critical of both the Fabian and the Independent Labour Party (ILP) traditions,
concluding that even for the latter ‘parliamentary activity seemed the highest form
of political action’ (1929: 279). Of the Labour Party up to the 1920s, he judged that
‘its fortunes have most strikingly confirmed the fact that opportunist ideology pre-
sented an insurmountable obstacle to the development of a genuine, potentially
revolutionary, political class struggle of the proletariat’ (1929: 281).
All these themes were later to be taken up and amplified by writers of the New
Left, though, as I show, with slight differences of emphasis. The specific contribu-
tion of Ralph Miliband is discussed elsewhere in this volume and so will not be
treated at length here. The parallels between his work and Rothstein’s, however, are
clear. The interpretation of labourism offered by Tom Nairn and Perry Anderson
in the pages of NLR in the mid-1960s had similarities with both Rothstein’s and
Miliband’s, though the two authors referred to neither. Anderson and his collabo-
rators, critical of the early New Left for its populist tone and for sacrificing intel-
lectual and theoretical work in favour of ‘a mobilising role which perpetually
escaped it’ (Anderson 1965a: 17), set out with the bold aim of transforming the
intellectual culture of Britain, which they viewed as a pre-requisite of any real
socialist advance, by introducing and applying Marxist thought drawn mainly
from continental Europe. The Nairn–Anderson theses thus represented an ambi-
tious attempt to pioneer a distinctive analysis of British capitalist development, its
state, society and class structure.
Despite a number of shortcomings, some justly identified by E. P. Thompson in
his excoriating and famous 1965 attack, what was distinctive and valuable about
the Nairn–Anderson project was its attempt to interpret ‘the present crisis’ diag-
nosed by Anderson with the historical and structural features of British capitalist
development. The theoretical rigour of this enterprise ensured that its interpreta-
tion of labourism was something of an advance on previous Left critiques. As is
well known, Nairn and Anderson identified various ‘peculiarities’ or specificities of
British history as vital to its subsequent development (Anderson 1964; Nairn
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1964a, 1964b and 1964c; for a reassessment see Anderson 1987). These can be sum-
marised into certain key positions having to do with, first, the nature of the British
State and establishment, particularly in terms of its class composition, second, the
nature of labourism and, third, its intellectual culture.
The major hypothesis advanced was that the nature and development of the
British State and its social classes had been crucially conditioned by an historic
compromise, or alliance, between agrarian (aristocratic) and mercantile (bour-
geois) capitalism. This compromise, which Anderson considered ‘the single most
important key to modern English history’ (1964: 31), was related to certain pecu-
liarities of British history: the absence of any ‘true’ bourgeois revolution (France
was the implicit model); the priority of the industrial revolution; and the experi-
ence of empire. From this essentially materialist beginning, Anderson and Nairn
went on to emphasise the cultural and ideological consequences, arguing that these
historical peculiarities enabled the ruling bloc to impose its own worldview on the
rest of society; in Gramscian terms, it was a genuinely hegemonic class. This world-
view was characterised as a ‘comprehensive conservatism’ (Anderson 1964: 40),
whose main pillars were empiricism and traditionalism, and which reflected and
recreated aristocratic cultural and material values. All this was linked to the idea
that the bourgeoisie had never stood in real opposition to the aristocracy, there had
never been a full bourgeois revolution and Enlightenment rationalism had never
fully replaced the ancien régime. The bourgeoisie in England failed to live up to its
supposed historical destiny, did not become a fully hegemonic class and so did not
develop an ‘authentic articulated ideology’ (Anderson 1964: 41) to challenge Con-
servative hegemony.
The history of the Labour Party and movement, for Nairn and Anderson, had to
be placed in this context. Developing Anderson’s argument (1964: 43) that ‘a
supine bourgeoisie produced a subordinate proletariat’, Nairn identified the high
point of working-class struggle with the Chartist movement, a movement which
collapsed before The Communist Manifesto (Marx and Engels 1848) was written.
The lack of availability of socialist theory to the working class, together with its
exhaustion after Chartism, and the lack of any experience of a Jacobin alliance with
a modernising bourgeoisie, were seen as contributing to a period of quiescence in
the nineteenth century, when other working classes in Europe were coming under
the influence of Marxist ideas. When working-class activism reconstituted itself, it
did so on profoundly moderate and reformist lines.
From that basis, a particular analysis of the Labour Party and movement as a
subordinate and corporatist entity was developed. Nairn and Anderson used the
term labourism to encompass both the Labour Party and the labour movement,
influenced by the Gramscian stricture, paraphrased by Nairn (1964c: 39) as ‘the
history of a party . . . cannot fail to be the history of a given social class’. They
alleged that labourism was both defined and limited by a number of key charac-
teristics: the pre-eminence of the trade unions; the inherent weakness of indige-
nous British socialism and the Labour Left; the acceptance of parliamentarism;
and the failure of intellectuals to forge a counter-hegemonic ideology. The Labour
Party itself was understood as an entity which, while being based on the myth of
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‘broad church’ unity, was actually defined and constituted by the structural subor-
dination of the Left (identified at first with the ILP’s ethical socialism) to the Right
(identified with the Fabians – pragmatic and competent reformers). Nairn called
the Fabians the intellect of the Labour Party and the Left its emotions or subjec-
tivity. The existence of this Left within the party functioned partly to legitimise and
reinforce right-wing hegemony within it; the battle in 1960 over Clause 4 was seen
as a classic example; with the Left arguing for the maintenance of traditional
socialist principles (to which in practice only lip-service had ever been paid) on
sentimental grounds. In reality, Nairn argued, the Labour Party was a bundle of
disparate forces united by the myth of the possibility of an evolutionary path to
socialism.
Although the rift between the first and second New Left groupings meant that
dialogue and collaboration between them was patchy, other New Left writers, most
notably Williams and Saville, also contributed through the 1960s and 1970s to
what we might now regard as a distinctive New Left interpretation of Labour.
Saville, like Miliband, treated the party’s history predominantly in terms of what
he saw as its consistent failure to press for socialist policies. His position, like
Miliband’s and the NLR writers’, hardened when it became clear that the 1964–70
Wilson Government was not going to deliver socialist policies nor effect far-
reaching alteration to the structures of the Labour Party – such had been the hope,
if not the expectation, of prominent New Left theorists upon Wilson’s accession to
power. For Saville and others, the Labour Party’s refusal to take a stand against the
American intervention in Vietnam seemed to confirm the (reluctant) conclusion
that not only was the party unable to effect radical change, but that its role was
actually functional for the maintenance of British capitalism. By the later 1960s
Saville (1967: 67) was asserting:
Labourism has nothing to do with socialism . . . the Labour Party has never been, nor
is it capable of becoming, a vehicle for socialist advance, and . . . the destruction of the
illusions of Labourism is a necessary step before the emergence of a socialist move-
ment of any size and influence becomes practicable.
Saville’s analysis of labourism was similar to Nairn and Anderson’s in its empha-
sis on the importance of the ideological hegemony of the ruling class and the role
this played in preventing the development of an independent party of the working
class, or a fully developed class consciousness. Thus labourism for him was ‘the
theory and practice of class collaboration’ (1975: 215).
The critics of labourism criticised
By the late 1960s, then, a distinctive interpretation of the history and role of the
Labour Party and movement had been offered by New Left writers, around the cen-
tral organising concept of labourism. Particularly in its Anderson–Nairn variant,
this is an interpretation which has been subjected to a number of criticisms, some
of them from thinkers associated at one time or another with the New Left itself.
Criticism has tended to focus on two main areas. Firstly, critics have alleged an
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excessive schematism or theoretical abstraction, and a corresponding a-historicism.
E. P. Thompson (1965), for instance, famously dismissed the entire Nairn–Ander-
son enterprise as representative of a reductionist Marxism which eschewed real his-
torical analysis, while two other thinkers also associated with the New Left, Raphael
Samuel and Gareth Stedman Jones (1982: 325), were inclined to dismiss the whole
category of ‘labourism’ as offered by Miliband, Anderson and Nairn, arguing:
What the New Left analysis offered was not a complex location of the history of the
Labour Party in specific historical contexts, but rather an eloquent and polemically
brilliant phenomenology of a set of ‘enduring reflexes’, partially embodied in a set of
institutions but mainly hovering like a dense mental fog over the low-lying ideologi-
cal terrain on which the Labour Party operated . . . As a savage and innovatory indict-
ment of the malaise of the Labour Party and labour movement in the late 1950s and
1960s the New Left critique is justly famous. But as a stand in for the history of the
Labour Party, it will not do.
A second, and related, charge has been that the New Left analysis of labourism
failed to appreciate the importance of indigenous working-class culture, the native
roots and variants of radicalism, and, correspondingly, too hastily dismissed the
entire Labour tradition as non-socialist. E. P. Thompson, who in his own work The
Making of the English Working Class (1963) argued that the working class made
itself as much as it was made, insisted upon the strength and resilience of working-
class institutions and took strong exception to Anderson and Nairn’s depiction of
the working class as irretrievably subordinate and reformist in consciousness. He
and others, from a socialist–humanist perspective, argued that Anderson and
Nairn (though the same criticism could also to some extent be applied to Miliband
and Saville) were implicitly likening the English experience of class and capitalist
development to a hidden ‘ideal type’, and in their implied insistence that socialism
had to be Marxist and revolutionary in character were rejecting out of hand
indigenous forms of radicalism as both non-socialist and reformist.
Both these strands of criticism somewhat miss their mark if we view (as I argue
that we should) the New Left critique of labourism offered by Miliband, the NLR
writers, Saville and Williams, as a whole – as a developing strand of analysis with a
number of contributors. Critics were correct to identify a lack of serious and close
historical studies of the Labour Party from a leftist perspective, but, as Samuel and
Stedman Jones (1982: 323) themselves noted, this was a result of a bias in Left
labour history in general, the prime motivation of which had long been the search
for ‘an alternative non social-democratic tradition’. Thus labour historians had
either tended to focus on traditions of dissent and radicalism in opposition to the
mainstream, or (like the New Left) been primarily concerned to understand why
the Labour Party and movement had not for the most part espoused socialist ideas
and policies. True, the New Left critique of Labour would not speak much to those
requiring a close historical study of the Labour Party; but neither Miliband nor
Anderson–Nairn had ever attempted or claimed to provide such a study. Rather,
what they offered was a theoretical framework, more or less derived from Marx-
ism, for understanding its essential nature and the particular role it played in
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British capitalist development. There is undoubtedly some truth in Samuel and
Stedman Jones’s claim that the use of the ‘analytical concentrate’ labourism (1982:
325) can lead to over-simplification of complex historical conjunctures, and, at
worst, encourage a circular and self-justificatory logic among those who apply the
term. However, these methodological difficulties cannot be said to invalidate
entirely the attempt to apply a theory-based interpretation.
The second strand of criticism noted above can also be countered by a close
reading of the New Left’s work on Labour as it developed over a number of years.
Here we must look in particular at the work of Raymond Williams. For while he
largely shared the view of labourism offered by his colleagues in the New Left, he,
more than they, paid attention to the strengths (as well as the deficiencies) of
indigenous working-class culture and socialist thought, as both separate from and
contributing to the political and institutional structures of the labour movement.
New Left thinkers were broadly agreed that the main ideological component of
English working-class radicalism was a tradition of moral critique, having its
antecedents more in utopianism (literary as well as political) and religious non-
conformity than in Marxism. Whereas Anderson and Nairn were (at first) inclined
to dismiss this tradition, however, Williams (along with Thompson) emphasised
its value. Williams argued that the potential for this moral tradition to mature and
shape the socialism of the labour movement and party had been lost, and he
blamed this not only on the Fabians’ imposition of a utilitarian outlook but also
on the uncompromising economism of the Marxists who opposed them. Thus ‘at
every level, this was a direct denial of the mainstream of the moral tradition of the
British working class movement, with its emphases on local democracy, participa-
tion, and the setting of human above economic standards’ (1965: 24).
One of the more important and innovative of New Left thinkers, Williams did
not sidestep the paradoxes thrown up for the New Left by its study of labourism, but
sought to incorporate a concern with culture and humanism into his own rework-
ing of Marxism as ‘cultural materialism’. He thus added to the New Left interpreta-
tion of labourism a more nuanced and sympathetic element, taking it beyond an
orthodox Marxist approach. But though his analysis went further than those of
other New Leftists in acknowledging the value of indigenous radical ideas, and the
genuine human sources of some Labour Left thinking,Williams nevertheless shared
with other New Left writers the view that the dominant traditions and internal
structural logic of labourism subordinated and defused these genuinely or poten-
tially socialist elements. By 1967 he, too, was convinced that the Labour Party was
no longer ‘just an inadequate agency for socialism, it was now an active collabora-
tor in the process of reproducing capitalist society’. He was later to characterise
Labour as a ‘post social democratic party’ essential to British capitalism when eco-
nomic and social stability demanded a neutralised working class (1979: 373, 377).
Evolution of the New Left critique
Williams’s developing perspectives are representative of a broader trend in the evo-
lution of New Left interpretations of Labour, which, though continuing to build
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on the analytical framework established in the 1960s, subtly altered over time. In
general it might be said that the focus shifted from an emphasis on the unique fea-
tures of the British State, its constitutional, cultural and social order (the early
Anderson and Nairn theses) towards an analysis that situated the critique of
Labour more firmly in relation to the development of global capitalism and
Britain’s position within this order. The New Left approach also began to con-
tribute to a broader set of concerns which developed on the Left around the nature
of British capitalism, relative economic decline, and the need for far-reaching con-
stitutional change. In this evolution of New Left thinking on Labour, the contri-
bution of Tom Nairn deserves special attention since it both built upon and revised
the existing Nairn–Anderson approach, while also reworking it to take account of
new political developments and his own changing theoretical preoccupations.
Through the 1970s and 1980s, Nairn reworked the earlier theses, in the process
shifting the emphasis towards analysis, not so much of the internal specificities of
labourism, but rather of the extent to which the party, in its nature, structures and
ideology, was inextricably bound up with the archaism of the British State and the
decline of British capitalism: its ‘sickness’, first diagnosed by Miliband, increasingly
viewed as only one symptom of a chronic ‘British disease’. One of the fundamen-
tal arguments supporting Nairn’s diagnosis of this ‘British disease’ concerned the
relationship of the Labour Party with British imperialism and nationalism, now
more fully theorised and placed in historical context than it had been in the origi-
nal theses. Nairn situated the rise of Labour in relation to the heyday of English
imperialism and the key tenet that this coincided with an era of exhausted quies-
cence in the labour movement, and argued that the party had thus from the first
confronted ‘an epoch of imperialist decline . . . with a philosophy and an organi-
sation rooted in the preceding era of imperial confidence and stability’ (1970: 4).
He also gave extended consideration to the particular brand of nationalism
espoused by the British Labour Party. Advocating entry into what was then termed
the European Economic Community (EEC) against the tide of opinion on the Left,
he argued that Labour’s opposition to the EEC was illustrative of the depth of its
commitment to nationalist illusions and of its subordination within the British
State formation. It was, Nairn contended (1972: 49–50), constitutionally incapable
of putting class before nation in the final test. In sum,
one may say that while Labour seems . . . to stand for class against nation, it represents
in reality the ascendancy of nation and the state over class. In analogous fashion, while
at a deeper level the left seems to oppose the right-wing leadership in the name of class
socialism, in reality it too sustains that leadership and so, in its own particular way, the
nation and the state. The whole structure of the movement represents a complex
estrangement of ‘class’ by ‘nation’, a process by which a class both affirms its own being
politically, and consistently loses that being by the very way in which that affirmation
is made – via the deep-rooted national-political ‘rules’ secreted after a long conserva-
tive history.
In developing the theme of Britain’s 1970s’ ‘crisis’, Nairn returned to the original
Nairn–Anderson emphasis on an interpretation of the British situation in its 
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totality. Politically, for Nairn, the best hope for a way out of the impasse that was
the ‘British disease’ was increasingly seen to be some kind of structural break or
rupture within one or more of the intertwined elements of Britain’s archaic con-
stitutional order. Peripheral nationalism was for a time seen as holding out the
possibility for such a ‘break up of Britain’ (Nairn 1977) and, later, the split in the
Labour Party was also viewed in this light. The hope was that the polarisation of
the party might presage a disintegration of labourism in its existing form that
could enable the Left to break free of its crippling confines.
If this hope proved a vain one, Nairn’s work continued to feed into a developing
corpus of New Left and Marxist-inspired work which broadened out the analysis
beyond labourism and towards a more general critique of British capitalism and
the State. Contributing to this were – as well as central figures in the original New
Left such as Miliband, Saville, Hall, Anthony Barnett, Nairn and Anderson – a
number of other leftists including Andrew Gamble (1974, 1981) and Colin Leys
(1983). As chapter 5, by David Coates and Leo Panitch, argues, by the 1980s certain
premisses of the New Left approach had won general acceptance in much leftist
scholarship. The idea of a long-run ‘crisis’ at the centre of British politics, having
to do with the historical specificities of Britain’s political and social structures, and
conditioning the nature and range of political and economic options, became
common currency. So, too, did the idea of the structural weakness of the UK econ-
omy as causally linked to the nature of Britain’s state institutions and social struc-
tures. These were ideas that fed into more mainstream debates about the need for
far-reaching constitutional change and electoral reform, and Britain’s relative eco-
nomic decline. Particularly through the journalism of Will Hutton (1996) they
have continued to develop in the work of leftist scholars of both the Labour Party
and British politics in general.
Strategic orientations
If the New Left’s interpretation of labourism has proved influential in an intellec-
tual sense, it has remained somewhat marginal in directly political terms. Despite
its articulation of a consistent critique, the New Left was only intermittently
involved in directly political initiatives to the Left of Labour, and the central strate-
gic question that its analysis of Labour raised – whether socialists should work
within or outside of the party – remained unresolved. The ambivalence of the early
New Left towards Labour, as has been seen, undermined its mobilising aspirations
and contributed to its disintegration. Though the later New Left eschewed such
directly political ambition, and thus avoided a similar fate, it nevertheless
remained divided on this intractable issue. Anderson and Blackburn’s 1965 volume
Towards Socialism gave extended consideration to the strategic dilemma posed by
the nature and predominance of the Labour Party.
Among the contributions, Perry Anderson’s ‘Problems of socialist strategy’
stands out as one of the most insightful interpretations of the problems and
opportunities posed for socialists by Labour that any New Left writer produced,
though it had much in common with work produced contemporaneously or 
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subsequently by other New Left writers. Developing the Milibandian critique of
Labour’s parliamentarism, Anderson went further to argue that in view of the ‘sta-
tism’ of Western social democratic parties, any viable socialist strategy must be
based firmly within civil society. The task for socialists, he concluded, was the cre-
ation of a truly hegemonic party, proposing a ‘coherent, global alternative to the
existing social order, and represent[ing] a permanent drive towards it’ (Anderson
1965b: 240). Such a party, he stated, should unite the working class and also
include technical and white-collar workers, as well as radicalised intellectuals. It
needed to direct its activities into cultural and societal fields, as well as the State,
and thereby prefigure the new society in its own (democratic) practices.
It was abundantly clear that Labour bore little relationship to Anderson’s vision
of the hegemonic party; yet, because it was the only working-class party in a nation
where the working class comprised 70 per cent of the population, he judged that it
could not be ignored. Its position represented a ‘permanent chance’ for socialism
lodged within the British social structure, yet the party itself was constitutionally
unable to seize this opportunity. Some of the Left’s traditional assumptions regard-
ing the relationship of the Labour Party to the working class were challenged.
Anderson pointed out that the supposed ‘mass’ character of the Labour Party was
somewhat overstated: in fact, Labour had relatively few members and activists
among the working class, a third of whom actually supported the Conservative
Party. And Labour had no strong youth organisation and no dedicated party press.
Any claim that it unified the working class was rejected – on the contrary, in its pre-
occupation with parliamentarism and exclusive dedication to electoralism Labour
atomised its support and neglected other forms of political activity.
One of the interesting things about Anderson’s essay, in retrospect, is the way it
anticipated the contours of later discussion of strategic options on the British Left.
His analysis in fact had much in common with that later made by Stuart Hall,
whose better-known work on ‘Thatcherism’ also proceeded from an attempt to
apply Gramsci’s ideas in an enquiry into the ways and means of hegemonic dom-
inance. Hall’s early work on this theme was strikingly similar to Anderson’s in its
criticism of the Left’s fixation with state power and its identification of civil soci-
ety as the key terrain on which to situate the struggle, and there were also obvious
parallels with Raymond Williams’s arguments regarding the critical importance of
culture and communication. Eric Hobsbawm’s influential 1978 Marx Memorial
Lecture ‘The forward march of Labour halted?’ (1981) also made some points sim-
ilar to Anderson’s – some thirteen years later – concerning the relationship of the
working class to Labour organisations, beginning a debate which led eventually to
the resignation of much of the socialist Left to the ‘broad democratic alliance’ pro-
gramme sponsored by Marxism Today.
With ‘Thatcherism’ in full flow in the 1980s the Labour Party under Neil Kin-
nock, who gave a nod to Hobsbawm’s analysis, embarked on a process of ‘mod-
ernisation’ that many characterised as the pursuit of electoral victory at any cost.
The dangers of such an approach had been outlined by Anderson in 1965. Dis-
cussing the view that the task for Labour was to win over fractions of the Tory vote
at each election, he warned that this could only result in a permanent pursuit of
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the fickle middle-class vote in a way which would damage democracy while doing
nothing to advance socialism. However, Anderson simultaneously rejected the tra-
ditional Labour Left’s alternative of populist appeals to voters’ altruism (Bennism,
later supported by NLR, could be seen in this light). What was proposed instead for
socialists and Labour was a grass-roots campaign, based in the working class, and
aimed at winning ‘a permanent sociological majority of the nation’. In sum, the
strategy proposed must amount to a systematic effort to ‘marry the structure of the
socialist movement to the contours of civil society’ (1965b: 279). Written at a time
when it was becoming clear that Wilsonism, even if pushed to its very limits, held
out little promise of embarking upon this kind of transformation, Anderson
simultaneously doubted that any other force could emerge outside the Labour
Party to mount a realistic challenge. Hence his admission of the ‘abstract’, or
utopian, character of his recommendations in the immediate context: ‘An authen-
tic socialist strategy can only be born within the internal dialectic of a mass social-
ist movement; it has no meaning or possibility outside it’ (1965b: 222).
The question of how such a mass socialist movement was to be brought into
being troubled NLR somewhat less than it had the earlier New Left, Anderson and
company having renounced any mobilising role in favour of a project of intellec-
tual transformation. Such a stance enabled NLR to escape the fate which had over-
taken its predecessor, one which was also to befall the regrouping of some of the
early New Left as the May Day Manifesto initiative in the late 1960s. Raymond
Williams, initially the prime mover in this, was joined by Hall and Thompson,
their aim being to produce a new understanding of the changing nature of capi-
talism and the Labour Party within the context of a non-sectarian organisational
initiative. ‘Shall we’, they asked in the Manifesto, ‘from the heart of the labour
movement, try to create in actuality what has long been imagined in theory, a New
Left?’ (Williams, Hall and Thompson 1967: 36). The Manifesto was launched on 1
May 1967.
Despite the group’s desire to take a non-sectarian approach, it was in fact riven,
up to the highest level, by serious disagreement on the central strategic question;
whether or not it was permissible for socialists to make electoral inteventions to
the Left of the Labour Party. Though their disagreement was not made public,
Williams was in favour of an extra-parliamentary strategy, while Thompson would
not renounce all hope in the PLP. Consequently, no real strategic suggestions were
offered during 1967–68. This was part of the reason why the Manifesto movement
never really got off the ground as a political initiative; the other was that it was
simply overtaken by events. By the time its proposed national ‘Convention of the
Left’ was held, in April 1969, and the group finally committed itself to acceptance
of the need for ‘the formation of a political movement, radical and socialist, pri-
marily extra-parliamentary, but accepting the significance of a national presence’,
the Paris May and the wave of student activism had left it behind. In some ways its
fate recalled that of the ‘first’ New Left and ‘NLR Mark I’: in attempting to move
beyond intellectual analysis of the situation to a directly political and mobilising
role, it disintegrated. A key sticking point, as before, was a profound ambivalence
about the relationship of a New Left to the Labour Party.
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By contrast, NLR’s increasing orientation towards a revolutionary Marxist pol-
itics from the late 1960s hardened its strategic perspective. The Labour Party was
increasingly presented in the pages of the journal as a positive obstacle to social-
ism. An interview with Michael Foot (1968: 28) gave NLR the opportunity to warn
him that ‘young militants ask themselves today whether a struggle against the
Labour party as it is might not eventually be an unavoidable form that the strug-
gle for socialism must take at a time when the Labour government is actually the
executor of British capitalism’. By the time of the general election in 1970, far from
considering it the duty of socialists to try to push Labour in a leftwards direction,
NLR was able to declare (in its regular editorial introduction ‘Themes’) that ‘its
cringing record as a custodian of British capital needs no demonstration here, and
poses few problems for Marxists’ (NLR 1970: 1). Indeed, the sole reason for any
continued attention to the party was simply that ‘to understand Labourism in its
deepest anchorage is a condition of eliminating it in struggle today’. Writing in Red
Mole shortly before joining the Trotskyist International Marxist Group (IMG),
Robin Blackburn (1970: 1) went so far as to declare that the only principled course
for socialists would be ‘an active campaign to discredit both of Britain’s large cap-
italist parties’.
In 1972 Parliamentary Socialism was re-issued, giving Miliband the opportu-
nity to add a postscript in which he argued for ‘the dissipation of paralysing illu-
sions about the true purpose and role of the Labour Party’ (1972: 377; see also
chapter 4 of this book, by Michael Newman). At various points through the 1970s
The Socialist Register was the locus for a renewed debate on the strategic options
available to socialists vis-à-vis the party. The nub of the problem was succinctly
summed up by Ken Coates, when he said: ‘If the Labour Party cannot be turned
into a socialist party then the question which confronts us all is, how can we form
a socialist party? If we are not ready to answer this question, then we are not ready
to dismiss the party that exists’ (1973: 155). While in general convinced of the first
point, New Left opinion on the rest of Coates’s conundrum remained divided.
Miliband’s exhortation to socialists to ‘move on’ from Labour and consider how
to form ‘a socialist party free from the manifold shortcomings of existing organ-
isations’ (1976: 140) revived discussion, but little practical progress was made.
The terms of the debate were to be altered somewhat by electoral defeat for
Labour in 1979. In the ensuing crisis, in particular with regard to the secession of
many on the Labour Right to form the Social Democratic Party in 1981 and the
advent of Bennism, some of the New Left were to invest renewed hopes in the
Labour Left.
This turn back to Labour was motivated by a real hope that Bennism would rep-
resent a new formation within the party that would break the confines of
labourism and give rise to what Quintin Hoare and Tariq Ali in 1982 called ‘a new
model Labour party’. The secession of the Right of the party – presaging a possible
‘break-up of labourism’ – added weight to this view. Some remained sceptical,
however. The idea of a rupture in the party creating new opportunities for social-
ism was not new –indeed it was one of the ‘paralysing illusions’ that Miliband was
keen to dispel. The New Left’s own interpretation of labour in many ways gave
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more grounds for pessimism than optimism about the prospects for Bennism, and
the political conclusions that were drawn by some proved, predictably perhaps, to
have rested on an overestimation of the possibilities.
The importance attached to ‘Bennism’ as a force which could break free from
Labourist contradictions rested on an underestimation of the extent to which this
formation was itself a product of those contradictions. In their attempt to displace
the moderate leadership of the party the Bennites demonstrated their adherence to
the traditional Labour Left belief that leadership ‘betrayal’ of the socialist ‘soul’ of
the party was the major cause of its failures. Nor did Benn’s programme transcend
Left labourist confines in other ways. Most crucially, its goals were envisaged as
achievable without major change to the Westminster model. Secondly, an implicit
assumption of the Bennite project, if it was to be realised, was that not only was
there a socialist majority within the labour movement itself but also within the
electorate as a whole. In no sense did Bennism really address the problem of how
socialist consciousness was to be created, both within and outside the party, rather
than simply appealed to or mobilised. In immediately political terms, however, the
‘socialists in or out debate’ must be regarded as somewhat marginal given the scale
of Labour’s subsequent electoral defeat.
From New Left to New Labour
The lessons drawn by the dominant tendency within the Labour Party from the
crushing defeat of 1983 placed it firmly on the course of the ‘modernisation’ which
was eventually to lead to power, but at the cost of accepting much of the social,
political, economic and ideological legacy of eighteen years of Conservative rule as
unchallengeable. Writers of the New Left during this period offered influential
analyses of the New Right, and as ideas of a generalised ‘crisis of the Left’ took hold,
New Left opinion on Labour became increasingly divided between those who tol-
erated the Kinnockite overhaul of the party as the only way to bring an end to
‘Thatcherism’ and those who wanted to maintain a ‘resolute Left’ perspective (for
example, Hall 1988; Hall and Jacques 1983). Among the latter we may include
Williams, Saville, Miliband and the NLR group, several of whom began to view
fundamental reform of the structures of the State, and in particular electoral
reform, as the best immediate prospect for the Left in decidedly unpropitious cir-
cumstances. As it related to the Labour Party, this projection advocated that as
much pressure as possible be brought to bear on the party to persuade it to adopt
far-reaching constitutional reform measures as part of its programme.
The disinclination of New Labour in power to do more than tinker with the
structures of the State has not been viewed with surprise, however, by those who
retain a broadly New Left perspective. Recent contributions to the relaunched
NLR by Nairn (2000) and Anthony Barnett (2000) have catalogued the failings
and disappointments of Blair’s modernisation agenda, but without being able to
suggest any convincing vehicle for advance. This is illustrative of the argument
made earlier, that despite having offered insightful, theoretically informed and
empirically well-grounded interpretations of Labour over a number of years, New
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Left thinkers have been largely unable to help the British Left more widely to over-
come the political problem of how to transcend or permanently alter Labourism.
This in turn should not be viewed as a ‘failure’ of the New Left. Rather, it is illus-
trative of the fact that the New Left since its inception has embodied (the early
New left) or in other ways been the pivotal point of (the later New Left) a repre-
sentational crisis and a profound uncertainty about the purposes and direction of
a socialist project. The legacy of the New Left must be viewed as in key respects an
ambivalent, contradictory and problematical one. This is as true of the early New
Left as of any later variants.
The arrival of the New Left was a product of a particular conjunction of events
– a crisis, for many left intellectuals – which forced them to question traditionally
held assumptions and beliefs about the nature of a socialist project and how such
a project might be created. From the start the New Left experimented with new
ideas about the changing nature of capitalism and the role of class within it. In
both its early and late manifestations the New Left has represented a range of
approaches to the question of agency and in particular whether sections of society
other than the industrial working class might contribute to the creation of a social-
ist future. In their endeavours to grapple with such issues the New Left has drawn
on novel theoretical influences (finding Gramsci, in particular, an inspiring
source). The New Left’s nature as an intellectual current obviously has dictated the
special attention given to the question of the role that intellectual work and cul-
tural transformation can play.
It is easy to caricature the concerns of the New Left (particularly the later New
Left) and to fall back too easily on arguments about a retreat into the academy and
an exaggerated distance from the concerns of working people. Undoubtedly the
New Left does leave us with a generally difficult legacy – it was responsible for a
great flowering of Marxist-influenced work in a variety of disciplines and contexts,
and yet this work was completed against the political tide.
One might argue also that the New Left’s renunciation or questioning of certain
of the tenets and assumptions of the traditional Left contributed to a climate of
uncertainty and disorientation in which the New Right, rather than the New Left,
proved able to seize the initiative. Politically speaking, the New Left must be
adjudged to have had only a marginal significance. But one should not conclude
from this that its perspectives may be ignored. If the British New Left has proved
incapable of influencing political events in anything more than a marginal way, it
has nonetheless provided us with perspectives for evaluating and understanding
those events which may still prove useful.
This chapter has advanced that argument in relation to one particular aspect of
the New Left’s work – the interpretation of Labour; and it contends that New Left
writers have proved and still prove to be well placed to offer enduringly valuable
perspectives on the nature of Labour that help us understand its development and
prospects.
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Ralph Miliband completed Parliamentary Socialism at the end of 1960 and it was
published in October 1961. This proved to be probably the most influential book
on the Labour Party written during the post-war era – possibly the most signifi-
cant of any period. As chapter 5 will confirm, the book helped shape a whole school
of left-wing interpretations of the party (Coates 2002; Panitch and Leys 1997) 
and established an analytical framework that challenged more conventional 
viewpoints.
Ironically, the argument advanced in Parliamentary Socialism was, in the first
instance, not entirely obvious, and its impact on many readers was not quite what
the author intended. Thus in 1994 Paul Foot of the Trotskyist Socialist Workers’
Party (SWP) wrote that no book had ‘made more impact on my life’. In 1961 Foot
was contemplating a life as a Labour MP: Parliamentary Socialism, however, ‘put
me off that plan for ever, by exposing the awful gap between the aspirations and
achievements of parliamentary socialists’ (Guardian, 6 June 1994). Foot was not
alone in deriving this message from the book. Yet, Miliband actually saw his work
as an eleventh-hour call for the party to be transformed into an agency for the
establishment of socialism, rather than a plea to abandon the party. However, it is
hardly surprising that so many could derive the latter message from Parliamentary
Socialism, as Miliband’s attitude to the party in 1960 had been deeply ambivalent.
Moreover, by the time the second edition was published, in 1972, his views had
changed so much as to require a postscript which maintained that Labour ‘will not
be transformed into a party seriously concerned with socialist change’. Thus, while
the task remained that of preparing the ground for a socialist alternative to capi-
talism,‘one of the indispensable elements of that process’ had now become ‘the dis-
sipation of paralysing illusions about the true purpose and role of the Labour
Party’ (Miliband 1972: 376–7).
In order to help further our understanding of Parliamentary Socialism, and sit-
uate it firmly in its intended context, this chapter explains the evolution of
Miliband’s thinking about the Labour Party. It does so by analysing his wider
assumptions about political change and the role of parties, and suggests that 
these were based on an attempt to understand both objective socio-political 
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circumstances and subjective intentions and convictions. In addition, the chapter
explains both the continuities and the changes in Miliband’s view of the Labour
Party between the 1950s and the 1990s.
The argument of Parliamentary Socialism
The opening sentences of Parliamentary Socialism effectively summarise
Miliband’s general outlook. Thus, of those parties ‘claiming socialism to be their
aim’, Labour is characterised as being ‘one of the most dogmatic’ – not about
socialism, but about the parliamentary system. ‘Empirical and flexible about all
else’, Miliband (1972: 13) asserted, ‘its leaders have always made devotion to that
system their fixed point of reference and the conditioning factor of their political
behaviour’. The rest of the book develops this point, providing an interpretation of
the party’s history and demonstrating that its insistence on parliamentary meth-
ods had wasted the potential of those who came to identify with it, and so had
thwarted the advance towards socialism.
A significant feature of the book – and of Miliband’s overall approach – is the
extent to which it differed from both Communist Party (CP) and conventional
Labour Left critiques. When CP members wrote about Labour, their argument –
implicitly or explicitly – was that only the CP was a truly reliable opponent of cap-
italism because of its pristine working-class character and acceptance of ‘scientific
socialism’. Even when advocating unity among all parties on the Left, their under-
lying proposition was that socialist advance depended on increasing the size of the
CP and securing acceptance of its theses. Parliamentary Socialism rejected any such
notion: its comparatively few comments on CP policies were all negative. Accord-
ing to Miliband, therefore, socialism would not come from a more influential CP.
The leitmotif of the Labour Left analysis was, in contrast, the theme of leader-
ship ‘betrayal’. The assumption here was that, while Labour as a whole was social-
ist, its leaders periodically ‘sold out’ and diluted agreed policies. Miliband certainly
shared the Left’s insistence on the importance of the party’s annual conference in
determining policies, arguing it was an obstacle to the ‘degradation of the business
of politics’ (Miliband 1958a: 174). He believed that the Left had two basic pur-
poses, both of which he endorsed: to push the leadership into accepting more rad-
ical policies; and to press for more militant attitudes towards Labour’s opponents.
Moreover, while the leadership ‘eagerly’ accepted the parliamentary system, the
Left adhered to its inhibitions and constrictions ‘with a certain degree of unease
and at times with acute misgivings’ (Miliband 1972: 14–15). Yet, the Left still
accepted parliamentarism, something which explained its ultimate failure – from
the ILP until it exited the party in 1932, the Socialist League of the 1930s, the
Bevanites and Victory for Socialism during the 1950s – to mount a successful chal-
lenge to the leadership. Thus, to Miliband, the party as a whole – the leadership as
much as the Left – subordinated socialism to the dictates of the parliamentary
road.
Miliband’s primary argument was that, as a result of this subordination, in prac-
tice Labour stood merely for social reform rather than socialism. For whenever
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there was a possibility of more extensive change through extra-parliamentary
action, the party had deliberately dampened it down. The only exceptions to this
general rule occurred when such action was thought to be in the ‘national interest’
rather than for class purposes. Thus when, in 1920, it seemed the Lloyd George
Government was about to become involved in war against the Soviet Union,
Labour and many trade union leaders were prepared to take direct action to pre-
vent such an outcome. In contrast, when the class element was dominant, the lead-
ership was paralysed. Accordingly, ‘it was the class character of the General Strike
which made them behave as if they half believed they were guilty men, and which
made them seek, with desperate anxiety, to purge themselves of their guilt’
(Miliband 1972: 82, 144–5).
Miliband’s secondary claim was that, despite Labour never having been social-
ist in practice, it had always contained socialists within its ranks. Indeed, the 1918
constitution, especially the Clause 4 commitment to extend public ownership, had
‘created a basis of agreement between socialists and social reformers’. At the time,
however, that which undoubtedly divided these ‘two fundamentally different
views’ of Labour’s purpose was ‘sufficiently blurred’ by the party’s 1918 manifesto,
Labour and the New Social Order, as ‘to suggest a common purpose, at least in pro-
grammatic terms’ (Miliband 1972: 62). In such an arrangement, Miliband argued,
the social reformers in the leadership enjoyed hegemony. At the time of writing
Parliamentary Socialism he nonetheless hoped that ‘labourism’ – which he defined
as the historic coalition of socialists and social reformers – was about to disinte-
grate. This was because the party’s then-leader, Hugh Gaitskell, who apparently
wanted Labour to abandon even its notional commitment to socialism, had
pitched himself fully against those who sought to fundamentally transform capi-
talism (Thorpe 2001: 125–44). Miliband appreciated that there would be attempts
to sustain labourism and that, in an electoral system which discouraged fission,
this would appear a wise course to many socialists. Even so, he considered ‘genuine
compromise’ between Gaitskell and Labour’s socialists to be impossible, as any
compact that obscured the party’s full commitment to socialism would merely
allow the leadership to maintain its historic course (Miliband 1972: 345). His con-
clusion was that Labour should now transcend the orthodoxies of labourism and
become a genuinely socialist party. Anything else would mean ‘the kind of slow but
sure decline which – deservedly – affects parties that have ceased to serve any dis-
tinctive political purpose’ (Miliband 1972: 345).
Parliamentary Socialism therefore was sustained by a powerful critique of
‘labourism’, and contemporary reactions, from those whose opinions Miliband
most respected, were generally enthusiastic.Yet even they were troubled by the pol-
itics of the work (Foot 1961; Hobsbawm 1961; Thompson 1961). This was partly
because Miliband concentrated on the negative case against Labour and spent little
time exploring alternatives. This unevenness led to the paradox, observed above,
that while the author saw his book as a last-minute exhortation for the party’s
transformation, others viewed it as a call for socialists to abandon Labour.
Miliband was undoubtedly guilty of not clarifying his underlying assumptions.
The next section explores his obscured purpose in writing the book.
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The politics of Parliamentary Socialism
Miliband had been a Marxist since the age at least of 16, when he first arrived in
Britain, in May 1940, as a Jewish refugee from Belgium. An understanding of
Miliband’s Marxism, and especially his distinctive understanding of Marxism’s
implications, even though not an explicit feature of his analysis, is crucial to any
full appreciation of Parliamentary Socialism.
As an adolescent, Miliband joined the left-wing Zionist organisation Hashomer
Hazair, and it was in that environment where he probably first encountered Marx-
ist thought. Once safely in Britain, he embarked on an analysis of society and pol-
itics from an essentially Marxist perspective, but for the first year or so established
no formal connection with a political party. Having gained a place at the London
School of Economics, which during the war was located in Cambridge, he associ-
ated with members of the CP. In June 1943, however, this contact effectively ceased
as he entered the Belgian section of the Royal Navy, in which he remained until
January 1946. During this period Miliband resumed his largely solitary attempt to
make sense of contemporary developments, aided by one of the few copies of Das
Kapital to find itself on a Royal Navy vessel. Despite this interest in Marxist theory,
with the Second World War over he became increasingly critical of Stalin’s Soviet
Union and the CP over a range of issues – especially Moscow’s attempt to bring
down the independent communist regime in Yugoslavia and the growing anti-
Semitism evident in numerous East European communist parties. As a result,
Miliband continued to stay outside the orbit of established communist politics.
Miliband’s relatively solitary position on the Left was an important influence on
Parliamentary Socialism and the key reason for some of its apparent ambiguity.
For, it was not the product of a long-time Labour left-winger whose interpretation
was forged through the experience of leadership ‘betrayal’; nor was it the result of
Moscow-imposed orthodoxy. Moreover, Miliband’s analysis was set within a
broader understanding of the development of socialist politics after 1945 than
usually attempted at the time.
One fundamental element in Miliband’s wider framework was his vehement
condemnation of American international policy. While critical of the Soviet
Union, he did not doubt that the USA carried primary responsibility for the Cold
War, and that this could be attributed to counter-revolutionary and anti-socialist
motives. Furthermore, he was adamant that the USA played a crucial role in
upholding West European capitalism. In fact, he argued that the USA had effec-
tively replaced fascism as the established order’s guarantor against any threat from
the Left – and viewed the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in this light. As a
result, like many on the party’s Left, Miliband saw Labour ending its close associ-
ation with Washington as a pre-requisite for building socialism in Britain.
A second feature of Miliband’s broader analysis was his rejection of Gaitskell’s
‘revisionist’ argument – most openly articulated by Anthony Crosland in The
Future of Socialism (1956) – that post-war capitalism had been transmuted into a
less exploitative and more stable ‘mixed economy’. In some short, but powerfully
argued, pieces written during the late 1950s, Miliband subjected this claim to 
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critical analysis, which foreshadowed his more extensive treatment in The State in
Capitalist Society (1969). He did not deny that capitalism had changed, but argued
that this did not affect its fundamental character. For, in all advanced industrial
societies what he termed ‘marginal collectivism’, based on limited state interven-
tion and welfare provision, had become ‘the price which capitalism has learnt it
must pay as a condition of its survival as a more or less going economic concern’.
In fact, he asserted, no leading capitalist economy could be run efficiently without
the kind of welfare state and extensions to public ownership associated with the
1945 Labour Government led by Clement Attlee (Miliband 1958b: 92). Thus, while
Miliband thought that some of the reforms associated with marginal collectivism
were worthwhile, unlike many in the Labour Party he did not think they marked a
step towards socialism.
A third aspect of Miliband’s overall argument concerned the role of the major
parties of the Left. He believed liberal democracy had re-established itself after
1945 without relying on fascism – as many business leaders had done during the
1920s and 1930s – simply because the Left presented no serious threat. Instead of
trying to transform capitalism, they limited their ambition to reconstructing and
reforming the existing economic system. This criticism applied as much to com-
munists in France and Italy as to Labour in Britain. Indeed, albeit for different rea-
sons, he doubted that communists or Centre-Left social democratic parties such as
Labour would bring about radical change. In the first instance, he believed that ‘in
every West European society a majority of people . . . would simply not support a
Communist-led social revolution, whatever the Communists might say or do’
(Miliband 1958c: 43). In contrast, social democrat leaders were everywhere ‘pri-
marily engaged in political brokerage’ between the trade unions and capitalism –
they were not trying to overthrow the latter with the help of the former (Miliband
1958c: 46). Against the Labour Left view that all that was needed was a new lead-
ership, Miliband believed that the integration of parties of the Left into capitalism
could not be explained in individualist terms but was the result of deeper struc-
tural forces (Miliband 1958c: 43).
The above were central points in the analytical framework behind Parliamen-
tary Socialism: on their own they suggest the approach of a detached Marxist.
However, like all good Marxists, Miliband wanted not only to interpret the world
but to play a part in changing it. This meant he had to become engaged in some
form of political activity – albeit of a rather tentative kind.
Miliband never doubted that a political party would be required to achieve
socialism, and he was gradually drawn towards Labour, if only because it was sup-
ported by most working-class voters, while he was increasingly negative about the
CP. The resignation of Aneurin Bevan from Attlee’s Cabinet in 1951, after the
introduction of prescription charges in the National Health Service, and the sub-
sequent development of the ‘Bevanite’ movement on the Labour Left, probably
finally encouraged him to join. Thus, from 1952 until 1957, the Labour Left was
thus the main focus of his political activity. Miliband even participated in the
Bevanite ‘second eleven’, which tried to build up support in the constituencies
(Jenkins 1979). In 1955 he also attended the party’s annual conference as a 
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delegate for the Hampstead CLP. There he delivered an impassioned, if a fairly con-
ventional leftist, speech on nationalisation and the need for conference to exert its
authority over the leadership. He ended by calling for a ‘clear and detailed pro-
gramme to say specifically and clearly that we stand for socialism, that we are a
socialist party, and that we shall go on being a socialist party until we have built the
socialist commonwealth’ (Labour Party 1955: 113).
Even while a Labour activist, however, Miliband never believed he belonged to a
truly socialist party; it was, however, the best means of articulating socialism at that
time. This position altered slightly with the emergence of the New Left during the
late 1950s. The New Left promoted a variety of avant-garde endeavours, including
cultural politics and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, an intellectual eclec-
ticism encapsulated in the journal Universities and Left Review. Miliband found
such initiatives encouraging – betokening an ending of the constraining atmos-
phere of the Cold War – and supported the new movement. However, he attributed
greater political importance to the other aspect of the New Left: the exit of many
communists following Krushchev’s 1956 secret speech, which revealed the true
nature of Stalinism, and the Soviet repression of Hungary during the same year. In
particular, the resignation of intellectuals, above all, the historians E. P. Thompson
and John Saville, was of crucial importance to him. For, it meant that there were
finally now Marxists outside the CP with whom he could join. When invited to
write for their journal New Reasoner, he did so with enthusiasm, and, at the end of
1958, Miliband became the first person never to have been of a member of the CP
to join its editorial board.
Despite the rise of the New Left, Miliband remained convinced that socialism
needed a political party with strong links to the working class and, in that regard at
least, Labour remained crucial. Thus, he continued to be active in the party, during
1958 becoming an executive council member and secretary of the home policy com-
mittee of the leftist Victory for Socialism (VFS). Miliband in fact hoped to draw the
New Reasoner group into an alliance with the Labour Left in the hope that together
they would transform Labour into a fully formed socialist organisation. Few others
saw merit in his proposal, and, instead, the likes of Thompson joined up with the
Universities and Left Review to establish the New Left Review, a journal which, for all
its intellectual merits, never exerted much influence on Labour politics.
Miliband still remained optimistic that Labour would take a decisive turn to the
Left as he wrote Parliamentary Socialism. It was in 1960 that Gaitskell’s attempt to
reduce the doctrinal significance of the party’s commitment to public ownership
suffered a decisive set-back. That year also saw him defeated at conference over
unilateral nuclear disarmament. While Gaitskell eventually managed to reassert his
position, Miliband’s belief in Labour’s centrality to any socialist strategy did not
alter. He stayed on the VFS executive until the organisation disintegrated in the
early 1960s, hoping – probably with diminishing faith – that through a combina-
tion of pressure and socialist education, both inside and outside the party, Labour
might yet be turned into an body committed to transform capitalism.
There is one final aspect to Miliband’s thinking at this time that needs to 
be highlighted. One of the unanswered questions in Parliamentary Socialism
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concerned the process of transition itself. For it was unclear whether Miliband
rejected the possibility of a peaceful road to socialism. In truth, he did not know if
violence would be necessary, for that would depend on the balance of forces pres-
ent at the time of transition. He certainly believed a peaceful transition was the
more probable if there was a large majority pressing for socialism, but he was also
convinced that the commitment of the political leaders would be crucial. In other
words, a party could bring about the transition to socialism only if it was sincere
and resolute about its intentions. Thus questions of intention, will, consciousness
and conviction were crucial in his attitude to political parties. In 1960 he was sure
Labour lacked those qualities, but still held it conceivable that they might be devel-
oped through sustained pressure. Given the extent to which Parliamentary Social-
ism reflected Miliband’s conditional, tentative and ambiguous support for the
party, it is perhaps understandable that so many misunderstood his message.
The search for a socialist party
Unlike many on the New Left, Miliband did not view Harold Wilson’s succession
to the Labour leadership in 1963 as cause for celebration. Like many he certainly
mistrusted Wilson personally. More importantly, however, he was largely alone in
preferring that Labour’s divisions be further accentuated while the new leader was
initially adept at smoothing them over. In contrast to most, Miliband was, more-
over, under no illusion about how far the Wilson Government elected in October
1964 was dominated by social reformers. Though it might introduce some valu-
able changes, there was no prospect of socialism from such a quarter. Nevertheless,
during the Government’s early days, he was enthusiastic about the possibility of
organising seminars for Labour MPs, hoping these might encourage them to press
for a more socialist strategy.
As did many others on the Labour Left, Miliband found Wilson’s period in office
between 1964 and 1970 to be a desperate disappointment. Indeed, it provided the
postscript to the second edition of Parliamentary Socialism with much material to
justify the author’s rejection of the party as a vehicle for socialism. Yet Miliband’s
position had been transformed far earlier than that of most others on the Labour
Left who took a similar route. While many activists were frustrated from the start
of Wilson’s tenure, most gave his government the benefit of the doubt until 1966 –
when its wafer-thin Commons majority was, courtesy of the general election of
that year, turned into something more substantial. In contrast, Miliband aban-
doned Labour in May 1965 on the grounds that it would never become a socialist
party.
The catalyst for this change of attitude was Wilson’s support for the American
war in Vietnam. For Miliband, there was no question of compromise here: the
Americans were external aggressors upholding a corrupt puppet government in
South Vietnam that resisted a popular social revolution and national liberation.
Thus, everybody on the Left had to oppose this policy. While many on the Labour
Left – especially those associated with the weekly Tribune – looked on Vietnam in
similar terms, most believed the Wilson Government should be supported given
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its possible role in reducing inequality and advancing state ownership. For
Miliband, however, Vietnam was the decisive issue of the era – the real fault line
that divided not only Left from Right, but morality from immorality. Labour
under Wilson failed this fundamental test. In some ways Vietnam was merely the
straw that broke the camel’s back, thus Miliband’s final decision might be thought
to have been not an especially dramatic one. Even so, given his belief that parties
were crucial agencies in the transformation to socialism, it had enormous impli-
cations for Miliband who still had no faith in any of the alternatives to Labour. So
began his search for an effective substitute, one that would continue for the rest of
his life.
As is often the case with converts, Miliband proclaimed his new conviction with
an impressive zeal. Indeed, he was so keen to demonstrate that Labour was now an
obstacle to socialism that he became wary of any form of association with his old
party. Thus, when prominent figures on the Left held a series of meetings leading
to the 1967 May Day Manifesto, which outlined a strategy to transform Britain into
a socialist society, Miliband refused to participate, fearing the project was too pre-
occupied with his old party. Nor did the events of 1968 help much, although he was
naturally heartened by growing opposition to the war in Vietnam and by the
mobilisation of students across the West in solidarity with the Vietcong. However,
because he was convinced that socialism needed a working class marching in step
with an organised socialist party, he never saw the often- anarchic student protest
as truly revolutionary. Nor did he have any faith in those Trotskyist and Maoist
groups that proliferated in the late 1960s – while the Soviet invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia in 1968 merely confirmed his enmity for communism.
Miliband constantly stressed that democracy and pluralism were integral to
socialism, something that should be reflected in all aspects of its theory and prac-
tice. If the freedoms associated with capitalist democracy were inadequate, they
should never be dismissed as ‘bourgeois’: socialists should instead aim to increase
their scope beyond that allowed by capitalism. Socialist parties, he believed, must
have open internal debates with dissenting minorities putting forward their own
policies. Furthermore, Miliband argued against the notion of a single party to rep-
resent the working class either in capitalist or socialist society (Miliband 1977).
The implication of all this was that a new socialist party had to be established as
soon as possible, one that would adhere to both Marxism and pluralism, qualities
neither Labour nor its rivals on the Left enjoyed. Miliband had toyed with this idea
ever since his break with Labour, but made a more determined attempt to bring it
about in the mid-1970s, when professor of politics at the University of Leeds.
However, despite various attempts to promote support for an inclusive, demo-
cratic, Marxist-oriented party, Miliband was no nearer to establishing such an
organisation at the end of the 1970s than he had been at the start. Even so, he
played a leading role in a more modest initiative – the Centres of Marxist Educa-
tion – designed to promote the spread of Marxist ideas in the labour movement.
Nonetheless, his aspirations for a party that would propagate socialism to the
masses had yet to be fulfilled.
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The impact of ‘Bennism’
Labour lost the 1979 general election, following what socialists viewed as yet
another depressing period in office. Miliband’s initial reaction was to criticise
socialists who still thought their main goal should be to push the party leftwards.
So far as Labour was concerned, Miliband believed the only contribution it could
make to socialism was if it split so that its left wing might form the nucleus for a
genuinely socialist organisation. Even that he believed to be unlikely. Thus,
Miliband was highly sceptical about the merits of the campaign to change the
party’s constitution, promoted by the likes of the Campaign for Labour Party
Democracy to give activists greater control of the leadership. Having participated
in the Bevanite campaign of the 1950s, Miliband believed such efforts were mis-
conceived, as he was convinced that the social reformers in the leadership would
always control policies in practice. Thus, while well intentioned, the attempt to
make this hegemony more difficult in constitutional theory seemed to Miliband to
be a waste of socialist energy.
During the 1980s Miliband slowly revised his position, due largely to a more
positive evaluation of those who sought to take the party in a more socialist direc-
tion and especially to his high regard for Tony Benn, their standard-bearer.
Miliband was impressed by Benn’s refusal to stand for the discredited Shadow Cab-
inet after the 1979 defeat, but only got to know him personally in April 1980 after
being invited to speak at a day-school in Benn’s Bristol constituency. Although
Miliband inevitably gave a lecture on why Labour could never become the agency
for a socialist transformation of Britain, there were signs of an immediate rapport
with Benn, which would develop into a close political and personal relationship.
Thus, when Benn, backed by an array of left-wing groups, challenged the incum-
bent Denis Healey for Labour’s deputy leadership in 1981, Miliband acknowledged
the Left’s progress within the party. Furthermore, given its acceptance of the need
for forms of extra-parliamentary action, this also appeared to be a new kind of
‘Left’. He also appreciated the wider political significance of the Left’s control of the
Greater London Council under Ken Livingstone. Indeed, during the early 1980s
the Labour Left appeared to have command of the party for the first time in its his-
tory. Not only were many local authorities under its influence but also Labour’s
basic economic policies now reflected the Left’s outlook. Constitutional change
had, moreover, reduced the influence of MPs and gave activists a say in the election
of both leader and deputy leader. The old left-winger Michael Foot, elected in
1980, was seen as merely a stopgap before Benn could assume the mantle. His
campaign to replace Healy as deputy was regarded as a dry run for the leadership
itself, and, while bitterly fought, Benn came within less than 1 per cent of winning
the post (Seyd 1987).
It was in this context that Miliband became involved in establishing the Social-
ist Society, the founding conference of which was held in January 1982. In atten-
dance were 1,200 individuals who ranged from members of the Labour Left to
those belonging to the SWP and the International Marxist Group. Miliband played
an important role in drafting the invitation, which significantly proclaimed that
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the society aimed to encourage socialist renewal inside the broader labour move-
ment and help those fighting for socialist ideas in the party itself. This did not
mean, however, that he was now reconciled to Labour. In fact, he remained wor-
ried that the society would become too preoccupied with the party’s internal
developments and wanted it to keep a critical distance. Nevertheless, this certainly
marked a change from his position at the time of the May Day Manifesto, for he
was now prepared to work closely with people who were still active in Labour’s
ranks.
During the early 1980s Miliband’s respect for Benn steadily mounted. He
viewed Benn as someone who – as a cabinet minister in the Labour governments
of the 1960s and 1970s – had seen at first hand how often the party’s principles
were subordinated to the ‘political game’, and he learned from the experience. He
was also attracted by Benn’s energy, constant refusal to accept defeat and convic-
tion that socialism would eventually triumph. Benn was not a theorist, still less a
Marxist, but there was a similarity between them in their optimism. It was also rel-
evant that they were almost the same age and so had many of the same formative
influences and reference points.
By 1985, however, Benn’s star no longer shone as brightly as it had done. He had
lost his seat in the 1983 general election – a disastrous defeat for the party nation-
ally for which many blamed the Left’s policies. Although returned to the Commons
as a result of the Chesterfield by-election a year later, Benn found that the atmos-
phere inside the party had changed considerably. He had also lost his chance to
replace Foot, who had resigned immediately after the end of the 1983 campaign.
The main strategy of the new leader, Neil Kinnock, was to push Labour back to the
mainstream so as to squeeze out the SDP, formed in 1981 by ex-Labour social
reformers who believed the Left had gained permanent control of the party. The
SDP almost forced Labour into third place behind the Conservatives in the 1983
election and Kinnock thought Labour’s only hope was to abandon most of the
positions it had assumed while Bennism was at its peak. In addition, the 1984–85
Miners’ Strike which ended in disastrous defeat, and the Thatcher Government’s
rate-capping of left-wing local authorities further demoralised and divided
Labour activists. As a result, many of Benn’s sometime supporters re-packaged
themselves as the ‘soft left’ and sought an accommodation with Kinnock.
It was in this inauspicious climate that Miliband made a proposal to Benn when
they met in February 1985. Benn’s (unpublished) diary records the conversation as
follows:
He [Miliband] said, ‘You are a great resource for the movement. Looking back from
Keir Hardie, Ramsay MacDonald, George Lansbury, Stafford Cripps, Nye Bevan right
through there has never been somebody with your experience of Government who has
taken such a radical position on institutional questions – quite exceptional experience
and you must use it properly. I would suggest that you keep absolutely away from
infighting in the Party which does nothing whatever to assist . . . I don’t know if you’ve
read [the] Life of De Gaulle but you are in the position he was at Colombey les Deux
Eglises, waiting, available, a senior statesman of the left and you should look ahead and
address people when you think it right to do so but that is really your function.
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‘Have you got a think tank – would you like me to help you to get together a few
academics who would be prepared to assist?’
I was very flattered. He said, ‘You underestimate your role as a leader, we need lead-
ers . . . and I think you should take that role . . .’.
Miliband was not complimenting Benn for the sake of it. After unsuccessfully
attempting to convince people that a new party was needed, and finding it so dif-
ficult to make progress, he saw Benn as a potential leader, one receptive to social-
ist ideas. Miliband’s recent experience in the Socialist Society had perhaps also
persuaded him that such initiatives would always be condemned to marginality
unless harnessed to a figure with a national reputation. He therefore thought it
important to bolster Benn, to keep alive the kind of socialist commitment he 
represented, by providing him with an intellectual forum. At the same time 
Benn’s involvement with people from outside the Labour Party might eventually
galvanise a wider socialist movement that could lead to the new formation
Miliband sought. Moreover, while Miliband realised Benn’s importance, this 
feeling was more than reciprocated and the enduring pattern of their relationship
was established.
If Miliband really told Benn he could ‘get together a few academics’, they were of
a very particular kind, for he invited Hilary Wainwright and John Palmer from the
Socialist Society, and Perry Anderson, Robin Blackburn and Tariq Ali from the edi-
torial board of New Left Review. The group called themselves the Independent Left
Corresponding Society (ILCS); and, with a fluctuating membership, the ILCS held
monthly meetings for the next few years. Benn and Miliband each derived some-
thing from the initiative, but both were aware that they were not entirely united in
their aims. While Miliband was trying to draw Benn out from internal Labour pol-
itics and make him the rallying point for a new socialist movement, Benn was keen
to harness the ILCS to the Labour Left to help it combat the Kinnock leadership.
As time went on, Benn’s increasingly marginal role in the Labour Party became
ever more evident, as was the position of the Left generally within Margaret
Thatcher’s Britain. After Labour lost a third successive general election. in June
1987, Miliband persuaded Benn to hold a socialist conference in Chesterfield.
Organised by the Socialist Society along with the Bennite Campaign Group of
Labour MPs, this was held in October 1987 and drew an attendance of 2,000
people. Miliband was disappointed by the predominance of SWP members and
the general focus on Labour politics. Although he remained a member of the
organising committee for the second Chesterfield conference, which was held in
the following June, and continued to be a friend and supporter of Benn, Miliband
probably no longer believed that the socialist breakthrough would occur in the
short-term. Indeed, in January 1988, he tried to dissuade Benn from standing for
the Labour leadership – this presumably was something De Gaulle would not have
attempted. Benn, however, did not take his advice – something he later regretted,
for he secured only 11 per cent of the votes in an election that gave Kinnock a
much-needed boost. Miliband shared the general view that the second Chesterfield
conference was more successful than the first, but he no longer exuded confidence
that the Socialist Movement, which emerged from it, was the embryo of a new
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party. He was well aware that, for the time being at least, the Left was in decline in
Britain and that non-aligned socialists of his ilk were highly marginal figures.
If Miliband’s role in relation to ‘Bennism’ is considered in comparison to his ear-
lier attitudes, some striking points emerge about the interaction between the ana-
lytical and subjective aspects in his interpretive framework. In 1979, his initial
position was to adhere to an analysis based entirely on an understanding of struc-
tural factors. From this perspective it seemed clear that Labour would never present
a real challenge to the Thatcher Government, and that the Left under Benn could
not gain control of it. However, he shifted his position because of an appreciation
of the subjective intentions of the Bennites and the character of Benn himself. In the
mid-1960s he had written off Labour because the Wilson Government’s attitude to
the American presence in Vietnam demonstrated its passivity and fundamental lack
of morality. In the mid-1980s Miliband was prepared to devote considerable time
to Benn for the opposite reason: he believed him capable of providing the right kind
of socialist leadership. In other words, Miliband wanted to help Benn because of the
latter’s convictions and determination. This did not mean his appreciation of the
Labour left-winger’s personal qualities negated his analytical framework. He was
always aware that Benn was unlikely to succeed within the Labour Party and that
the tide was turning against the Left in general. Nonetheless, Miliband’s allegiances
were determined both by his assessment of people’s subjective qualities – con-
sciousness, will and ideology – and by his analytical framework. He did not believe,
however, that subjective intentions could transcend objective circumstances – as
was indicated by another shift in his view of the Labour Party.
After communism
It was argued earlier that Miliband saw developments in the Labour Party from an
international perspective: Parliamentary Socialism owed much to his understand-
ing of the role of West European social democracy and of an international system
dominated by the USA. It is therefore perhaps not surprising that what would be
his final position was also based on an analysis of the key changes in the wider
world – particularly the collapse of communism.
After 1968 Miliband had regarded the Soviet-backed regimes of Eastern Europe
as ‘bureaucratic collectivist’ systems that had no relation to socialism. However,
during the 1980s, when the leader of the Soviet Union, Mikhael Gorbachev,
attempted to reform the Soviet regime from within, Miliband become an enthusi-
ast for what was referred to as perestroika. With the prospects for the Left generally
bleak in the West, he hoped that a successful transformation of the East European
system into a form of democratic socialism might revive the prospects for social-
ism across Europe. If Gorbachev succeeded, the association between the Left and
totalitarianism – so powerful a weapon in the armoury of the Right – could finally
be broken. Unfortunately, Gorbachev failed and the Soviet Union eventually
embraced capitalism rather than pluralist socialism.
Miliband tried to suggest that the downfall of communism was, nonetheless,
also advantageous for the Left, given the extent to which the Soviet regimes had
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long embarrassed Western socialists such as himself. However, he was not entirely
convinced by his own argument, and in August 1989, as the East European regimes
crumbled, he wrote that, for years to come, ‘socialists will be something like a pres-
sure group to the left of orthodox social democracy’. It was social democratic par-
ties such as Labour that ‘will for a long time constitute the alternative – such as it
is – to conservative governments’ (Miliband 1989a: 36). A few weeks later he sug-
gested that the end of communism meant ‘socialism has to be reinvented’. ‘All anti-
socialists’, he went on, ’rejoice in what they take to be the death of socialism’, and
while socialists needed ‘to prove them wrong’, that ‘will require a lot of work’
(Miliband 1989b). This was slightly misleading, for he still believed that a Marxist-
inspired version of socialism was both valid and possible. Much of the ‘reinvention’
was therefore also ‘reaffirmation’, as Miliband was to show in his final (and posthu-
mously published) book Socialism For a Sceptical Age (1994). However, acceptance
of the fact that social democracy would be the only alternative available to the
forces of the Right for a long period had clear implications for his attitude to
British politics, for it meant, in effect, acquiescence in Labour’s role as the leading
party on the Left.
It would nonetheless be wrong to suggest that Miliband had come full circle
back to his position of 1960. When completing the first edition of Parliamentary
Socialism he had also known that the socialist transformation would be ‘a long
haul’ but had thought that the first step should be Labour’s conversion to socialist
ideas. By 1994 his own commitment remained undiminished, but he knew social-
ism was not currently on the political agenda. In the meantime Labour could be
supported as the alternative – ‘such as it is’ – to the Right.
Miliband died in May 1994, the same month as Kinnock’s successor John Smith,
and so did not live to see Tony Blair become leader of what he would refer to as
‘New Labour’. It is worth asking what he might have made of events after 1994, had
he lived. Miliband would, no doubt, have seen Blair’s Labour Party as preferable to
the Conservatives. Yet he would probably have regarded it as much further
removed from his own convictions than was the Labour Party he had condemned
in Parliamentary Socialism. He would undoubtedly have been forced to accept that
the ‘long haul’ was now even longer than he had previously believed. Yet he might
also have thought it inadequate either simply to denounce ‘New Labour’ or to give
up all hope of socialism. Rather than despairing, he would have analysed Blair’s
project as part of an international phenomenon and tried to identify the factors
likely to produce a more adequate response to the latest phase of capitalism. Most
importantly, Miliband would have insisted that – whatever Labour’s role in the
process might be – it remained both possible and necessary to create a co-opera-
tive, democratic and egalitarian society.
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The belief in the effective transformation of the Labour Party into an instrument of
socialist politics is the most crippling of illusions to which socialists in Britain have
been prone . . . To say that the Labour Party is the party of the working class is . . .
important . . . but it affords no answer to the point at issue, namely that a socialist
party is needed in Britain, and that the Labour Party is not it, and it will not be turned
into it. To say that it is a party of the working class is, on this view, to open the discus-
sion, not to conclude it. It might be otherwise if there was any likelihood that the
Labour Party could be turned into a socialist formation; but that is precisely the prem-
ise which must, on a realistic view, be precluded. (Miliband 1976: 128, 130)
Labourism . . . a theory and practice which accepted the possibility of social change
within the existing framework of society; which rejected the revolutionary violence and
action implicit in Chartist ideas of physical force; and which increasingly recognized
the working of political democracy of the parliamentary variety as the practical means
of achieving its own aims and objectives. (Saville 1973: 215; see also Saville 1988: 14)
The legacy of Ralph Miliband’s writings on the Labour Party has been, and
remains, both an important and a controversial one. It is also one that is much car-
icatured by critics unfamiliar with its central theses. Indeed, too often in collec-
tions of essays on New Labour these days, lazy throwaway lines discourage serious
readers from exploring its complexity and continuing importance. So, for exam-
ple, in the essays gathered to mark the Labour Party’s centenary (Brivati and Hef-
fernan 2000), the works to be discussed here were dismissed by Ben Pimlott as the
‘we wuz robbed’ school of party history (Jefferys 2000: 68); and even the more
careful Robert Taylor reported that in the work inspired by the writings of
Miliband ‘trade unions were portrayed as a formidable, defensive barrier to
Labour’s Socialist advance, supposedly holding back the masses from commitment
to a militant socialism’ (Taylor 2000: 10). But neither characterisation, though per-
haps appropriate to many others, is either accurate or just in respect of Miliband;
and, indeed, one reason why this chapter may be of lasting value is that it will
demonstrate that impropriety.
For there is a distinctively Milibandian perspective within the historiography of
the Labour Party. The content and complexity of that perspective has grown over
5
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time, as the early work of Ralph Miliband and his sometime collaborator John Sav-
ille has been supplemented by the writings of other scholars persuaded of the
importance of their initial formulations. Yet even those initial formulations were
not of the ‘we wuz robbed’ variety. Instead, from the outset, the arguments devel-
oped by Miliband and Saville about Labour politics were far more sophisticated
and important than that. From its inception, the Milibandian perspective on the
Labour Party emphasised the importance of three things. It emphasised, first, the
centrality of parliamentarianism to the theory and practice of Labour Party poli-
tics, and its deleterious consequences for the party’s capacity to act as a successfully
reformist agency when in office. It stressed, second, the functionality of the Labour
Party’s periodically radical rhetoric to the long-term stability of the British class
structure, and its harmful consequences for the creation and consolidation of a
radicalised proletariat. Third, it emphasised the inability of socialists within the
Labour Party to do more than briefly (and episodically) radicalise the rhetoric and
policy commitments of the party in opposition, and the deleterious consequences
of that inability for the creation of a genuinely potent socialist party in Britain.
It is these three complex propositions that constitute the core of the early-
Miliband-inspired scholarship on the Labour Party and its limits; and it is with
their establishment and development that this chapter is primarily concerned.
The Labour Party and working-class incorporation
The character of Miliband’s early writings on the Labour Party have been docu-
mented in the previous chapter, and will not be re-established here. Instead, we
begin by observing, lest it be forgotten, that Miliband’s later writings were not pre-
dominantly focused on the Labour Party, and from 1969 the focus of his work
shifted to state theory. This shift – beginning with the publication of The State in
Capitalist Society (1969) and his famous debate with the Greek socialist theorist
Nicos Poulantzas – made him for a while one of the most internationally recog-
nised intellectual figures in political science and sociology in the English-speaking
world and beyond. In this change of focus and status, it was not that his original
positions on the Labour Party were abandoned so much as generalised.
The thesis in The State was the by-now-standard one for the Milibandian
‘school’ as a whole. This was that democratic politics in advanced capitalist soci-
eties operate within powerful class constraints; and that these constraints are
structured into the political domain through the conservatism of state bureau-
cracy, the force of business and financial interests, and the ideological pressure of
capitalist values in the mass media. Social democratic parties of the Labour Party
variety were not entirely ignored in this analysis; but they appeared there in less
prominent roles. They appeared as orchestrators of capitalist legitimation and
working-class demobilisation, as part of the political processes that accommodate
democratic aspirations to capitalist power structures, and as ‘singularly weak agen-
cies of mass education in socialist principles and purposes’ (Miliband 1969: 196).
What in Parliamentary Socialism (1961) had been presented as a vulnerability to
parliamentary socialisation now reappeared in The State in Capitalist Society as an
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inadequate capacity for counter-hegemonic politics. Hence the latter book singled
out Labour leaders’ ‘ideological defenses’ as being ‘generally not . . . of nearly suf-
ficient strength to enable them to resist with any great measure of success conser-
vative pressure, intimidation and enticement’ (Miliband 1969: 195).
What was presented in general terms in The State also reappeared as very much
a United Kingdom phenomenon, in Miliband’s Capitalist Democracy in Britain
(1982). There, the compatibility of capitalism with democracy, now explained in
neo-Gramscian terms, was seen as a consequence of ‘the hegemony exercised by
the dominant class and its conservative forces’ (1982: 15). The capacity of that
hegemony to survive unscathed was, in considerable measure, still seen as a prod-
uct of past Labour Party policy. Miliband was clear on this when critiquing the
arguments of his mentor Harold Laski:
The whole political scene would indeed have been transformed had the Labour Party
in the inter-war years been the socialist party which he wanted it to be, or at least
believed that it must soon become. But one of the most significant facts about the
British political scene was precisely that the Labour Party was not then, and was not
on the way to becoming, such a party. This gave Laski’s argument a certain air of unre-
ality, which the passage of time has made even more pronounced. This is a great pity
because the argument itself is right: the political system would be fundamentally
affected if the Labour Party (or any other party) did become a major force for social-
ist change; even more so if it was able to form a government and sought to implement
a programme of socialist policies. But the fact is that the political system has never had
to face such a situation. This of course is something which itself requires explanation.
(Miliband 1982: 16)
Key to that explanation for Miliband, in 1982 as much as in 1961, was the Labour
Party’s own exposure to (and enthusiasm for) the rules and institutions of parlia-
mentarism as these were generally understood among the British political class.
‘Nothing’, he wrote,
has weighed more heavily upon labour politics in Britain than the existence of a strong
framework of representation: however inadequate and undemocratic it might be,
there did exist, it was believed, a solid proven structure that could be made more ade-
quate and democratic, that had already undergone reform, and that in due course
could be used to serve whatever purpose a majority might desire, including the cre-
ation of a socialist order. (Miliband 1982: 27)
Parliamentarism of this kind worked, according to Miliband, by co-option and
incorporation. ‘It simultaneously [enshrined] the principle of popular inclusion
and that of popular exclusion’ (Miliband 1982: 38): co-opting and incorporating
the working class as an electorate, their more radical parliamentary representa-
tives, and their trade union leaderships. The British parliamentary State sustained
the private rule of capital in the UK by drawing all these potentially oppositional
social forces and political institutions into a form of democratic politics that left
elected governments subject to the constraints of a conservative state apparatus
and a well-entrenched business and financial class, and left their electorate subject
to heavy ideological pressure from schools, churches and the media. The Labour
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Party leadership, Miliband argued, had long been an active player in that process
of political socialisation and incorporation: training early generations in the rules
of parliamentary politics (especially in the illegitimacy of the use by Labour of
industrial power for political ends); and repressing (until challenged by the Ben-
nite internal party reforms of the early 1980s) internal party democracy, so that
MPs could remain free of effective pressure from constituency activists and Labour
Cabinets could remain free of party control (Miliband 1982: 68–76).
The question of ‘betrayal’
Quite contrary to what their less than careful critics often assert, neither Miliband
nor Saville subscribed to some ‘sell-out’ theory of British labour, some notion that
the British working class was inherently socialist but was persistently betrayed by
its moderate political leadership. The Milibandian understanding of the relation-
ship between Labour as a political party, the working class as a social force and
socialism as a body of ideas was always far more complex than that. As Marxists
Miliband and Saville always believed that the contradictory relationship between
capital and labour in a capitalist society precludes an effective long-term realisa-
tion of working-class interests without a major resetting of property relationships.
They did not apologise for perpetually raising the socialist question, seeing it still
a legitimate issue to discuss when exploring left-wing political formations. But
their critique of British Labour was not that an already existing socialist working
class required better political leadership. Such a claim constituted, in Miliband’s
view, a ‘gross overestimation of the strength of the socialist forces in the Labour
Party and in the labour movement at large’ and, as such, ‘obvious nonsense’
(Miliband 1977a: 47). He later wrote:
There is no point pretending that there exists a ready-made majority in the country
for a socialist programme. How could there be? One of the fruits of the long predom-
inance of labourism is precisely that the party of the working class has never carried
out any sustained campaign of education and propaganda on behalf of a socialist pro-
gramme; and that Labour leaders have frequently turned themselves into fierce pro-
pagandists against the socialist proposal of their critics inside the Labour Party and
out, and have bent their best efforts to the task of defeating all attempts to have the
Labour Party adopt such proposals. Moreover, a vast array of conservative forces, of
the most diverse kind, are always at hand to dissuade the working class from even
thinking about . . . socialist ideas . . . a ceaseless battle for the ‘hearts and minds’ of the
people is waged by the forces of conservatism, against which have only been mobilized
immeasurably smaller socialist forces. (Miliband 1983a: 304–5)
The Milibandian thesis was never that an inherently socialist working class was
periodically betrayed by Labour Party moderation. It was rather that the possibil-
ity of creating such a radicalised class has been blocked by, among other things, the
presence of a party committed to Labourism rather than socialism, and the peri-
odic leftwards shift in rhetoric made by the Labour Party whenever working-class
militancy intensified. The Milibandian argument was always that the emergence 
of such a working class was, with the Labour Party in the way, extraordinarily 
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difficult to trigger; but it was also that the creation of mass support for socialist
programmes was both possible and necessary. The whole thrust of the Milibandian
argument on the working class and socialism was that the fusion between the two
was one that had to be created, and that such a creation required clear and unam-
biguous political leadership of a kind that the Labour Party systematically declined
to offer. As Miliband and Marcel Liebman (1986: 481) put it:
The notion that very large parts of ‘the electorate’, and notably the working class, is
bound to reject radical programmes is a convenient alibi, but little else. The real point,
which is crucial, is that such programmes and policies need to be defended and prop-
agated with the utmost determination and vigour by leaders totally convinced of the
justice of their cause. It is this which is always lacking: infirmity of purpose and the fear
of radical measures lies not with the working class but with the social democratic lead-
ers themselves.
Careless critics have therefore moved too quickly to condemn those who take this
perspective for misunderstanding the Labour Party’s project as something other
(and more radical) than it was. Not so. They always understood that project – in
all its moderation and episodic radicalism – well enough. They simply found it
wanting both when measured against its own promises and when set on the wider
map of European and global working-class politics.
The Miliband legacy
To dwell, as we have thus far, on Ralph Miliband’s contribution to the study of the
Labour Party minimises the great effect of the broader role he played in founding
a creative new current of Marxist political analysis. The remit of his Marxism and
Politics (1977b: 14), arguably his greatest book, was the need to show clearly
what a Marxist political theory specifically involves; and to indicate how far it may
serve to illuminate any particular aspect of historical or contemporary reality. For this
pupose, the developments in Marxist political thinking in recent years have obviously
been of great value, not least because the constricting ‘triumphalism’ of an earlier
period has been strongly challenged and the challenge has produced a much greater
awareness among Marxists that Marxism, in this as much as in other realms, is full of
questions to be asked and – no less important – of answers to be questioned. Many
hitherto neglected or underestimated problems have attracted greater attention; and
many old problems have been perceived in better light. As a result, the beginnings 
have been made of a political theorization in the Marxist mode. But these are only
beginning.
It was this broader perspective, this invitation to go beyond the old Marxist para-
digm and create a new and richer one, that excited the new generation of intellec-
tuals and scholars that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, the two of us among them.
Unconnected with each other in any way, we took up many of the themes that
Miliband (and Saville) had already sounded in their studies of Labourism, seeking
not only to extend their account of the contemporary party’s history but also to
develop further the conceptual apparatus for doing so. Like Miliband, we also
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sought to go beyond the Labour Party in this respect and to contribute to the
development of Marxist political theory in general. Unlike him, however (he once
privately admitted to being bored by economics), we also sought to engage on this
basis with the new Marxist political economy. Thus in our accounts of the Labour
Party from the 1960s to the 1990s we both built on what he had established and yet
departed from him in various ways. This meant telling the history of policy and
intra-party conflict in more detail than he did, and concentrating much more on
economic policy and political economy.
Miliband was therefore not alone in turning from the focused analysis of one
political party to a more general political sociology of social democracy and the
State. By the mid-1970s Leo Panitch had already intervened significantly in the
emerging international debate on corporatism (Panitch 1977a, 1980a, 1981), and
had made his initial contributions to the new Marxist work on the State (Panitch
1976, 1980b, 1986b, 1986c). After Labour in Power? (Coates 1980), Coates’s own
Gramscian turn then produced The Context of British Politics (1984a) and Running
the Country (1995 [1990]), both of which sit alongside Colin Leys’s Politics in
Britain (1983) as major attempts to produce a general assessment of the parame-
ters of Labour politics in the manner of Miliband’s writings on the State. Such ini-
tiatives then extended into intellectual territory that Miliband did not explore –
rounding out this Marxist political sociology with a series of studies in interna-
tional and comparative political economy. Panitch encouraged (and developed
himself) a new approach to democratic state administration (Albo, Langille and
Panich 1993) and a distinctive Socialist Register position on the relationship of
globalisation to the State (Panitch 1994); and Coates produced, first, a detailed
survey of British economic under-performance (Coates 1994) and then a compar-
ative study of models of capitalism (1999a, 2000a). This set of later publications
produced new frameworks for analysing developments in Labour politics: not only
by exploring the limits of Old Labour politics through a discussion of ‘corpo-
ratism’, but by examining the limits of New Labour through notions of ‘progres-
sive competitiveness’. In this way, a Milibandian perspective was eventually
brought to the analysis of New Labour, one that was armed with a range of con-
cepts and arguments that went beyond those available to it in the first phase of its
work on the Labour Party.
The issue of ‘corporatism’
The first moves in these new directions came in response to the experience of
Labour in power between 1974 and 1979. Through his intervention in the famous
profits squeeze debate of the 1970s, Panitch stressed the centrality of class conflict
to understanding the crisis of the British economy (Panitch 1977b). In a study ini-
tially designed as an update of The Labour Party and the Struggle for Socialism,
Coates developed what was an early attempt at Milibandian political economy to
explain Labour’s dismal performance in office. In Labour in Power? (1980) Coates
argued that, though vital as a first step, it was no longer enough merely to list the
range of powerful interests constraining Labour governments, because to do only
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that was to imply that those interests were in control of their world even if Labour
was not in control of its. What was needed instead was the recognition that ‘nei-
ther private elites nor public figures either understood or were in complete control
of the main processes which shaped the world economy over which they presided’,
and that it was the capitalist nature of that world economy that ultimately held the
key to the failure of this Labour Government and to the growing estrangement of
trade unionists from it. ‘To understand the events of the 1970s’, Coates (1980:
160–1) argued, ‘to assess the true impact of elite constraints, to place the power of
British trade unionism, and to discuss the future of the Left in Britain, the ques-
tion of capitalism had to be faced, and its impact on British politics fully under-
stood.’
The question was how best to do that. One answer came from a systematic
examination of the class constraints then eroding the viability of corporatism. In
a widely cited article written against the background of the second Wilson Gov-
ernment, Panitch (1977a: 66) defined corporatism as ‘a political structure within
advanced capitalism which integrates organized socio-economic producer groups
through a system of representation and co-operative mutual interaction at the
leadership level and of mobilization and social control at the mass level’, empha-
sising its inherent instability with the presence of strong social democratic labour
movements. The class parameters surrounding even the corporatist version of the
capitalist state, Panitch argued, and the resulting policy outputs reflecting ‘capital-
ist class dominance’ had eventually to draw the unions out of corporatist struc-
tures, or had at least to oblige them ‘to abstain from accommodative behaviour if
they were not to be repudiated by their rank and file membership’ (Panitch 1977a:
138). This explanation of the propensity of Labour governments to succumb to
winters of discontent of the 1978–79 variety also figured in David Coates’s later
writings on this last example of Old Labour in power. What Labour then under-
stood to be socialism, he wrote,
was more properly understood as a mild form of corporatism, the sharing of political
power with bureaucratized trade union leadership and corporate capital. Yet . . . this
power sharing was itself a major barrier to capital accumulation, and so proved
destructive of the very economic growth that Labour governments sought to extract
from the mixed economy . . . For even on such favourable political and industrial ter-
rain corporatism proved to be extraordinarily brittle. Anaesthetizing rather than
removing the basic cleavage of interest between capital and labour, by pushing that
tension down to lower levels of decision-making, corporatist structures . . . in the end
fell victim to the contradictions they were supposed to suppress. (Coates 1984a: 258;
see also Coates 1984b: 131)
The political economy of ‘New Labour’
This repositioning of the study of the Labour Party on the wider canvas of state
theory and corporatist political practice moved the centre of gravity of such stud-
ies away from the detail of Labour Party political developments into a more gen-
eral analysis of capitalism and the contemporary state. That move was accentuated
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through the course of the 1980s and 1990s by further emphasis on questions of
political economy. The long years of Thatcherism imposed their own imperative
here. David Coates probed the adequacy of Thatcherite claims about the adverse
economic consequences of a strong labour movement, and argued against the low-
wage, low-welfare, growth strategy that the Conservatives were then pursuing.
Panitch followed his colleague Greg Albo in theorising that strategy as one of ‘com-
petitive austerity’, contrasted it to the emerging Centre–Left enthusiasm for strate-
gies of ‘progressive competitiveness’, and developed arguments about the
inadequacies of each (Albo 1994, 1997). As New Labour repositioned the party’s
economic policies – from both the radical statism of both the Bennite alternative
economic strategy and Old Labour corporatism – Panitch saw parallels between
Labour’s growing enthusiasm for reskilling as the key to industrial modernisation
and ‘Clintonomics’, and warned the Left about both.
The two centuries-old search for a cross-class ‘producer’ alliance between labour and
national capital as an alternative to class struggle has taken shape in recent years in the
form of the progressive competitiveness strategy, but its weaknesses have been very
quickly revealed in the context of the globalization of capital. (Panitch 1994: 87)
Similar arguments were by then appearing sequentially in Coates’s writings on the
British economy. These came first in the form of a critique of Thatcherite low
wage-growth strategies (Coates 1994), and later as critiques of New Labour’s
emerging political economy and of contemporary social democratic growth
strategies of the Swedish or Clinton–Reich variety (Coates 1999a, 1999b, 2000a).
By the time Models of Capitalism was published, towards the end of New Labour’s
first term, those following a Milibandian perspective had equipped themselves
with a set of political economy theses that both illuminated central weaknesses in
New Labour’s economic strategy and rounded out what had hitherto been an
approach to the politics of Labour more narrowly anchored on the terrain of his-
tory and sociology.
Limits to Labour Party radicalism
Between the 1980s’ writings on the limits of Old Labour’s corporatism and the
1990s’ writings on the dangers of New Labour’s enthusiasm for ‘progressive com-
petitiveness’ – came a further refining and deepening of some of the older strands
of the Milibandian approach to Labour politics. This focused particularly on the
inability of the party to transform itself into an effective counter-hegemonic force,
and the inability of the Labour Left, however well endowed, to transform Labour
into a socialist organisation. The argument on the link between Labour’s electoral
politics and its weakness as a hegemonic force occurs in a number of places in
Coates’s work (Coates 1983: 98; 1986: 423; 1989: 102–3; 1996a: 63–4). On each
occasion Labour’s electoral fragility was linked to its inability or refusal to forge
more than an episodic and limited electoral relationship with its mass base. In
1996, Coates noted the high ‘degree of assistance from external events and forces
the Labour Party has always needed to create an electoral bloc sufficiently sub-
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stantial to give it parliamentary power’, and its long-established failure to establish
any of the institutions –‘newspapers, clubs, communities’ – of a fully functioning
Labour movement. Restricting itself to a vote-getting relationship with its work-
ing-class base, so the argument went, and mobilising even that relationship only
episodically, Labour left the formulation of mass opinion to more conservative
sources of values and policy in the privately owned media. This left Labour
marooned as a largely ‘passive recipient of electoral swings’, with its politics never
normally in possession of ‘sufficient magnetic force to redraw the shape of elec-
toral Britain by the power of its own programme and possibilities alone’. No
wonder, then, Coates (1996a: 63–4) argued, that majorities so gratuitously won
were easily lost, or that ‘Labour majorities when they come tend to be accidental
rather than created, and invariably prove to be as tenuous as they are fortuitous’.
Although most of those inspired by Miliband moved away from Labour Party
studies to produce more general work that engaged with political sociology and
political economy, those adopting a Milibandian view were not silent on the detail
of developments within the party during its long years of opposition after 1979. In
fact, they played a full part in the debates triggered by the 1983 electoral defeat.
They argued in particular against the ‘move to the right’ logic of Eric Hobsbawm’s
The Forward March of Labour Halted? (Mulhern and Jacques 1981; see Coates
1983; Panitch 1986a) while also chronicling and commenting on the party’s policy
trajectory after 1983 (Coates 1996a). Panitch and Leys’s The End of Parliamentary
Socialism (2001 [1997]), dedicated as it was to Miliband’s memory, directly spoke
to the continuing relevance and importance of the approach he pioneered to the
understanding of the detailed internal development of the Labour Party. Ever since
Parliamentary Socialism, the argument for socialist politics had engaged with suc-
cessive generations of the Labour Left; but not until The End of Parliamentary
Socialism had any of the academics closely associated with Miliband addressed
themselves in a detailed, focused and sympathetic way to Left Labour politics. That
omission was now addressed, with the post-1970 Labour Left treated as a new Left
sensitive to the weaknesses of its predecessors. The End of Parliamentary Socialism
offered a detailed guide to the conflict within the party from 1970 to 1983. It
explored the radical democratic character, as well as the weaknesses, of Bennism,
the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy and the alternative economic strategy.
It documented the role the union leadership and the Old Left played in their ulti-
mate defeat; and then analysed the process of policy reformulation and the disem-
powerment of activism within the Labour Party up to the end of the century.
The end result of this intellectual journey has been the creation of a distinctively
Milibandian voice in the current set of debates on the nature and potential of New
Labour. The Milibandian voice in the burgeoning literature triggered by the 1997
victory has been distinctive in at least three ways. Though as concerned as other
scholars and commentators to isolate what is new is New Labour’s ‘Third Way’
(Panitch and Leys 2001: 237–61; see Coates 2000b), it has been distinctive partly
through its propensity to combine its recognition of novelty with an emphasis on
continuities in the politics of New Labour: underlying continuities (with Old
Labour) in the party’s continuing enthusiasm for a co-operative relationship with
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the business community; continuities with Gaitskellite revisionism from the
1950s; and continuities (between New Labour and the Major Government which
preceded it) in basic industrial and employment policy (Coates 2000c). In this
writing on New Labour, therefore, there is still more than an echo of Miliband’s
propensity to see Labour leaderships of whatever stripe as a political force which
acts ‘as a safe alternative government for the British establishment’ (Panitch and
Leys 1997: 218).
The school’s scholarship remains distinctive, too, in the persistence of its focus
on New Labour’s economic and social policy. Unlike many other analyses of New
Labour, it has not set much store by the Blairites’ constitutional agenda, preferring
instead to address the policy (and ultimately electoral) consequences of New
Labour’s enthusiasm for the ‘new growth theory’. This focus definitely reflects the
school’s post-1980 shift away from Labour Party studies mentioned earlier, a shift
that ironically and by a quite circuitous route left those influenced by Miliband
well positioned to explain the constraints on New Labour when the revamped
Labour Party returned to power. For by moving the focus of our work into inter-
national and comparative political economy, those of us who earlier had been so
persuaded by Miliband’s work on the Labour Party found that, when we came back
to writing about New Labour, we were better situated to write about the Blairite
economic project than were many of the scholars whose work had remained
sharply focused on party politics and party issues alone, as ours, broadly speaking,
had not.
A third distinctive feature of our work on New Labour in power has been its
propensity still to measure New Labour’s performance – as once we measured Old
Labour’s – against various kinds of socialist yardsticks. By those tests, the party led
by Tony Blair is far less a party of social reform even than was that led by Harold
Wilson; and of course the Blair-led Government is light years away from the
reformist party long sought by the Labour Left – the one briefly brought into view
again by Bennite pressure between 1970 and 1983 before being ‘modernined’ away
by Kinnock and Blair. As Colin Leys (who joined Panitch as co-editor of The Social-
ist Register in 1997) argued well before New Labour came to power, to criticise such
policy realignments was not to deny that policy modernisation was necessary to
win victory after nearly two decades in opposition. What did concern him, how-
ever, even before they came to office, was whether, as New Labour deployed ‘the
buzzword of “modernization” to good short-term electoral effect . . . any serious
project for social change, let alone one that can seriously be called socialist, can be
constructed on such a foundation’ (Leys 1996: 26). In keeping with the Miliban-
dian perspective as a whole, he proved correct in thinking that the answer to that
concern would soon be given with a resounding ‘No’.
The development of such arguments since 1979 means that additions now need
to be made to the three core elements of the Milibandian perspective on the
Labour Party laid out at the start of this chapter. To those can be added, fourth, the
centrality of corporatism to the politics of Old Labour, and the particular inap-
propriateness of that form of politics to parties of social reform in an economy
with so weak a manufacturing base and so globally focused a set of financial insti-
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tutions. Fifth, the peculiarly electoralist nature of the Labour Party’s relationship
with its potential mass base, and the particularly inappropriate nature of that rela-
tionship for a party requiring to consolidate a counter-hegemonic presence. Sixth
the attractiveness of the Bennite attempt to reset Labour Party politics, and the
necessary limits of that attempt. Seventh, there should be added the centrality to
the New Labour project of strategies of ‘progressive competitiveness’, and the par-
ticular inappropriateness of those strategies for a party seeking both a prolonged
period of majority electoral support and a strengthened industrial base from
which to finance social provision.
The continuing relevance of the Milibandian perspective
Complex and extensive bodies of argument require careful reading, and such read-
ings take time – time that many critics of the Milibandian perspective have not
always afforded it. As we noted at the start of this chapter, too often the whole
corpus has been dismissed as merely criticising the Labour Party for not being a
socialist party when in truth it had never set out to be one; as though that was the
argument being offered in Parliamentary Socialism and in the scholarship inspired
by it. But that was never the Milbandian view of the Labour Party. The Labour
Party has always been understood from within this perspective – even at moments
of the party’s greatest radicalism – as at most a reformist party. It has always been
understood, moreover, as more normally at best a party of social reform, one within
which Centre-Left and Centre-Right social democrats battled for dominance (with
the latter invariably in the ascendant). The whole focus has been not on the poli-
tics of Labour as a party that betrays its own socialist goals and its already socialist
working-class constituency, but on the politics of labourism and its consequences.
The whole focus has been on a party that was moderate in its fundamental aims,
even when these were articulated in some form of socialist discourse. Such schol-
arship has always understood the Labour Party as one which, through its particu-
larly ‘narrow interpretation of parliamentary democracy’ (Panitch 1988: 349),
locked itself very early in its career onto a trajectory of increasing conservatism, a
trajectory which arguably has now repositioned the party to the Right of any pro-
grammatic position that could be described as even progressive, let alone socialist,
in intent. The Milibandian perspective has always conceded the presence within
the Labour Party of individuals and programmes of a socialist or progressive kind;
but it has always insisted too that socialists within the party have never enjoyed
more than a minority and subordinate presence.
The frustration which more moderate commentators on Labour matters down
the years have expressed with Milibandian writings seems to have been created in
part by the fact that the concept of ‘socialism’, used as a yardstick against which to
judge New, as well as Old, Labour appears insufficiently defined. In defence we
would simply say that this frustration ignores those writings in the Milibandian
genre that do offer varying degrees of specification of what may be meant by
‘socialism’ today. There have been many such (Albo 1994; Albo, Langille and Pan-
itch 1993; Burden, Breitenbach and Coates 1990; Leys 1999; Miliband 1977, 1994b;
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Panitch 1980b, 2001; Panitch and Gindin 1999; Wainwright 1994). It is not that
there is a single Miliband-inspired definition of an alternative order. Such a speci-
fication would have an arbitrariness that would render it valueless. It is rather that
we can point to various moves to specify part of what that socialism might be, to
put some flesh on what Panitch and Leys’s 2000 Socialist Register termed ‘necessary
utopias’, to engage in what Gindin and Panitch in that volume called ‘rekindling the
socialist imagination’. If Labour Party scholars do not read this work, it says some-
thing significant – and sad – about their lack of interest in answering the question:
what is socialism? In that sense, the frustration of those who criticise Milibandians
for their lack of clarity is matched by our frustration with their apparent total lack
of interest in the issue of alternatives to the status quo.
The Milibandian argument has always been, in that sense, an argument
addressed only to part of the audience interested in the Labour Party. It has been
(and it remains) an argument – a set of theses about Labour and its possibilities –
addressed primarily to the concerns of socialists – those inside the Labour Party
itself and those beyond. Is activity within the party a precursor of the creation of a
mass base for socialist politics, or a debilitating distraction from that creation? This is
the central Miliband question. Those who take that perspective have always been
keen to ally with the Labour Left and to support its growth (Panitch and Leys 1997:
268). Ultimately, however, they have also been, as Hilary Wainwright once called
herself, ‘obstinate refusniks’ (Wainwright 1987: 6) on the question of taking mem-
bership of the Labour Party for socialist purposes. And they have always recog-
nised that the creation of a socialist working class in Britain was a task that would
take a long time, which is one reason why they have argued that the Labour Party’s
short-term electoral concerns so obviously predisposed the party against any
attempt to undertake it.
A final word on the importance of Ralph Miliband himself. Because time is pass-
ing since his death, and because his major writings of the late 1960s were not
directly focused on the Labour Party, there is a danger that new generations of
Labour Party scholars will discount his importance. That would be a great loss to
left-wing scholarship in Britain. We have separately recorded our own personal
debts to him and his work (Coates 1996b; Panitch 1995); but the debt (and the
importance of his work) runs wider than that. Ralph Miliband was a member of
that generation of socialist intellectual giants who, by the sheer force of their per-
sonalities, the charisma of their teaching and the quality of their scholarship cre-
ated a huge (and more or less safe) intellectual space within which radical students
could pursue radical research. Before them, the range of the tolerable (and the tol-
erated) in the study of British Labour was narrow and arcane. We have the freedom
to react to them now, to decide how much to take from their work as our own,
because they won for us a width and a quality of scholarship missing in their youth.
This intellectual space has been much eroded of late by the enthusiastic absorption
of neo-liberal orthodoxies by the vast majority of Centre-Left parties; which is one
of the reasons why we believe that intellectuals of their stature are needed again: to
stem and to reverse that tide.
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Since the early 1960s, in a series of articles and books, Tom Nairn has articulated a
distinct and challenging interpretation of Labour Party politics. Many of these
publications formed part of a wider project, one closely associated with the work
of Perry Anderson which examined the trajectory of British political development
over the last 300 years.
While there was much overlap with Anderson’s concerns, Nairn’s central – and
initial – contribution to this undertaking focused on a particular account of the
character of British reformism. Two of Nairn’s publications stand out as especially
relevant in this regard. First, in ‘The nature of the Labour Party’, a paper in two
parts originally published in New Left Review during 1964 and subsequently
merged as a chapter of Anderson and Blackburn’s Towards Socialism (1965), he
gave a coruscating overview of the party’s failures during the first sixty years of its
history. In passing, the reader should note that although these publications are
cited by their original titles as papers, where applicable, they are quoted from the
volumes in which Nairn and Anderson later republished them. Second, in The Left
Against Europe (Nairn 1973), a short book originally published as a special issue of
New Left Review, Nairn assessed what he considered to be the British Left’s inade-
quate response to the Conservative Government’s application for membership of
the Common Market.
Aspects of Nairn’s critique of the Labour Party are not original, echoing those
associated with other condemnations of ‘Labourism’. Taken together, however, his
work has provided a distinctive explanation of the difficulties encountered by the
party, the failures it has generated and the many disappointments it has induced.
His analysis is, moreover, unusual in the emphasis it placed on the need to exam-
ine Labour’s record within the context of European social democracy. Interest-
ingly, many of Nairn’s points echoed those made by Egon Wertheimer, a German
social democrat and journalist, one of the first to compare Labour to its continen-
tal counterparts. Wertheimer’s 1930 Portrait of the Labour Party was, however, a
largely descriptive and fairly positive account, whereas Nairn’s analysis of Labour
politics is a blunt and often scornful evaluation of its weaknesses.
6
An exceptional comrade? 
The Nairn–Anderson interpretation
Mark Wickham-Jones
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Nairn’s emphasis on the exceptional character of British reformism provides the
basis for a discussion of a feature of Labour’s politics that has been often over-
looked by academics: the party’s insularity. To be sure, commentators have noted
the party’s isolation – in terms of ideological contacts and organisational commu-
nications – from other parties of the Left. Rarely, however, have they assigned
causal significance to that remoteness in defining Labour’s character. It is worth
noting that at the time Nairn’s ‘The nature of the Labour Party’ was published,
some commentators and scholars concluded that Labour was finally starting to
look towards European social democracy for inspiration. A frequent claim made
during the early 1960s (and since, for that matter) was that Labour’s right-wing
revisionist leadership wanted to mimic the outlook adopted by continental
reformist parties. Before fully setting down his thought on the subject, even Ander-
son thought that the party’s right-wing intellectuals, in particular Anthony
Crosland, saw Sweden as ‘an exemplary model of an existing socialist society, and
one from which we have much to learn’ (Anderson 1961a: 4; see also Anderson
1961b as well as Elliott 1993: x and 1998: 2–3).
While this chapter examines mainly Nairn’s interpretation of Labour politics,
Anderson’s work is referred to when relevant. It focuses on a distinct aspect of their
joint endeavour, the contrast between British social democrats and their European
counterparts. It does not, however, address the wider context within which Nairn
located his account – the ‘Nairn–Anderson theses’ which, in the latter’s words,
drew up ‘a general map of English class society’ and constructed a ‘framework for
understanding the national crisis of British capitalism’ (1992d: 2). That is some-
thing more completely covered in chapter 3, by Madeleine Davis.
I first outline the central features of Nairn’s argument, leaning heavily on his
original two-part article and assessing where it fits with the work not only of his
collaborator Anderson but that of other leading figures on the New Left, especially
Ralph Miliband. As one way of examining the veracity of Nairn’s substantive
points, Wertheimer’s earlier and friendlier analysis is also cited. The chapter then
addresses the extent to which Nairn’s approach can be reconciled with the often-
made claim that Labour sought to learn from Swedish social democrats during the
1950s and 1960s. Finally, the strands of the chapter are drawn together in assessing
what Nairn’s work contributes to our understanding of the party.
An anatomy of ‘Labourism’
For the purposes of this chapter, there are three inter-related parts to Nairn’s expla-
nation of Labour’s supposed bankruptcy as a reformist party. First, he considers
that the party exhibited a ‘well known antipathy to theory’ (Nairn 1965: 159);
second, that Labour was dominated by its trade union affiliates; and, third, that the
party persistently demonstrated a defensive and subordinate outlook. Together
these determined the character of British reformism, which Nairn describes as
‘Labourism’, a term first articulated in debates at the start of the twentieth century
(for a general discussion see Fielding 2000). In the early 1960s, members of the
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New Left, including most notably Ralph Miliband, redeployed the term. While
there were differences in the meaning Miliband and Nairn respectively attached to
the concept, aspects of the former’s account nonetheless resonate with the latter’s
analysis.
The first element that makes up Nairn’s appreciation of Labour’s failure to
develop into a fully fledged reformist party was its atheoretical and empirical
stance. This meant it did not draw on Marxist or, for that matter, any other ideas;
it assigned intellectuals no substantive internal role; and it was unable to outline a
coherent theoretical design of what might be involved in a socialist transition
(Nairn 1965: 165–6; see also Chun 1993: 80). Labour’s ‘empirical and flexible’ out-
look was also a central feature of Miliband’s seminal text Parliamentary Socialism
(1972: 1). Wertheimer (1930: 46, 195 and 202) similarly contended, and with con-
siderable emphasis, that there was a ‘mistrust of theory and systematic thought’
within the wider labour movement. In The Future of Socialism Crosland, in 1956
out of the House of Commons, developed a related premiss: Labour ‘was not
founded on any body of doctrine at all, and has always preserved a marked anti-
doctrinal and anti-theoretical bias’ (1956: 80).
Hence Anderson could lament ‘the failure of any significant body of intellectu-
als to join the cause of the proletariat until the very end of the nineteenth century’
(1992a: 34). Yet, even that inflow was characterised as comprising pseudo-intellec-
tuals and essentially bogus socialists, whose most important constituent was Fabi-
anism, which was committed to merely piecemeal and practical reforms enacted
through the parliamentary system. Anderson defines it to be a ‘leaden legacy’
(1992a: 35); while for Nairn (1965: 167) the Fabians were, if nothing else, ‘the tech-
nicians of reform – perhaps the most able reformers of this kind produced by
socialism in any country’. Moreover, from Labour’s first days, overtly socialist
groups were marginalised, while other left-wing elements, most obviously the ILP,
were as weak as the Fabians in taking up and deploying ideas. Lacking coherence,
the ILP was characterised by a strong moral outlook, one inspired by Christianity
(Nairn 1973: 56). These groups ‘accepted – the Fabians by conviction, the ILP
socialists for want of an alternative – the evolutionary character of socialism’
(Nairn 1965: 166; his emphasis). The failure of the party to offer intellectuals a
meaningful part in its strategy had significant consequences, resulting in ‘the lack
of the catalyst element a socialist movement requires to be itself ’ (Nairn 1965: 174;
see Anderson 1992a: 35). Wertheimer was less contemptuous of Labour’s empha-
sis on practical measures at the expense of theoretical commitment. He even con-
sidered the party’s vagueness about ultimate goals to have helped in recruiting the
unions (1930: 49), while its consequently ‘elastic methods’ ensured that it became
– at the time of writing – ‘the most powerful among the Labour parties of the
world’ (1930: 204).
The second element to Nairn’s overall analysis is the fact that in organisational
terms, from the party’s foundation, Labour was dominated by the trade unions.
This meant, as Anderson notes, that at its origins ‘there was to be no mention of
socialism’ (Anderson 1992b: 160). It also meant that when, in 1918, the party
adopted a new constitution, including an ideological position, Clause 4, which
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apparently defined Labour’s commitment to public ownership, it had little practi-
cal force. Despite appearances, Nairn (1965: 184) argues, this did not signify a con-
version to socialism; it rather assigned the latter ‘to its proper place, the
constitution, where it could be admired occasionally and referred to in moments
of emotion’.
Of more practical significance than Clause 4 was the party’s structure, outlined
in the 1918 constitution (and not substantively revised until 1997), which ensured
continued union ascendancy. Most obviously, union block votes cast at its annual
conference, for Nairn (using an often repeated phrase) ‘the dead souls of
labourism’, elected most of the seats on the ruling National Executive Committee
and determined the fate of proposals submitted to conference (Nairn 1965: 180).
This is because, for most of the party’s history, block votes constituting the affili-
ated members of trade unions massively outweighed the party’s individual mem-
bership. In similar vein, Wertheimer likened some of the block vote to ‘dead souls’,
those whose levies were paid by union officials despite their memberships having
lapsed (1930: 23). Writing years later, Anderson also took up the metaphor: ‘Over
time, it [the block vote] raised up a Leviathan of dead souls, whose mythical 
millions enabled party leaderships to crush rebellions and to finance elections’
(1992c: 349). It was these unions that constituted ‘the real basis of labourism’
(Nairn 1965: 208).
The union ascendancy made the development of a mass party much harder than
it would otherwise have been, as apolitical affiliated members undermined the
financial and electoral need to expand Labour’s active base. ‘The lack of any inten-
sive local party life and the slender threads that bound trade unionists to the party’,
Wertheimer stated (1930: 22), ‘tended to work against the formation of a strong
individual socialist consciousness.’ Sharing a commitment to piecemeal measures,
the Fabians and the trade unions formed an enduring alliance (Nairn 1965:
180–1). Compelled by a deep-seated loyalty and acutely aware of its own weak-
nesses, the party’s Left was however unable to challenge this bond. At times the link
between the unions and the PLP nonetheless endured what appeared to be an
unbearable tension. Wertheimer puzzled over its persistence in the face of mani-
fest incompatibilities over policy, in what Lewis Minkin (1991) characterised as
‘Wertheimer’s paradox’. Nevertheless it is an attachment that has been sustained in
one form or another to the present day.
The third part to Nairn’s analysis is the apparently defensive nature of Labour’s
outlook. From its earliest days, the overriding concern of the unions was not
socialism but the protection of workers’ living standards. They decided to establish
and foster their own political party in response to several factors, including: the
economic crises of the late nineteenth century; frustration over lack of support
from the Liberals; and legal judgments against them. In fact, Nairn concludes
(1965: 162), ‘trade union leaders were only convinced of the necessity for working
class politics when such action became necessary to safeguard trade-unionism
itself ’.
The party’s defensive orientation led to a concern with parliamentarianism and
– in order to win votes – ‘respectability’: this alignment explains Labour’s support
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for and belief in the ‘nation’. Paradoxically therefore Labour became both a party
of class (the working class) and a party of the nation and ‘Labourism is really the
history of this ambiguity’ (Nairn 1973: 49). Wertheimer noted that Labour’s trans-
formation from pressure group to governing party was comparatively relatively
easy (Wertheimer 1930: 46; see also 75–7). This is because, unlike other continen-
tal parties, it had never been illegal; did not see the state as repressive; and had no
record of opposition to existing political arrangements. Thus the labour move-
ment quickly became ‘an integral part of the British nation’. Reflecting its unique
status, from promoting gains by the working class, Labour frequently served to
defuse pressure for more far-reaching reforms to promote national unity. Hence
the measures brought about by the 1945–51 Labour Government were meant not
to bring victory to the proletariat but ‘to integrate the working class more ade-
quately into national life’ (Nairn 1973: 71). The effect of Labour’s hostility to the
European Common Market after 1970 served likewise to calm more radical
demands as it switched attention away from the class conflict that threatened to
engulf Heath’s Conservative administration (Nairn 1973: 80–3).
As already noted, Nairn’s denunciation of Labour’s defensive outlook echoed
that of Miliband. The latter also argued Labour played an integrative role in capi-
talist society similar to the subordination highlighted by Nairn (Miliband 1958:
46). Later, in his postscript to Parliamentary Socialism, Miliband argued (1972:
376) that capitalism ‘badly needs’ Labour ‘since it plays a major role in the man-
agement of discontent and helps to keep it within safe bounds’. In his study of
incomes policy, Leo Panitch (1976) also took up the integrative role of the Labour
Party in a sustained and persuasive analysis. David Coates and Leo Panitch further
develop some of these themes in chapter 5 of the present volume. In a detailed
analysis of Anderson’s account, Robert Looker (1988: 17) notes the similarities of
his approach to that of many other critics of Labourism, concluding it to be dis-
tinguished from them only by its essentially ‘relentlessly dismissive’ tone.
Nairn (1965: 179, 208) saw these three features, taken together, as creating a party
characterised by ‘subordination and defeat’ as well as by a ‘sclerotic conservatism’.
Anderson similarly emphasised the corporately defensive nature of Labour’s con-
figuration: the party, he believed, made no sustained attempt to be a hegemonic
transforming force in British politics (Anderson 1992a: 33). In the early 1960s sev-
eral features of Labour’s subordination stood out: one-third of working-class voters
supported the Conservatives; the party lacked activists (in fact more workers were
members of the Conservative Party); it had a weak youth movement; and did not
have the support of a partisan press (Anderson 1965: 251–5).
Both Nairn and Anderson allude somewhat elliptically to the form which a suc-
cessful reformist party might have taken in the context of British politics. Given
that their original argument was much influenced by Gramscian analysis (see For-
gacs 1989: 74–6), it is unsurprising that one significant feature of such a party
would be its hegemonic aspirations: for ‘a hegemonic class seeks to transform soci-
ety in its own image, inventing afresh its economic system, its political institutions,
its cultural values, its “mode of insertion” into the world’ (Anderson 1992a: 33).
The implication of their argument is that such a party required a coherent theo-
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retical understanding of a socialist transformation (Chun 1993: 80). Thus, ‘armed
with a more systematic vision, [Labour] would no doubt still have been defeated,
but its struggles would have entered an enduring tradition, capable of informing
the future’ (Anderson 1992a: 33). For a brief period, in the early 1960s, New Left
Review’s position, under Anderson’s editorship, indicated a hope that Harold
Wilson’s leadership of the party might just transform it into such a hegemonic
party. Anderson believed that Labour had some potential, provided it was pre-
pared ‘to transform the structure of British society’ (The Times, 7 June 1965). It was
a position New Left Review soon abandoned (for a sympathetic account see Elliott,
1998: 18–32; for critical comment see Birchall 1980–81 and Sassoon 1981).
The exceptional nature of British reformism
The notion of British exceptionalism is central to the Nairn–Anderson theses.
They maintain that exceptionalism permeated class forms and relations in Britain
(notably the form taken by the dominant land-owning class), the character of cap-
italist development, and the proletariat’s defensive and subordinate ethos that
shaped labourism. Repeatedly Nairn emphasised the different historical path taken
by reformists in the United Kingdom, a trajectory that led directly to the excep-
tional form of labourism as a peculiarly British phenomenon. Although lacking
Nairn’s historical perspective, Wertheimer’s discussion of Labour politics also
accords a fundamental significance to exceptionalism. His central contrast was
with the German Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) but he also drew
more general parallels between Britain and Europe. The opening sentence of his
book is blunt: ‘The foreign socialist undertaking a study of the British Labour
party is met by the surprising fact that its organisation completely departs in every
way from all that he has hitherto thought desirable and necessary’ (Wertheimer
1930: 1).
In particular, Nairn (1973: 71), in the first place, regards continental reformists
as much more open to ideas in the construction of a socialist programme, assert-
ing: ‘Above all, [British Labour] has much less in common than appears with the
traditions of Marxist internationalism which constitute the most precious inheri-
tance of the European working class.’ Wertheimer (1930: 45) similarly notes the
differing status given to theoretical programmes: ‘In contrast to the continental
parties, whose every stage of development was accompanied by a corresponding
programme, the British Labour party from its hour of birth to the last years of the
war had been quite content with the annual resolutions of the party conference.’
Of Labour’s 1918 programme, he thought that as ‘an example of theoretical insight
and knowledge’ it was ‘far inferior to the most elementary of continental socialist
programmes’ (1930: 60). In a discussion recorded with a trade union official
during his trip to study Swedish social democracy, Anderson (1961b: 41) reports:
‘We in Britain are more empirical – we don’t have this ideological approach you
continentals have.’
Second, Nairn believes the unions have not dominated European social 
democratic parties in the way they have governed Labour (1965: 168). Anderson
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(1992b: 161) contrasts Labour’s structure with those found on the continent: ‘Its
new [1918] constitution formally ratified the absolute dominance of the unions
inside the party with a voting structure unlike that of any European social democ-
racy, which effectively neutralized the admission of individual members’. For
Wertheimer, the relationship between Labour and the union was ‘utterly different’
from that on the continent (1930: 49).
Third, Nairn contends that Labour’s European equivalents were less defensive
and subordinate in their outlook. Although many looked towards parliamentary
tactics, they did not demonstrate the kind of utter devotion to this path character-
istic of Labour. This accords with Miliband’s view: ‘Parliamentarism in the British
Labour movement was only unique in that it was so much more explicit, confident
and uninhibited than its continental counterparts, and that it met with so much
less resistance’ (1972: 1–2). In distinguishing Labour’s attitude from that of Euro-
pean parties, Anderson is scathing:
In Britain, the working class has developed over one hundred and fifty years an
adamantine social consciousness, but never a commensurate political will. The very
name of its traditional political party underlines this truth. Alone of major European
working class formations, it is neither a Social Democratic nor a Socialist nor a Com-
munist Party; it is the Labour Party – a name which designates not an ideal society, as
do the others, but an existent interest. (1992a: 37; see also Fanti 1964: 31–2)
Despite a large working-class base and heavy industrialisation, political labour was
slow to organise in Britain, in marked contrast with most of Europe (Anderson
1992b: 159). Anderson judges that, ‘In consciousness and combativity, the English
working class has been overtaken by almost all its continental opposites’ (1992a:
26). He has repeated the point: ‘The political subordination of the British Labour
stood out in any comparative perspective’ including, for that matter, the United
States (Anderson 1992b: 161). Likewise Wertheimer (1930: 212) noted: ‘Member-
ship [as a union affiliate] is therefore most frequently only an attribute of loyalty
to the union, and by no means the result of personal inner conviction as on the
continent’.
Wertheimer (1930: 87–8) reported additional significant differences between
Labour and its European counterparts. For he judges Labour’s ultimate policy
aims were focused on public ownership while continental parties wanted to trans-
form the nature of work. European parties also adopted cultural aims, for example
regarding the relationship between Church and State. Labour in contrast was
judged to be more embedded in the prevailing dominant culture than its
Left–reformist counterparts were within their own polities (1930: 89–93). He also
remarked on the related ease with which Labour’s parliamentary leadership 
controlled the party, for this was a product of the structure of union affiliations
which contrasted with the continental experience of party machine domination
(1930: 216).
Labour’s 1945 general election victory meant that, for a fleeting moment at least,
‘[t]he national “British way” appeared vindicated’ (Nairn 1973: 72). In the event,
though full employment was temporarily achieved, the basic configuration of
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capitalism was not challenged and the City of London, Britain’s financial sector,
recovered its dominant position within the economy (Anderson 1992b: 166). After
1948, the Fabian notion of inevitable progress according to which reform led to
further reform was discredited as the Labour Government struggled to sustain the
pace it had established during its first years in office: ‘in reality, the Labour party’s
loss of confidence was the dominating fact’ (Nairn 1965: 195). The relative pros-
perity that followed this reassertion of capitalist power also disoriented Labour:
‘For about ten years after the defeat of 1951, Labourism seemed to drift at the
mercy of events, feebly trying to discover a new formula’ (Nairn 1965: 199).
Labour’s singularity is therefore central to the explanation that Nairn and
Anderson offer of its ultimate failure. In his re-evaluation of their work, Anderson
(1992b: 190) summarises the correlates that defined British reformism, ‘a perva-
sive and deep-rooted union implantation’ with ‘a traditional lack of central
authority and obdurate resistance to rationalization of the factors of production’.
He asserts that this combination precluded the construction of ‘a Swedish or Aus-
trian path in the post-war UK’. From this claim, it can be inferred that Anderson
considers – in a way similar to later analysts – that union structures have ruled out
the construction of corporatist-type arrangements in which short-term costs
might be traded for longer term gains (for a discussion of which see Garrett 1998).
Interestingly, at the time of his support for Wilson’s Labour, Anderson had indi-
cated (1964: 25) tentative support for incomes policies as a path by which socialist
objectives might be advancted.
Anderson and Nairn’s stress on the exceptional character of British political
development as an explanation of the many disappointments undergone by the
labour movement has attracted considerable academic attention. In his polemical
response, E. P. Thompson (1965: 312) was bitterly critical of their notion that other
countries did things ‘in every respect better’. Thompson (1965: 337–9) criticised
the lack of empirical detail in Nairn’s account, a deficiency which he thought led
the latter, on the one hand, to exaggerate the role played by Fabianism and, on the
other, to neglect the contribution made by the more radical socialists. More
friendly critics like Raphael Samuel and Gareth Stedman Jones (1982: 325)
charged Nairn and Anderson with using particular episodes to construct a mis-
leading ‘ideal-type’ of labourism which they then used as a framework through
which to view the party’s history. In response to Thompson, Anderson conceded
that his original analysis was overly cultural and neglected the contribution of the
Communist Party to the labour movement (1992b: 168; 1966: 24). Nonetheless,
George Lichtheim praised both Thompson and Anderson–Nairn with equanimity.
Noting the emergence of an ‘Anglo-Marxism’, he concluded that ‘Thompson is
right: the British development fits the Marxian categories as much as does the
French’ while stating that Anderson and Nairn’s ‘brilliant’ and ‘fruitful’ conceptual
approach ‘looks like a remarkably successful naturalisation of Gramsci’s neo-
Marxism’ (Lichtheim 1965: 14–15).
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Labour and Sweden in the 1950s
In their analysis, Nairn and Anderson say less about the insular outlook of British
reformism than about its exceptional nature. Implicit in their approach, however,
is the conviction that not only does Labour differ by comparison with other social
democratic parties but that it is isolated from them, with detrimental consequences
for the reformist project in the UK. Thus, in his discussion of Swedish social
democracy, Anderson contended that the British Left ‘has usually tended to be
insular’ and had ‘much to learn from Sweden and other countries’ (1961a: 4–5).
With regard to ideas, Nairn (1965: 164) argued: ‘The leaders of labourism thought
that, however appropriate Marxism might be in foreign countries, it just had no
reference to Britain.’ He went on to quote G. D. H. Cole’s reference to Ben Tillett, a
union militant, who declared in 1893 that ‘he would sooner have the solid, pro-
gressive, matter-of-fact fighting trade unionism of England than all the hare-
brained challenges and magpies of continental revolutionists’ (Nairn 1965: 171). A
general belief in insularity also figures prominently in Wertheimer’s account. He
observed (1930: 53) that when, in 1918, Labour did finally adopt a policy docu-
ment – Labour and the New Social Order – which outlined a set of aims, it had little
impact abroad, which Wertheimer took to be a reflection of the party’s isolation
from other reformists.
A significant criticism of the notion that Labour has been from the outset an
insular exceptionalist–reformist party, however, is to be found in the argument
that, during the 1950s and early 1960s, some of its senior figures – namely revi-
sionists on the party’s Right – looked towards their European neighbours in a sys-
tematic and determined fashion. This need not, however, be seen as contradicting
Nairn and Anderson’s case, as it may simply mean that the likes of Gaitskell and
Crosland reached similar conclusions at about the same time and decided to tackle
the party’s historical isolation. Notes from a talk given by Crosland certainly
demonstrate some sympathy for the Nairn–Anderson interpretation including
such headings as ‘Britain: what’s wrong’ or ‘Continuous under-estimate of Eur.
Mov.’, ‘Nostalgia for Little England’, and ‘No foreign invasion or defeat’. Crosland
appeared to echo Anderson’s historical analysis in writing: ‘Class structure not
abolished: aristocracy peacefully embraced new classes’ (Crosland nd). Anderson’s
pieces on Swedish politics were in fact based on his belief that Labour was begin-
ning to open itself up by looking at social democratic achievements elsewhere –
although he soon abandoned that position. Nairn (1964: 65) does not appear to
have ever adopted such a view, for he characterised revisionism as a recasting of
Fabianism and saw Gaitskell as the ‘chosen vehicle’ for the ‘continuation of the
alliance between Fabian intellectualism and trade union bureaucracy’. His scepti-
cism on this point is confirmed by a later comment that, the revisionists consti-
tuted a generation of ‘liberal thinkers’ who ‘invented “social democratic” forces for
the Labour party, based upon largely spurious parallels with continental socialist
reformism’ (Nairn 1981: 51; my emphasis).
In contrast to this, a number of academics have asserted that Labour’s revision-
ists did look towards Swedish social democracy with genuine interest. David
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Howell (1980: 193) argued that, in the 1950s, the revisionists ‘proclaimed Sweden
as a worthy example for British Labour to emulate, regarding it as a society where
social democracy had adapted itself successfully to material affluence in such a way
as to appear the natural governing party’. Howell (1980: 201) claimed vindication
in positions found in Crosland’s The Future of Socialism (1956) and especially in
his 1963 The Conservative Enemy. Further support is offered by Stefan Berger’s
claim (2000: 322) that Crosland ‘like many in the Labour Party remained in touch
with mainland European reformism, in particular in the Scandinavian countries’.
Just how significant an influence was Swedish social democracy on Crosland is
debatable. The question is, however, important as Crosland enjoys considerable
status as perhaps the pre-eminent post-war social democratic theorist. Moreover,
while he opened The Future of Socialism with the statement ‘This book is about
socialism in Britain’, he continued parenthetically that it ‘draws freely on the expe-
riences of other countries, notably Sweden and the United States’(1956: 12).
Anderson (1961a: 4) considered Crosland to draw heavily on the former’s experi-
ence and, while he noted that the latter received an equal number of mentions, ‘of
the two [Crosland] gives the palm to Sweden as coming nearest to “the socialist’s
ideal of the ‘good’ society”’. In fact, the Index to the book lists over 80 references to
the United States but only around 30 to Sweden, a pattern repeated in The Conser-
vative Enemy where there are 13 references to Sweden and a further 4 to Scandi-
navia, but nearly 40 to the United States. Moreover, in both volumes, Crosland’s
references to Sweden focus descriptively on particular aspects of its political econ-
omy and society: few make normative points about Swedish social democracy and
what it might imply for Labour’s programme.
At points Crosland is in fact keen to distance himself from the Scandinavian
model, suggesting in particular that joint enterprise councils and incomes policies
should not be applied in Britain because they were inappropriate to the national
context (1956: 342, 458). Hence, although impressed by the Swedish social democ-
rats’ electoral success, Crosland believed the programme that underpinned it held
little relevance to Britain. Hence the absence of a detailed critical engagement with
Swedish politics is unsurprising because central aspects of the Swedish model were
far removed from the one that Crosland lays out. In his discussion of wages, for
example, Crosland (1956: 451) cites the 1953 translation of a Swedish trades union
confederation – the Landorganisationen (LO) – report. This document laid out in
detail what was to become the Rehn–Meidner model, which functioned in the
period of full employment to facilitate labour mobility and wage restraint while
promoting a measure of egalitarianism in the determination of wages. Although
Crosland described this as containing an ‘excellent discussion’ of wages policy, he
disagreed with its substantive argument. High profits, Crosland argued, would
inevitably undermine wage restraint, which in such circumstances would have to be
abandoned. The LO’s position, in contrast, was to tackle rising profits accruing to
employers during a period of full employment through a fiscal squeeze while main-
taining some form of wage restraint. Perhaps indicative of Crosland’s work’s insu-
larity, Sassoon (1996: 244) considers that, while deemed to be of so much influence
in Britain, The Future of Socialism had very little impact elsewhere in Europe.
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If Crosland was not interested in looking closely at the Swedish experience, nei-
ther were other members of the British labour movement (see Wickham-Jones
2001). Between 1951 and 1964 only one Labour Party delegation and one Trades
Union Congress (TUC) group visited Sweden to investigate how their counterparts
went about matters. The 1951 Labour Party visit was of little consequence and
accorded only the briefest of references in the party’s annual report. The TUC visit
in October 1962 was of more moment as it was interested in discovering the basis for
union centralisation, the reasons for Sweden’s calmer industrial relations and how
the national interest could be reconciled to that of individual unions. It concluded,
however, that ‘[c]lear and precise answers were not obtained to each of these ques-
tions’ (TUC 1962: 1). Members of the TUC Economics Committee were also quick
to argue that ‘great care’ should be taken in drawing conclusions about the extent to
which aspects of the Swedish system were applicable in Britain: it was always unwise,
and could be dangerous, to assume that what worked satisfactorily in one country
could be imitated in another’ (TUC Economics Committee 1963: 24).
The most common reasons given at that time by British social democrats and
trade unionists as to why the Swedish approach was inappropriate concerned
structural differences between the two polities. Given Labour’s advocacy of an
incomes policy, and the support offered for a time by the TUC to the party on this
matter, however, the structural argument is not persuasive. Other critics of the
Swedish model focused on its goals to conclude that the British movement should
not adopt such policies because they were undesirable. This is because the Swedish
road included collaboration between organised labour and employers, something
which many British union leaders feared would erode their independence and abil-
ity to advance their members’ interests. The TUC’s 1962 trip was nonetheless a
serious initiative in looking at social democratic arrangements, but little came of
it. When corporatist-style policies were adopted in the UK in the mid-1960s, they
were very different (and much less successful) than those adopted in Sweden.
Further evidence of Labour’s insularity is to be found in its economic policy-
making process of this time. Few policy documents looked at the experience of
social democratic parties abroad. In the case of Sweden, only one internal docu-
ment, a report of a Socialist International experts’ conference, held in 1955, dis-
cussed features of its model. And this did not feed into the party’s policy-making
machinery. Although on some issues the party did look at arrangements abroad,
for example concerning planning, when Labour returned to the question of
incomes policy in the early 1960s it did not address either the Swedish experience
or those of social democratic parties elsewhere. The overall impression is therefore
of an insular and internalised policy-making process (Wickham-Jones 2001).
Two significant points emerge from this discussion of Labour’s supposed
attempt to learn from the Swedish experience. First, the claim that Labour looked
towards Sweden is exaggerated. Second, Nairn’s argument about the defensive and
subordinate outlook of British trade unionism is only partly confirmed. In some
ways, the TUC was more open than was the party, although the reasons why it
eventually rejected the Swedish model are redolent of the labourism that Nairn
claimed was so influential in shaping Labour politics.
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Conclusions
This chapter has outlined Tom Nairn and Perry Anderson’s account of Labour
Party politics. It has proved to be immensely influential over the last forty years.
Their polemical dismissal of the party has become an important part of the dis-
course by which Labour’s failings as a reformist project are frequently and critically
evaluated. To give just one example, in his best-selling The State We’re In, Will
Hutton (1995: 46–8) laments the ‘poverty’ of Labour’s strategic thinking and the
domination of the party by economistic unions, the party’s constitution being ‘dis-
figured’ by block votes.
Nairn and Anderson emphasise the force of historical development: how much
their characterisation of British reformism depends upon this particular trajectory
is, however, uncertain. One can accept their conclusions about Labour’s atheoret-
ical outlook, subordination to the trade unions and defensive outlook without
endorsing their analysis of British history. Nairn and Anderson nonetheless make
a series of powerful points about the possible origins of Labour’s failure to more
fully transform capitalism.
It is arguable that some of their reasoning is exaggerated due to the polemical
idiom in which they were expressed. At times the party may not have been as hos-
tile to theoretical influence as Nairn suggests: the work of G. D. H. Cole, Evan
Durbin and R. H. Tawney is pertinent here, as is Crosland’s own contribution (for
a useful survey on these issues see Thompson 1996). A lack of regard for Marxism
did not necessarily mean the party was uninterested in ideas. There have also been
constraints on the unions’ domination of the party: the leadership has been able to
extract resources and money as well as acquiescence over certain policy issues in
exchange for meeting union demands. At times these exchanges, a central theme of
the work of Lewis Minkin, which is highlighted by Eric Shaw in chapter 11 of this
collection, have been far less one-sided than Nairn indicates. Indeed, from Nairn’s
standpoint, Wertheimer’s paradox – the policy disparity between economically-
minded union leaders and politically driven parliamentarians – is inexplicable. As
a series of exchanges, both rational and norm-driven, the relationship makes more
sense. Finally, Labour has not always been as defensive and subordinate in outlook
as Nairn claims: radical programmes have been designed that go beyond the kind
of practical reformism associated with Fabianism. In practice, however, the impact
of such programmes has often been disappointing while the party’s experience in
office has often been, to say the least, disappointing.
The notion of exceptionalism is a powerful one. From its foundation in 1900,
there were significant differences of outlook, policy, organisation and ethos
between Labour and other European reformist parties. In a recent work, Fielding
(2000) argues persuasively that the distinctions between Labour and some mythi-
cal norm of what constituted European social democracy have been exaggerated.
Yet, while defining any ‘European model’ is problematical, it is evident that many
continental social democratic parties have shared a range of features, especially in
terms of their programmes. The German Wertheimer certainly believed they
enjoyed a common identity, discourse and programme, and that Labour did not.
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Take the contrast between Labour and the Swedish social democrats in the 1950s:
they had different organisational structures (including distinct relationships
between the party and the unions) and varied policy commitments which in turn
reflected diverse conceptions as to what should be the goal of social democratic
parties. There was a clear hostility in the United Kingdom, noted above, towards a
mimicking of Swedish arrangements. Other European parties looked towards each
other and learned from each other; in contrast, Labour did not. When Swedish
labour economists sought to discuss their programme with the TUC their
advances were rebuffed (Wickham-Jones 2001).
Labour’s exceptionalism, in turn, has been related to its insularity. The concept
of insularity exposed by Anderson and Nairn is an important one: it provides an
explanation, in part at any rate, for the particular character of British reformism
and for the kinds of policies that the party has articulated. For much of its history
Labour has been reluctant to discuss, let alone learn from, experiences elsewhere.
The disparities between Labour and Europe were well illustrated in the debate over
British membership of the Common Market. In 1971, the left-wing MP Eric Heffer
told the special Labour Party Conference that debated British membership of the
Common Market: ‘We must have confidence in our ability to build a socialist
Britain, and not to look for some panacea outside’ (Labour Party 1971: 339). A
decade later, in 1981, Tony Benn complained about a draft policy paper because it
was ‘a real bureaucrats’ paper – let’s copy France and Japan. There was nothing
about social justice or socialism’ (Benn 1992: 150). These statements are redolent
of a prevalent insularity that has defined much of the Labour Party’s history – one
evident on both the party’s Right and its Left.
Whether the party remains as insular as it once was is another matter. During
the 1980s, partly in response to a general Europeanisation of British politics,
Labour looked overtly to the European social democrats, although Anderson
doubted the extent of this development (see 1992c: 328). During the 1990s, the
party under Tony Blair’s leadership became more eclectic, looking to the experi-
ence of the Democrats in the United States but also the Australian Labour Party
(see King and Wickham-Jones 1999). Arguably, however, these developments came
too late to revive the reformist project within the UK. Indeed, by the 1990s, it could
be argued, Labours’ leaders looked abroad to find ways of finally killing off
the hope that the party would ever be the means by which capitalism would be 
radically transformed.
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In the ranks of that distinguished generation of post-war British academics who
established labour history on a professional footing, Henry Pelling is generally
regarded as worthy but rather dull. For he did not share the more colourful far-left
political affiliations of figures such as Eric Hobsbawm and Edward Thompson.
Indeed, when these Marxists were at the height of their influence in the late 1960s
and 1970s, Pelling’s careful history of the British Communist Party was frequently
dismissed as Cold War propaganda. At that time his contributions to the history of
the Labour Party were commonly pigeon-holed as scholarly but narrow, for they
were seen as mere political history with no obvious wider implications for the
analysis of society as a whole. As Jay Winter (1983: x) put it, albeit respectfully, in
the Introduction to a collection of essays in Pelling’s honour:
In place of what may be called the ‘sixty years’ march syndrome’ of labour history,
Pelling quietly and authoritatively provided . . . a rigorous and accurate account of the
evolution of the institutions of the modern labour movement . . . In a sense, his polit-
ical histories have helped to fulfil the classic aim of historical scholarship: the replace-
ment of mythology or vague memory by painstakingly-researched and documented
historical analysis.
At the same time, many modern British political historians, increasingly interested
in Labour’s replacement of the Liberals as the main party of progress, were associ-
ating Henry Pelling’s name with an interpretation of the rise of Labour based on
broader social trends. Thus, in one popular survey, Paul Adelman (1972: 87) out-
lined the work of a school of historians who emphasised the extent to which the
Liberals’ political base had decayed before the outbreak of the First World War:
Pelling, for example, has emphasized repeatedly the enormous importance of increas-
ing trade union affiliations for future Labour development . . . Moreover, he stresses
the importance of those more general social and economic factors – growing difficul-
ties in basic industries like coal, for example, coupled with increasing geographical
unity on the one hand but deeper class divisions on the other – which were bound
eventually to play into the hands of the Labour Party.
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Indeed, Winter claimed that Pelling had been able to bridge the divide between the
approach associated with an older generation of historians, who emphasised
activism and struggle, and that of a younger generation, more concerned with
popular Conservatism and apathy. In that sense he considered that Pelling had
made an influential contribution to ‘a better understanding of the multiple polit-
ical and social meanings of the experience of class in modern Britain’ (Winter
1983: xi).
Early career
Clearly there are some threads to be disentangled here, and it may be helpful to
begin with some biographical information. Like most of the other members of the
founding generation of labour historians, Pelling’s early life was dominated by a
combination of studying history at Cambridge University and serving in the
armed forces during the Second World War (Winter 1983: viii). Indeed, he came
from a conventional upper-middle-class family and started out with classics, so it
was the interruption of his studies by the experience of military service which
turned him towards more progressive politics and more recent history. Perhaps
because this shift in his interests coincided with the Labour Party’s landslide elec-
tion victory of 1945 and the urgent tasks of post-war reconstruction which it then
faced in government, Pelling was never attracted to the Communist Party. On the
contrary, his role as secretary of his university Labour Party and Fabian Society
allowed him to meet such memorable celebrities as the Cabinet Minister Hugh
Dalton. Meanwhile, one of the more significant influences among his teachers was
the economic historian Michael Postan, an outspokenly anti-Marxist East Euro-
pean emigré, close to figures on Labour’s right wing such as Hugh Gaitskell. More-
over, Pelling’s subsequent doctoral research on the early history of the ILP brought
him into personal contact with many of the by-then-elderly pioneers of British
Labour politics, and he struck up particularly warm relationships with such ethi-
cal socialists as Kathleen Bruce Glasier.
As already indicated, when this research began to appear in published form it
had something of a paradoxical character. For, on the one hand, Pelling paid a great
deal of attention to the detail of political events. In his own words at the beginning
of his first major work, The Origins of the Labour Party: ‘This book is an attempt to
describe how the Labour Party came into existence. It is primarily a study in the
development of new political structure’ (Pelling 1954a: v). He looked in particular
at the leadership, the ideas and the interaction between such small groups as the
Social Democratic Federation (SDF), the Socialist League, the Fabian Society and
the ILP. And his sources were largely institutional ones: the newspapers, pamphlets
and minute books of these organisations, supplemented where possible by corre-
spondence between their leaders, which he had frequently collected himself from
those directly involved. On the other hand, however, Pelling also sometimes
accounted for long-term political trajectories in much broader social terms. Thus
he concluded his ‘Introduction’ by discounting the influence of political thought
on the emergence of the Labour Party, emphasising instead ‘the continually
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increasing importance of the “labour interest” in a country which, with a matur-
ing capitalist economy and a well-established class system, was now verging on
political democracy’ (Pelling 1954a: 12).
Given the political and intellectual context in which his own basic approach had
been formed, it would have been surprising had there been no comments of this
sort in Pelling’s work. For Labour’s triumph in the general election of 1945, and the
creation of the National Health Service and the nationalisation of leading indus-
tries that followed, were widely seen as the fulfilment of earlier socialist predictions
about the evolution of modern industrial societies. There may have been some
brief setbacks on the way, but history seemed to be on their side and to have turned
in their direction gratifyingly quickly, indeed within the space of one lifetime. It
was, after all, only forty-five years since the foundation of the Labour Party, and
only sixty years since the emergence of the earliest modern socialist groups.
Perhaps that was all there was to it: Pelling had intended to write only narrow
political history, but had been swept along by the surrounding atmosphere into
making unguarded comments reflecting the times he lived in rather than his own
considered judgements. His contribution to the history of the Labour Party would
therefore best be appreciated by discarding the dated chaff of his more general
remarks in order to preserve the fertile seed of his detailed institutional analysis.
And his reputation would remain worthy but still dull.
The remainder of this chapter suggests, however, that to do so would be a mis-
understanding of the way he opened up the serious historical study of the Labour
Party, and that it would risk leaving out the core of his own interest and motiva-
tion. The first two sections look more closely at Pelling’s early work on the origins
of the Labour Party and show how it was based on a coherent, if theoretically
understated, conception of class and politics in modern Britain. The third section
examines some of Pelling’s unpublished papers to explore the influences on his
thinking of a distinctive and, for an allegedly dull historian, perhaps surprisingly
continental strand of socialist thought. More broadly, this chapter hopefully
demonstrates that a position sympathetic to the moderate mainstream of the
Labour Party, rather than to the Communist Party or the New Left, does not need
to be intellectually uninteresting.
The apparent paradox in Pelling’s work was already evident at the start of his first
major book. For The Origins of the Labour Party (1954a) begins by accounting for
organised labour’s adherence to the Liberal Party in the 1860s and 1870s in specif-
ically political terms, as a result of the restricted franchise and limited financial
resources, alongside the appeal of William Gladstone’s progressive policies. But it
then goes on to introduce the changes of subsequent decades with the broader
social claim that ‘large-scale industry developed a class solidarity among the work-
ers which in the end facilitated effective political action in the interest of labour as
a whole’ (1954a: 4). More careful consideration, however, reveals aspects of this
claim that otherwise may not be immediately obvious.
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Firstly, the conception of ‘class solidarity among the workers’ was not framed in
orthodox Marxist terms as a reduction of distinctive positions to a lowest common
denominator of economic deprivation, leading eventually to a bitter political
revolt. Rather it was seen in quietly revisionist terms as an increase in material well-
being and organisational strength, leading to a growing capacity for constructive
political reform. Thus Pelling followed the passage cited above with a description
of the establishment of the Trades Union Congress (TUC) in the late 1860s, its suc-
cess in improving the legal status of trade unions, the rising expectations of the
craft bodies and the first signs of organisation among less-skilled workers in the
early 1870s.
This period of progress was soon followed by a long economic depression
which, contrary to orthodox Marxist predictions, ‘so far from encouraging Social-
ism and the break-up of the Liberal Party, actually discouraged working-class mil-
itancy and destroyed the “advanced” elements then in existence’ (1954a: 6).
However, the more positive dynamic was reasserting itself by the late 1880s, for
‘throughout the last half of the century the effective political strength of labour was
almost constantly increasing: the growth of industry, the improvement of real
wages and conditions, and the extension of educational facilities all combined to
maintain this long-term trend’ (1954a: 7). Even in discussing the widespread feel-
ing of insecurity in the trade union world following the defeat of the engineers by
an aggressive employers’ lockout in 1897, Pelling was still at pains to highlight the
distinctive conditions affecting each organisation. Thus long-term unemployment
in metalworking, new technology in shoemaking and printing, and poor working
conditions on the railways were neither reduced to one underlying trend nor seen
as leading to any kind of revolt against the system: ‘the attitude of the bulk of the
unions now favouring independent labour representation was dictated more by
fear for the security of their existing position than by the hope of any millennium’
(1954a: 211). Moreover, it was just as important that they had been able to build
up the financial reserves to allow them to do something about it.
Secondly, the nature of ‘effective action in the interest of labour as a whole’
would be fundamentally shaped by the political terrain to be traversed. In the
British case this meant above all that any attempt to turn it in a revolutionary
direction would lead to a dead end. Thus, in reviewing the trajectories of different
socialist groups in the Conclusion to The Origins of the Labour Party, Pelling
remarked that ‘the British working class as a whole had no use for the conception
of violent revolution. Any leader who failed to recognise this could not expect to
win widespread support’ (1954a: 231). Indeed the leader of the SDF, H. M. Hynd-
man, had already been dismissed in a way which was humourously appropriate
both in itself and in its application to later generations of would-be revolution-
aries:
Hyndman saw himself as the Chairman of the Committee of Public Safety, installed in
office by an untutored but enthusiastic mob aroused to violence by the bitterness of
capitalistic crisis. It was an entertaining if somewhat unreal expectation that he, the
City man, complete with the frock-coat and top-hat which were his customary dress,
should be borne to power as the workers’ choice in order to inaugurate the dictator-
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ship of the proletariat. History has seen many ironies, but this was one which it was
not to tolerate. (1954a: 49)
In addition to the revolutionaries’ underestimation of the intelligence of ordinary
people and misunderstanding of the impact of economic circumstances, this was
also due, in Pelling’s view, to the extension of political democracy in late nine-
teenth-century Britain. For working men were increasingly able to express their
views peacefully through the doubling of the national electorate by the 1884
Reform Act, accompanied by less dramatic but equally important legislation of
1882–83 removing the property qualifications for candidates in borough elections
and preventing most methods of bribing voters. Moreover, the wider background
to such appeal as socialism did have in the British context was strongly coloured by
radical land reformers like Henry George and backward-looking cultural critics
like Thomas Carlyle and John Ruskin. Thus among the early socialist groups it was
the Fabian Society’s decision to adopt constitutional reformism and evolutionary
gradualism that provided an appropriate application of Marxist social theory to
British political conditions as well as synthesising it with indigenous intellectual
traditions.
Thirdly a grasp of the correct overall strategy would, however, rarely be enough,
for political success also depended on being able to choose the right tactics. Thus,
while Fabianism provided an accurate analysis of trends in British society and pol-
itics, it made little contribution to the foundation of the Labour Party because its
leading figures, based as they were in London, became too bound up in futile
attempts to permeate the existing Liberal and Conservative Parties. By contrast,
other reformist socialists committed themselves to building up independent
labour representation by following the example of the Irish Nationalists, who had
obtained concessions by securing the election of a group of MPs large enough to
hold the balance of power in the House of Commons. The most prominent among
this type was Keir Hardie, from the west of Scotland, who combined this parlia-
mentary ambition with the struggle to build an alliance between his ILP and the
TUC in order to tap the latter’s financial resources, eventually leading to the foun-
dation of the Labour Representation Committee (LRC) in 1900. Although Hardie
had begun as an enthusiastic Gladstonian Liberal, his personal experience of the
brutal conditions of the coalmining industry led him to advocate a break with both
existing parties from surprisingly early in his political career:
Labour questions, thought Hardie, should take precedence over all other questions,
and working men irrespective of party should combine to effect this. Nor was this, he
considered, an impossible task: for even without further constitutional reform, work-
ing men could exert a decisive influence at Westminster. But it could only be done if
those who were sent to Parliament to represent labour were bound to a definite labour
programme. (1954a: 75)
Fourthly, the effectiveness of the tactics chosen would be vitally dependent on
the responses of significant political opponents and rivals. Thus the sharp growth
in trade union affiliations to the LRC after 1901 was a result of the latest manifes-
tation of hostile judge-made law in the Taff Vale ruling. This stipulated that,
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although individual leaders were now safe from being sued through the courts for
criminal conspiracy for their actions during industrial disputes, the unions as
organisations could be sued for civil conspiracy and the amounts involved in pay-
ments of damages to employers could be very substantial. Even more vitally, the
growing momentum of the LRC within the overall ‘progressive alliance’ between
organised labour and middle-class liberalism was the result of the stubborn resist-
ance of the local Liberal Parties to the adoption of trade union candidates, despite
consistent pressure in that direction from their national organisers:
All along, there is little doubt that most of the non-Socialist trade-union leaders would
have been happy to stay in the Liberal Party – which most of them had belonged to in
the past – if the Liberals had made arrangements for a larger representation of the
working class among their Parliamentary candidates . . . Even Keir Hardie’s revolt at
Mid-Lanark in 1888 had been directed, not against the policy of Gladstone, but
against the system by which the local association chose its candidate. (1954a: 235–6)
Yet the Liberal leadership itself was not exempt from criticism for its handling of
the new political currents, for it proved to be surprisingly slow in pressing seriously
for the state payment of MPs’ salaries and of returning officers’ fees, both reforms
which might have helped to retain the loyalties at least of the smaller trade unions.
Fifthly, and finally, a complete historical account of effective political mobilisa-
tion would require not only an evaluation of the intellectual analysis available but
also an appreciation of the level of emotional commitment involved. Here, as
Pelling made clear in reviewing a collection of essays on Sidney and Beatrice Webb,
was another major weakness of the Fabians:
The paradox of the Webbs was that, fundamentally, they did not understand politics
. . . They knew how institutions worked, and within certain limits they could work
them; but they could not measure the forces that transmuted and transcended these
institutions – the elemental forces of political power. ‘Marriage’, said Beatrice, ‘is the
wastepaper basket of the emotions’. She did not realize that the same could be said of
politics or indeed of almost every field of human endeavour. (Pelling 1950: 507)
By contrast, the success of the early ILP was bound up with its quasi-religious out-
look and the powerful motivating force of its members’ passionate faith in the ulti-
mate victory of their cause. Indeed, a strictly accurate estimate of resources and
prospects was not always advisable:
It does not matter if the faith feeds on illusions, for it is capable of conquering reality
. . . It was this crusading zeal which drew attention to the Socialists in the eighties, and
enabled them . . . to have an influence in politics far beyond what their numbers jus-
tified. (Pelling 1954a: 229–30)
Drawing on the deep traditions of popular religious nonconformity was probably
inevitable, given the family backgrounds of most of those involved, and this bedrock
of emotional attitudes was fundamental to the ILP activists’ sense of purpose and
enthusiasm. It was also fundamental in shaping their public performances, espe-
cially in the case of Hardie and Philip Snowden, both of whom delivered speeches
consciously based on the sermonising techniques of evangelical revivalism.
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Labour and politics
For Pelling, then, class was intimately bound up with politics. In so far as there
were important ‘pre-political’ elements of ‘class solidarity among the workers’,
providing an underlying foundation, they were not confined to material forces. For
they included not only such economic trends as larger workplaces and higher
wages, but such social trends as increasing education and literacy, and such cul-
tural and religious traditions as literary Romanticism and popular nonconformity.
But class, for Pelling, was not something which impinged on politics from the out-
side; rather it was to a very large extent the result of political processes. The choice
of strategy and tactics, the response of rivals and the mobilising of emotion among
potential supporters were all vital elements in facilitating ‘effective political action
in the interest of labour as a whole’. Indeed, he was later to comment of the ILP
leaders that ‘by their constant emphasis on the importance of “labour representa-
tion” they had done much to foster the growth of class solidarity’ (Bealey and
Pelling 1958: 283). Thus The Origins of the Labour Party concluded with a passage
which begins by celebrating the formation of a permanent party, moves on to
highlight its dependence on human agency and ends on what might be read, in the
increasingly faction-ridden 1950s, as a note of warning:
[T]he unity of the party, once established, remained substantially intact, and in the
first half-century of its life, every General Election but two that it fought resulted in
an increase of the aggregate Labour poll. The association of Socialist faith and trade-
union interest, of hope for an ideal future and fear for an endangered present,
seemed on the point of disruption at times: yet it survived, for a variety of reasons
which lie outside the compass of this book, but also because in the years before the
party’s birth there had been men and women who believed that the unity of the
working-class movement, both in industry and politics, was an object to be striven
for, just as now most of their successors regard it as an achievement to be main-
tained. (1954a: 241)
Pelling, then, was clearly not an orthodox Marxist; nor, despite his close atten-
tion to institutions, was he a straightforward Fabian. The Origins of the Labour
Party, as its very title suggests, did contain significant teleological elements, for it
identified those chains of events which led to the end-point of the foundation con-
ference in 1900. However, his immersion in the study of the late nineteenth cen-
tury was deep enough for Pelling to have detached himself from the inevitable
evolution assumed by most of his left-wing contemporaries. Instead he was able to
pay attention to the ways in which the two older parties had also been able to
reconstruct genuine appeals, even under a more democratic franchise. For the Lib-
erals had been able to draw on the traditions of nonconformity and temperance,
and under Gladstone become associated with highly emotional struggles for the
extension of the franchise and a democratic foreign policy. Meanwhile, the Con-
servatives, partly defined in opposition as the party of the established Church and
the brewing trade, had actively associated themselves with such equally emotive
issues as paternalistic social reform and hostility towards immigrants. A Labour
Party had undoubtedly emerged, but there had been nothing inevitable about it
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and, though active in a rapidly changing social context, the party was to remain
deeply influenced by the political background out of which it had stepped:
Its principal leaders were all ex-Liberals, many of them Liberals still in all but name;
and the object of its policy in its first thirty years of life seemed to be not so much to
win the confidence of the whole working class as to supplant the Liberal party. In this
aim it succeeded, and by the nineteen-twenties it had become the party of the Celts
and the nonconformists, of the teetotallers and the pacifists. The process of adaptation
to make it a national party and to redress its bias of old Liberalism seems to be still in
progress, not having gone all the way when the party attained power for the first time
in 1945. (Pelling 1953: 238)
It should now be clear that for Pelling political agency and the legacies of previ-
ous political actions were the decisive factors in understanding the origins and
nature of the Labour Party. Social trends did provide important material for politi-
cians to work with, and on the whole those in Britain favoured increasingly effec-
tive democratic reformism. However, there was no concession to any notion of a
unified working class as the basis for explanations of political behaviour. On this
issue there is a clear line to be drawn between Henry Pelling’s approach and those
not only of contemporary orthodox Marxists such as Eric Hobsbawm, but of
younger post-Marxists such as Gareth Stedman Jones and Ross McKibbin. For all
of these other historians assumed the economic formation of a homogeneous
working class in late nineteenth-century Britain and consequently saw the main
task as being to explain its lack of interest in socialism, let alone revolution (Hob-
sbawm 1984; McKibbin 1990; Stedman Jones 1983; and for further discussion of
these issues see Reid 1995). In some contrast it is striking that in his second major
work, Labour and Politics, 1900–1906, written jointly with Frank Bealey, Pelling
went out of his way in his introductory chapter to emphasise that, even after the
formation of the Labour Party, popular attitudes remained highly fragmented
along regional lines. This was a development of his long-standing interest in the
very different characteristics of labour politics in the south and the north, partly
already explained as a result of the more open and more radical nature of London
Liberalism, but now increasingly also seen as a result of deeper cultural traditions.
To some extent these might be understood in terms of the relationship between
each region and the central State. For example, on the issue of the Boer War, which
was just coming to an end at the time of Labour’s foundational conference, the
adoption of political positions ‘was largely determined by traditional sectional loy-
alties which in some cases had been maturing since the Middle Ages. The Welsh,
the Irish, and to some extent the Scots, with the aid of the English religious dis-
senters, stood against the tide of Imperialism’ (Bealey and Pelling 1958: 2).
As that statement itself indicates, however, Pelling was increasingly concerned
with the impact of religious affiliations. Characteristically, this was to be under-
stood less in terms of the intellectual or moral teachings of the churches and more
in terms of such pragmatic influences as family environment and denominational
schooling. Thus, having charted the local levels of attendance at Church of Eng-
land schools and shown their striking correlation with levels of support for the
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Conservative Party in the same areas, Pelling concluded that ‘this classification
provides a much better index of political feeling for provincial England than any
that is simply based on class differentiation or degree of industrialisation’ (Bealey
and Pelling 1958: 5). Most of the urban industrial regions showed a characteristic
combination of nonconformity and popular Liberalism, and the major exceptions
could now be understood in religious terms. In particular, the regional strength of
Anglicanism helped to account for the Conservative bias of Lancashire, while the
weakness of all denominations in the much more mobile context of the metropo-
lis helped to account for the more secular and materialist tone of politics in
London. Indeed the influence of religious affiliation was seen as part of the expla-
nation for regional variations in the appeal of the newer socialist bodies them-
selves, with the rationalist and anti-clerical Fabians and SDF making more
headway in Lancashire and London, while the idealist and evangelical ILP had a
greater appeal in nonconformist areas, especially in the north.
Nor was this tendency towards the regional fragmentation of politics seen as
being counteracted by the growth of trade unionism. For, despite its intimate con-
nection with economic inequality, that too remained marked by weakness and sec-
tionalism. The degree of unionisation varied markedly across occupations, with
agricultural labourers still being the largest single group but barely organised,
while the centres of manufacturing industry were still, as often as not, charac-
terised by small firms, out-work and non-unionism:
Industrialisation, always a catalyst of change, transformed the social structure suffi-
ciently to bring new political forces into play: but since the new industries grew up in
a piecemeal, localised fashion, the national pattern was hardly less variegated than
before. (Bealey and Pelling 1958: 284)
Thus even those occupations that did have a significant union presence still tended
to be found in particular industrial districts and were merged into regional politi-
cal traditions. Cotton-workers were mainly concentrated in Lancashire, strongly
influenced by local Conservatism and therefore less motivated towards direct
labour representation. Coalminers were dispersed in a number of county unions,
usually in nonconformist districts, so, while able and willing to elect significant
numbers of their own officials as MPs, still found a congenial home within the Lib-
eral Party. Meanwhile, those groups like the metalworking craftsmen who did have
more of a national presence were usually spread too thinly to be able to influence
political outcomes in particular constituencies.
Direct labour representation had taken a new form with the LRC in 1900 and
worked up enough momentum in the general election of 1906 to adopt the
grander title of the Labour Party. But Pelling was underlining the factors which
meant that for most of the century to come Labour would experience enormous
difficulties in constructing a governing majority:
Both in Parliament and out, the stresses and strains of the party structure revealed
themselves, as they had done earlier, in controversy, in recrimination, even in seces-
sion. In these events we can see the very essence of British politics – the social, indus-
trial, and religious differences, the peculiarities of local situations, the interplay of
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environment, of personality, and even of sheer accident. Nor is this surprising. The
story of a great political party contains within itself the history of a nation. (Bealey and
Pelling 1958: 288)
Note again that ending: the history of a nation, not the history of a class. For the
lasting value of Henry Pelling’s work is not just to be found in his commitment to
accurate archival research, pioneering though that was in its day, but above all in
his determination to locate the history of labour within the history of the country
as a whole. This is a challenge which still needs to be taken up more widely if labour
history is to find its rightful place once again at the centre of our understanding of
the recent past.
Socialism and democracy
Thus far, this account has been based on a close reading of Pelling’s published
work, and elements of it may therefore be quite familiar. At least it should have
demonstrated that he was an unusually intelligent historical observer, but it may
still appear that he was only stumbling on insights in the course of narrow, empir-
ically defined research projects. However, a number of unpublished papers deliv-
ered to a variety of university audiences in the late 1940s present a very different
picture. For here we find Pelling involved in a series of rigorous encounters with
socialist thought and prepared to make broad generalisations. Initially surprising
in relation to his later public reputation, this is less so when we consider their orig-
inal context. For both the author and many of those in his audiences had just been
de-mobbed from a costly war against German Nazism only to be confronted with
the intensification of a Cold War against Russian communism. Much has been
made of this highly charged ideological context in relation to the distinguished
group of Marxists who emerged from the discussions of the Communist Party
Historians’ Group. From what follows it should be clear that this appreciation
needs to be broadened to include the more moderate mainstream of the university
Left of that period (for some aspects of the intellectual environment in Cambridge
University at the time see Taylor 1997; for the unusual German ethical-socialist
influences on Allan Flanders, a parallel figure in the field of industrial relations, see
Black 1999 and Kelly 1999).
Already in what seems to be the earliest of these papers, probably given to an
informal audience of research students while he was working on his doctoral dis-
sertation on the early history of the ILP completed in 1950, Pelling made it quite
clear that his motivation was to produce work that was ‘relevant to contemporary
problems and future action’ (Pelling nd a: 1). Moreover, he explained that his 
initial institutional focus was meant only as a point of entry to a much larger 
field:
Its formal structure is a foundation for one’s studies, which will then be able to extend
and broaden until one can appreciate the wider historical perspectives, and if desired,
comprehend the philosophical and political thought of the period and its general
social attitudes. (Pelling nd a: 5)
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Such wider perspectives were indeed explored in the most revealing of those
unpublished talks, ‘Socialism and democracy’, given on the centenary of The Com-
munist Manifesto in 1948. For on that occasion Pelling was prepared to make a
clear distinction between the principles of Marxist social theory and the variety of
political strategies which could legitimately be derived from them. He quoted at
length from Engels on the broad theory of historical materialism and underlined
its prophetic anticipation of the emergence of independent working-class politics.
However, he also argued that Marx and Engels themselves had deliberately left
some room for manoeuvre in particular national circumstances and it had only
been Lenin who had insisted on the necessity of the violent overthrow of the bour-
geois state. In contrast, Western European reformists, especially in France and Ger-
many, had argued that ‘in certain countries the tradition of democratic
government had developed sufficiently for the class struggle to be modified into
constitutional channels’ (Pelling 1948: 6). Thus it would seem as if Pelling’s under-
stated historical observations on the improvement of economic conditions and the
extension of the franchise in late nineteenth-century Britain were not just chance
insights, but rather were connected to a familiarity with the emergence of revi-
sionist trends within Western European Marxism. In other circumstances the
public presentation of his work might have taken a different form, but the inten-
sity of the Cold War at the time hemmed him in on both sides. For the label ‘Marx-
ist’ was largely restricted to the Soviet-aligned communist parties, while any
innovative references to historical materialism were likely to attract only Stalinist
rebukes:
[O]ne might say that what distinguishes Marx from earlier thinkers is simply his
application of scientific method to history and his discovery of the central impor-
tance of economic motivation. Any political thinker who follows in the path of Marx
and who develops his doctrine still further and in so doing modifies his conclusions
or introduces new complications into an apparently simple picture at once lays him-
self open to accusations from what I might call the theological Marxists, the patristic
commentators, of deviating from the true ‘line’ of Marxist thought. In so far as I deal
with developments in the twentieth century I shall therefore attempt to avoid con-
fusing meanings by [not] introducing the word Marxist in any sense at all. (Pelling
1948: 4)
Pelling, then, was familiar with Marxist theory and prepared to locate himself in
relation to it, but even without the Cold War he would probably have found that
tradition too constraining. For in the context of the debates on strategy within the
Second International, it was the eclectic ethical socialism of Jean Jaures that he
found particularly attractive. The reference to Jaures is to his interventions at the
1903 Bordeaux Congress of the French Socialist Party, during which he was
attempting to find a middle way between reformists and revolutionaries, increas-
ingly divided on the issue of joining a coalition government. Pelling probably came
across this speech in R. C. K. Ensor’s Modern Socialism (1904: 163–86), which was
part of his own private collection of books, and which contained a wide selection
of British, French and German socialist texts. The middle way of Jaures gave Pelling
a more general framework for understanding that parliamentary politicians were
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likely to be tempted to join coalition governments and make too many compro-
mises, and for concluding that this could be avoided only if reformist parties
remained firmly based on the extra-parliamentary movements of the working
class, ‘that is, upon those who have suffered most from the inequalities of the pres-
ent social system’ (Pelling 1948: 16; for the reception of Jaures in Britain in the
1900s, see Tanner 1991). This seems to have been particularly appealing as an anti-
dote to the traumatic memory of Labour’s former leader Ramsay MacDonald’s
formation of the National Government in 1931, its subsequent imposition of a cut
in the level of unemployment benefit in the face of strong opposition from the
TUC, and a near-fatal split in the Labour Party:
The Socialist party [Jaures argues] must defend democratic liberties; it must be mind-
ful of the national culture; yet it must bear in mind the possibility of violent capitalist
reaction using the State machinery against the proletarian class, and therefore it must
safeguard its hold upon the sympathies of the workers and retain its defensive organ-
isation of their interests. (Pelling 1948: 8)
This would suggest, therefore, that Pelling’s appreciation of the ILP’s tactics of
independent labour representation was not just the result of a pragmatic evalua-
tion of their important contribution to the foundation of the Labour Party, but
reflected a deeper sense of the ethical basis of political action and the moral
responsibilities of democratic politicians.
Familiarity with these general principles in continental socialist thought also led
him to a number of broad conclusions about the peculiar nature of British histor-
ical development, with a special focus on the ways in which it had further intensi-
fied existing Western European trends towards parliamentary reformism. Relative
geographical isolation had protected the country from much of the political
upheaval accompanying periodic waves of military aggression in the rest of
Europe, and it had consequently been able to develop as a more continuous uni-
fied state with a stronger parliamentary tradition. The former had contributed to
a widespread sense of the complexity of national affairs and the inappropriateness
of dealing with them through such channels of direct democracy as popular
assemblies, the election of delegates and the use of referenda. The latter had
evolved as a combination of an electoral system which gave the strongest party in
the country a majority of seats in the House of Commons and a custom of form-
ing governments which then gave that majority a complete monopoly of cabinet
offices. Socialist activists in Britain took this so much for granted that they rarely
reflected on its peculiar propriety to their own political project:
a system which, in spite of being undemocratic, or rather perhaps because of it, is
admirably suited to express in constitutional form not only the idea of the class strug-
gle, but also the concept, apparently so unconstitutional, of the dictatorship of the
proletariat. The agency of this dictatorship would be the cabinet, which is both the
central authority of initiative in legislation and the final arbiter of executive policy.
(Pelling 1948: 12)
It was characteristic of Pelling’s approach both that the peculiarities of British
development should thus have been seen in terms of political rather than 
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economic or social structures, and that these broad outlines should have been fol-
lowed immediately by an account of specific political actions. For against this
background there had still been a lively debate on the British Left involving Marx-
ist and syndicalist rejection of the parliamentary road, and ultra-radical calls for a
major overhaul of the constitution. Although in the end Pelling judged that Mac-
Donald had gone too far in the direction of parliamentary reformism, it had been
his consistent political intelligence and effective leadership that had kept the early
Labour Party on a peaceful and gradualist path more appropriate to British 
conditions:
What a contrast there is between this and Leninism! The Bolshevik theory has been
defined as Socialism while you wait, or rather Socialism while you won’t wait; and for
some countries, unfortunately, it may be the only approach to Socialism that is possi-
ble. But this country, which has already benefited by peaceful transfers of power from
older to newer aristocracies in earlier centuries, will permit the internal transforma-
tion of institutions while retaining the outward forms of those institutions compara-
tively unchanged. (Pelling 1948: 14. For the importance of MacDonald’s contribution
see also Pelling nd a: 16, and Pelling nd b: 1–2, 9–10)
These reflections on British history by a Labour moderate in the late 1940s strik-
ingly anticipated the more open-minded and imaginative debate which became
possible among Marxists after the splits in the communist world over the Soviet
acknowledgment of Stalinist excesses in 1956. Indeed, Pelling’s emphasis on the
impact on Labour reformism of the survival of aristocratic power and traditional
institutions in Britain was remarkably close to the position later taken by such
leading figures among the younger generation of the New Left as Perry Anderson
and Tom Nairn, though of course in their case the analysis was inflected with tones
of bitter regret (Chun 1993: 69–76; Reid 1978).
Given the overall framework of Pelling’s ‘Socialism and democracy’ talk as a
reflection on one of the foundation texts of Marxism, it is not surprising that he
referred frequently to ‘the working class’, and in his more specific comments on the
British Labour Party clearly underlined the centrality to its constitution of ‘work-
ing class organisations’, most notably in the case of the trade unions which con-
trolled a majority of votes at its annual conference. In his broader conclusions
about the peculiarities of British development, however, he also emphasised that it
was the country’s relatively peaceful history and its high level of individual liberty
which had allowed the open formation of a large range of voluntary associations,
including dissenting churches and co-operative societies, and also the trade unions
themselves. As a result, these
organisations, while often of working class origin, tend to cut across the direct dis-
tinctions of class conflict as defined by Marx; moreover, by exerting their strength in
political action they have obtained important concessions from the State, concessions
which associate them, if not with capitalism itself, at any rate with the so-called capi-
talist State. This accounts for a strong tendency in Britain to distrust Marx’s theory of
economic classes as a misleading abstraction from the complex structure of society.
(Pelling 1948: 9; see also Pelling nd b: 1)
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Here, then, anticipating the trail of his later historical work, we can see how
Pelling’s encounter with socialist thought involved, first, a careful revision of many
of its implications and applications and, then, a turning back again to undermine
some of its key presuppositions. For, having emphasised amelioration, constitu-
tionalism, political traditions and political agency, he went on to question the
whole notion of class itself, at least in its application to the British context (for his
very early interest in regional differences see Pelling nd a: 8–12).
Still worthy, but dull?
Henry Pelling’s work on the early Labour Party was undoubtedly informed by the
empirical method, with all that implies for the careful collection and open-minded
consideration of the relevant evidence. However, the insights he produced were
not the result of a blinkered stumbling about in the archives, but rather of a con-
scious interaction with key issues in Western European socialist thought. As
already mentioned, the Cold War environment was one reason he did not make
this more explicit, but another was his aversion to becoming trapped in an exces-
sively rigid intellectual framework (though some broader thinking was indicated,
in a muted way, in Pelling 1954b: 1–16). It seems likely that in this respect he con-
sciously modelled himself on what he saw as a further distinctive strength of
British Labour strategy:
The theory is there, but it is worked out empirically and is seldom coherently
expressed. Like the British constitution, it has never been precisely formulated and
committed to writing. The party has had its prophets and its visionaries; it has had its
active apostles of its gospel, tireless and innumerable; but it has no summary creed and
no constraining intellectual discipline. Perhaps this is an advantage, for future devel-
opments may require subtle modifications which would be difficult to make if every-
thing had been set down once and for all on paper. (Pelling 1948: 18)
Perhaps, then, it has been a mistake to attempt to explain and clarify the ideas
underpinning Pelling’s work. But that may still be redeemed if we are able to keep
them at the back of our minds as a kind of sounding board, rather than relying on
them as a set of rules to be followed, which would only get in the way of a clear
reconstruction of the peculiarities of historical processes as they are recorded in
the complexities of historical evidence.
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The work of the historian is always a complex and heterogeneous aggregate of
theories, narrative, interpretation and analysis. Such originality as it possesses lies
more often than not in the distinctive pattern which the historian gives to the
components of his or her work, rather than the components themselves, many of
which may be found elsewhere. The three books by Ross McKibbin which form the
focus of this chapter raise interesting questions for the study of the Labour Party
largely because of this type of originality in which familiar elements are given
novel interpretation and arrangement. These studies are linked but they do not
represent a systematic investigation of my subject matter; there are too many dis-
continuities for that in McKibbin’s lines of enquiry: questions raised in relation to
the years 1880–1914, for example, are simply dropped for the period 1918–50.
Nevertheless a more or less coherent picture emerges of Labour’s history in the
first half of the twentieth century.
It is an account of the Labour Party that is intimately related to the social his-
tory of the working class. The main explanation of Labour’s politics, achievements
and limitations which emerges from McKibbin’s work is grounded in the culture
of its principal constituency – the British working class – rather than the party’s
leadership, organisation and programme. Though the first of his studies – The Evo-
lution of the Labour Party (1974) – is an institutional history of the party, McKib-
bin was already persuaded that political action is the result of social and cultural
attitudes which are not primarily political. Politics itself is said to play only a sub-
ordinate and inarticulate part in people’s lives. The general thesis of this book – an
implicit theory of British society – attributes both the rise of the Labour Party in
the years up to 1924 and the slow attrition on the part of the Liberal Party to the
growth of ‘an acutely developed working class consciousness’. But it is a class con-
sciousness which obstructed the spread of socialism and excluded Labour from
many areas of working-class life. Though the Labour Party remained ideologically
vague until at least the end of its third decade, according to McKibbin, it was
unable to become the sort of catch-all ‘people’s party’ which some of its leaders
desired. It remained a class party.
8
Ross McKibbin: class cultures, 
the trade unions and the Labour Party
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The growth of ‘an acutely developed working class consciousness’ thus involves
a paradox: Labour’s rise both depended on and was restricted by it. The Ideologies
of Class (1990) promises to make this paradoxical thesis more explicit by pursuing
answers to the question: ‘What was the social character of the British working class
in the period we conventionally think it to be most mature, that is from the 1880s
to the early 1950s?’ At this point the range of the investigation is broadened. McK-
ibbin now wants to examine the relations of the working class to the rest of society
as well as its relations to the Labour Party. Classes and Cultures (1998) takes this a
stage further, and though the Labour Party itself virtually disappears in the process
McKibbin tells us that his biggest study to date is ‘a political book . . . probably
more a book about the social and ideological foundations of English politics than
anything else’.
I begin by considering McKibbin’s account of the working class in the period of
Labour’s birth, broadly the years 1880–1914, a time when Britain had proportion-
ately the largest working class in the world. The working class represented about 75
per cent of the population and was largely free of the ethnic, linguistic, national
and sectarian divisions which obstructed class solidarity elsewhere. Class divisions
were both conspicuous and acute. Class segregation, according to McKibbin, even
intensified in the years between 1918 and 1951, as the classes became more iso-
lated, occupationally and residentially, each from the others. The future that had
been predicted in the 1880s was that of a social explosion resulting from class con-
flict. But it was a future that failed to materialise. Britain alone of the major Euro-
pean states produced no mass Marxist party in the years up to 1914. While Werner
Sombart famously puzzled over the question ‘Why is there no socialism in the
United States?’ McKibbin considered that the question of ‘exceptionalism’ might
be asked more fruitfully of Britain which was similar enough to continental
Europe to make the difference more intriguing.
‘Why was there no Marxism in Britain?’ To answer that question, and to exam-
ine the larger anomaly of British exceptionalism, McKibbin advances four sub-
sidiary questions:
● How far did the structure of the workforce promote collectivism?
● To what extent did the associational culture of the working class accelerate or
impede the transmission of rejectionist ideologies?
● How far did the working class feel excluded from civil society? and
● To what degree did it possess a leadership capable of articulating and directing
a specifically socialist working-class politics?
McKibbin proceeds to account for the special path taken by the British working
class, though he does so without the aid of comparative analysis and in such a way
that it is difficult for the reader to find a structured answer in the mass of inde-
pendent variables which he brings to bear on the problem. His answer has signifi-
cance, however, for a number of reasons. First it uses arguments which clearly
inform his discussion of the nature of the Labour Party. It lays bare some of the
interpretive issues which McKibbin’s empirical histories conceal or leave implicit.
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Second, McKibbin draws from a common pool of arguments about the ‘peculiar-
ities’ of the British working class which have found favour with a number of influ-
ential historians of quite different ideological persuasions. Those arguments and
theories have become almost received wisdom. They are overdue for a reappraisal.
McKibbin begins by drawing attention to the weakness of the collectivist ele-
ments affecting the working class. The trade unions reached only 15 per cent of the
employed workforce in 1901 and an even smaller proportion of working-class
women. Much of the workforce was seasonal labour, fragmented and unstable; the
service sector was ‘the most rapidly growing part of the Edwardian economy’; then
there was ‘that vast and unnumbered race who worked for themselves or others on
a catch-as-catch-can basis’ (McKibbin 1990a: 3). While shop-assistants and clerks
were deprived of the social intercourse which facilitated organisation, and other
workers were subjected to conditions which left them economically insecure and
isolated, there were some workers – such as the penny capitalists of the London
streets – who positively rejoiced in ‘a jaunty and attractive individualism [that] was
essential to life’ (1990a). Other features of the economy served to localise indus-
trial relations and encourage paternalism. During the Edwardian period only 100
firms employed more than 3,000 people, accounting for at most 700,000 workers.
Small-scale enterprise dominated and relations with employers were either close
or mediated by sub-employers. The sexual division of labour also militated against
a communitarian solidarity by excluding women from politics as well as the work-
place, while providing men with an occupational rather than a neighbourhood
loyalty.
McKibbin assumes that the rich associational life of the working class stood in
the way of both a rejectionist ideology and the development of a party successfully
integrating these interests under its own roof, as the Social Democratic Party is said
to have done in Wilhelmine Germany. Wage levels in Britain also permitted ‘more
or less everything that made up late nineteenth-century working class pastimes’
and ‘gave the working class a certain autonomy . . . not available to any other Euro-
pean work-force’. Thus any working-class party ‘had to compete with an existing
working-class culture which was stable and relatively sophisticated’ (1990a: 13).
Though McKibbin is also of the view that poverty and the daily struggle for sur-
vival did not conduce to a collectivist political commitment, the main thrust of his
argument is that working-class leisure activities presented opportunities for an
active engagement in society outside of politics: inclusion rather than social exclu-
sion, then, but both beyond the reach of national politics. Political ambitions
existed – indeed the working class was ‘intensely political’ according to McKibbin
(1990: 296) – but these interests were ‘scattered and localised’ among a profusion
of associations. Was this because there was no overwhelming sense of grievance
which could have united the working class against civil society? McKibbin certainly
considers this to be part of the argument. Walter Bagehot was right, on this view,
to identify deference as a factor in political stability. But he supplied only half the
explanation.
McKibbin points to the increasing ideological hegemony of Crown and Parlia-
ment in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the acceptability of both to the
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working class and the security of the existing status order, institutional structure
and class system which derived from it. How was this possible? The Crown evolved,
he says, as an ‘even-handed guarantor of the class-neutrality of Parliament’. Parlia-
ment itself was the focus for working-class political aspirations. Action outside of
the political system, narrowly conceived, was widely accepted as illegitimate. In
part this perception was informed by the observation that the upper classes them-
selves adhered to the rules of the political game. Patriotism – both cause and effect
of crown worship – reinforced the sense that Crown and Parliament belonged to
and represented the nation. But in McKibbin’s view the working class was far from
being the dupe of these arrangements:
it is entirely arguable that the traditions, catch-phrases, and ideological fragments that
shaped working-class politics also helped to shape the politics of all other social classes
. . . that the freedom of the middle and upper classes to choose one political strategy as
against another was thereby limited by these historical imperatives, while, equally, the
ability of the working classes to modify the social and economic relationships they
inherited was proportionately enlarged. (1990a: 26)
The rules were thus binding on both sides. Coercion was ruled out to a greater
degree in the UK than on the continent. The State was more or less compelled to
keep out of industrial relations, and the unions by 1875 had a freedom of action
‘unique’ in Europe. A ‘bloody-minded and ill-disciplined workforce’ (1990a) had
to be tolerated as part of this equation. The working class was subject to neither
incorporation nor coercion, and was able to extract these benefits in return for its
deference to the class and institutional status quo. It created its own institutions
within that framework and produced its own leaders, rather than having to adopt
them from among an alienated intelligentsia, as on the continent. The Labour
Party was, of course, one of these institutions led by working-class men. But for
Labour to establish itself with the craft-divided organised working class, whose
interest in the party was ‘only intermittent’, it had to tread cautiously and embrace
only those commitments which did not disturb any particular working-class inter-
est. An anodyne ethical socialist rhetoric was acceptable on this basis, but so too
was much of the liberal ideology. The career of Arthur Henderson (who was party
secretary during 1911–34, foreign secretary in 1929–31 and, briefly, leader in
1931–32) illustrates all of these points.
For McKibbin, Henderson was by 1931 as representative of the rank and file ‘as
any individual could be’ (1990b: 63). He was also a ‘type’ – one recognised by
Lenin, Weber and Michels – for whom politics was both a vocation and a system
of party patronage – a system which he had a hand in creating. Henderson was a
leading Wesleyan Methodist, temperance reformer and an ‘advanced radical’ all his
life. He was rooted in trade unionism and advanced his parliamentary career, with
the help of Liberal patrons at every turn, through the Friendly Society of Iron-
founders, as a candidate of the union’s Liberal wing. Yet he was one of those who
came to realise that his parliamentary career could not depend on the Liberals and
it was this realisation which redirected him to the cause of independent labour rep-
resentation, as it did for many similar men.
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This turn did not involve an ideological shift from liberalism. Henderson’s
maiden speech was in favour of free trade. He supported the First World War in
common with the vast majority of his fellow-trade unionists, though strongly
sympathising with much for which the dissident and pacifist-leaning Union of
Democratic Control stood. He also believed in harmonious class relationships,
favoured the conciliation and arbitration of industrial disputes, and was openly
class-collaborationist, as dictated by his social Christianity. He wanted Labour to
represent the community, to become a ‘national people’s party’.
Here, however, he ran up against the ‘industrial sectionalism’ of the unions and
the realisation that he was leader only on sufferance, unable to impose on the
unions ideologies which adversely affected their interests. For McKibbin Hender-
son’s career discloses what Labour was and what Labour could not become. Hen-
derson was ideologically representative of a generation of Labour leaders who
began by seeking parliamentary careers as Liberals and ended up being catapulted
by the First World War into the leading place in British politics because of struc-
tural rather than ideological changes in the political system. The extension of the
franchise and the enlarged role of the unions brought about by the war made this
possible. But Henderson’s leadership was always organisational and rhetorical, and
its limits were set by the unions in which he had his roots.
(1974)
Up to 1924 the Labour Party was at all levels, according to McKibbin, a working-
class organization . . . a truly proletarian party’ (1974: xiii). Labour emerged from
the war in 1918 even more ‘an agent of the unions’ than it had been in 1914, the
war having probably strengthened the right-wing of the party rather than the left-
wing. Though McKibbin says he is concerned primarily with the ‘mass organiza-
tion’, rather than the parliamentary leadership, of the Labour Party for these
reasons – arguing that its centre of gravity, at least until 1922, was extra-parlia-
mentary – there are some curious omissions in his history. He has almost nothing
to say about the political impact of the massive growth of the unions and the
industrial conflict of the years 1910–14. On methodological grounds he does not
consider the impact of the First World War on Labour and trade union politics,
years in which the unions continued to grow, especially in heavy industry. The
immediate post-war years, up to the severe slump of 1921, complete the cycle of
events which saw trades union membership peak at 8.25 million. But in largely
ignoring the industrial conflict, political ferment and structural changes of those
years, McKibbin has eliminated much from his narrative that bears on class con-
sciousness and socialism – Labour’s dominant rhetoric by 1931 – and robs his nar-
rative of a dynamic that helps to explain this otherwise unlikely ideological
development.
McKibbin has two further objectives, beyond explaining the character of the
Labour Party through an analysis of its mass organisation; first, to suggest reasons
why it replaced the Liberal Party as the principal party of the Left; second, to
explain why the Labour leadership was unable to emulate the German SPD and
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create a global working-class movement. Henderson’s career has already provided
the reader with relevant evidence. More generally McKibbin sees a social gulf sep-
arating the leaders of the craft unions from the Liberal Party when the Labour Rep-
resentation Committee was set up in 1900. The issues that divided organised
labour from the Liberal Party were less of policy and more of class understood in
this way: ideologically there was little difference between the two parties (1974:
54), as can be seen throughout the Edwardian years when Labour’s electoral for-
tunes depended largely on avoiding contests with Liberal candidates and it was dif-
ficult to disentangle the Liberal and Labour elections campaigns. Thus at the elite
level – as in the Gladstone–MacDonald electoral deal of 1903 – Labour depended
on an agreement with the Liberals. But at the grass-roots level local Labour Parties
depended on the unions: the local parties worked effectively when the unions gave
their support. Labour organisation made no impression in constituencies held by
candidates of the Miners’ Federation, for example, until the union changed sides
from Liberal to Labour – a process not yet completed in the localities by the out-
break of war. The grip of the unions on Labour by 1910 is also illustrated by the 11
trade unionists who sat on the 16-man National Executive Committee (NEC) of
the party and the fact that all but 35,377 of the 1,430,539 members were trade
unionists (over half a million of whom were miners). But it is illustrated also in the
fact that until 1918 the characteristic local organ of the Labour Party was the trades
council (1974: 33).
The self-restraint that made the understanding between the parliamentary Lib-
eral and Labour Parties work began to break down at the local level between 1910
and 1914 as initiatives were undertaken locally to contest elections, whether the
Liberals liked it or not. McKibbin resists the idea that this had much to do with
growing ideological differences, or because of objectionable policies associated
with the Liberal Government. He allows that the industrial militancy of 1911–13
may have contributed but says that this is difficult to prove. Instead he attributes
the change to a growing ‘feeling’ that the Liberals were not working class while
Labour was (1974: 70–1). This, it might be noted, is also difficult to prove, but
McKibbin allows the discussion up to 1914 to end on that note. In fact he later sug-
gests that the industrial unrest may have made local parties more militant and that
the attraction of many union members, from among the growing number of trade
unionists, to the Labour Party contributed to this change of mood. For at least
some of those people the conversion to Labour may have had more to do with the
industrial conflict than Labour’s political activities (1974: 86).
That, however, is not the main thrust of his argument. Half the working class is
still voteless, of course, but by 1914 Labour is stronger organisationally at local
level, the trades councils are performing their political functions more effectively,
and the Liberals reply in kind to the greater combativity of the local Labour organ-
isations. The evidence, McKibbin suggests, is that, but for the outbreak of war
between 150 and 170 Labour candidates would have contested a 1915 general elec-
tion, including single-member constituencies, without regard for electoral pacts of
the sort brokered and still favoured by Ramsay MacDonald. By-elections and
municipal elections after 1910 suggest Labour was getting stronger (1974: 84–5).
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McKibbin denies that there was any significant move to the Left during the war.
The same people were in control of the party in 1918 as in 1914. The unions sup-
ported the war while the Left was defensive and divided. Opposition to socialism
within the unions ‘was inflamed by the war’ (1974: 90) and the unions forced a
change in the method of electing the NEC, in 1917, which further concentrated
power in their hands. In that year a new political formation of trade unionists and
co-operators was mooted – to be called the ‘People’s Party’ – and though nothing
came of it McKibbin offers it as evidence of the alienation of many trade unionists
from the socialists. These were still largely to be found in the small ILP, which was
excluded from the Reorganisation Committee which was put together to draft a
new constitution for the Labour Party. Discussion of doctrine is absent from the
record of the committee’s deliberations. Henderson refrained from mentioning
socialism during his tour of the districts to sell the new constitution. The real issue,
from the unions’ standpoint, was who would dominate the NEC (1974: 98 and
102). The 1918 TUC showed that there was still considerable support for a sepa-
rate ‘Trades Union Labour Party’ even though the unions got their way on the sub-
stance of the new constitution. The Parliamentary Committee elected at this TUC
was as patriotic as any elected before it, and, according to McKibbin, ‘the mem-
bership of this committee was a more important determinant of the Labour Party’s
development than the break-up of the Liberal Party, the Russian Revolution, the
work of the Webbs, or even what Henderson thought he was doing in 1917’ (1974:
103).
The Russian Revolution, McKibbin allows, had taught Henderson ‘that a pow-
erful parliamentary alternative to Bolshevism was immediately required’, and this
also informed the new constitution (1974: 92). Clause 4 was vague enough to be
acceptable in that context. The unions supported the sort of wartime collectivism
that they had just experienced and they were ‘more anxious’ than they had been
that the forms of collectivism they had always supported – such as selective nation-
alisations – should find their way into legislation. This was the point of overlap
where the socialist minority and the trade unions could find common ground. But
‘in Britain alone the left wing of the working class movement did not emerge from
the war in some way stronger than it entered it . . . the war did not necessarily mean
the defeat of socialism in Britain, it did mean the defeat of the socialists’ (1974:
105–6). The strength of the Left in Scotland, particularly of the ILP, is allowed as
an exception to this pattern, though McKibbin is quick to link it with the weakness
of the Scottish unions outside Glasgow (1974: 163).
In 1924 Labour Organiser could find only two strong local Labour Parties based
on individual membership – Ardwick and Woolwich. Local parties were still very
reliant on union branches. Most funds were supplied locally, most candidates were
chosen by the unions, not by head office. No further consideration was given to an
electoral pact with the Liberals after 1918, and Labour contested as many seats as
it could in the belief that it was competing for the same electorate as the Liberals.
It consciously aimed to forestall a Liberal revival (1974: 120). The ease with which
individual Liberals moved into the Labour Party, however, ‘is evidence that the
political differences between Liberal radicals and the Labour movement were by
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no means unbridgeable’, despite Labour’s commitment to nationalisation. Differ-
ences in policy were less important, according to McKibbin, than ‘social and psy-
chological resentments which powerfully directed Labour’s actions towards the
Liberal Party’ (1974: 121). This argument, the reader will note, has already been
employed to explain the divergent paths of the two parties by 1914. McKibbin now
informs us that the Liberals were ‘bourgeois in a particular way’ – ‘self-consciously
superior’, patronising and condescending, they rubbed up the Labour leaders with
their ‘scarcely concealed snobbery’ in entirely the wrong way. The minority Labour
Government of 1924 was a ‘propaganda exercise’ designed to show that Labour
could do without them.
Leading figures in the Labour Party were impressed by the organisational feats
of the German SPD. Herbert Morrison did his best to emulate its methods in
London, but his attempts to create a network of Labour associations constituting
a genuine Labour community failed (1974: 171). McKibbin attributes this to the
evident lack of unity of purpose of the British working class which was also
revealed in the abortive attempts to institutionalize relations with the Co-opera-
tive Union in 1921. He alludes to the cultural enmeshing of the working class into
the national culture – a point on which he is less sure in Classes and Cultures –
partly because ‘sport as a working-class pastime was so much more important in
Britain than anywhere else in Europe’ (1974: 234). Morrison’s efforts succeeded,
however, in frightening head office which was deeply suspicious of anything
beyond its control. The party’s relations with the Labour Research Department
and the Daily Herald further illustrate its centralising tendencies and its concern
about ‘troublemakers’, especially communist troublemakers. Trade union pressure
‘is the most insistent theme’ in these episodes, though one which complemented
the centralising instincts of party leaders such as MacDonald. But what about the
spectacular collapse of trade union membership from 1920, the defeat of the 
General Strike and the reprisals which followed it? Was Labour’s apparent depend-
ence on the unions undisturbed by these developments? Did its growing strength
in local government fail to supply a different dynamic? McKibbin has no answers
to these questions. Indeed they do not arise, – even in his later discussions of the
inter-war years.
At this point it is instructive to turn to McKibbin’s explanation for Labour’s suc-
cess in eclipsing the post-war Liberals (for an alternative view, see Tanner 1990:
1–16). For McKibbin the Representation of the People Act of 1918 ‘was of the first
importance’ in Labour’s eclipse of the Liberals (McKibbin, Matthew and Kay 1990:
82). The 1916 split in the Liberal Party is downplayed as a causal factor. McKibbin
argues that the Labour splits of 1914, August–September 1917 and November
1918, which received as much contemporary publicity as had the Liberal split, sug-
gest that there were other reasons for the decline of the Liberals than the splits
themselves. Nor does he accept that the Liberals were somehow more averse to
wartime collectivism than the Tories. The war itself, in this view, is overrated as the
cause of Labour’s success and the Liberal’s decline (1974: 240). Everything, accord-
ing to McKibbin, points to ‘Labour’s enduring ante-bellum character’. It simply
continued to reap the benefits of ‘an already existing industrial class consciousness’.
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Because ‘it had no life apart from the unions it gained electorally from their
growth’. Meanwhile the Liberals suffered from their inability to claim the loyalties
of any class. But the union-based class consciousness which benefited Labour also
set limits on what it could achieve. The working class ‘did not lead their social lives
within the confines of their Party, nor did they regard Party allegiances as the judge
of their cultural values’ (1974: 245). Politics had to compete with ‘too many other
things’; the working class had not suffered the active persecution visited upon their
German counterparts; and the unions had more limited objectives than the Hen-
dersons and Morrisons and held the power to get their way. In McKibbin’s view
Labour inevitably failed, in a nation ‘profoundly divided by class’, to break out of
its electoral dependence on the unions, despite a propaganda appeal that was
designed to be classless. He concludes with a remark that might have been
intended as a riposte to Miliband: ‘If it is objected that it has not served the cause
of socialism or even the “true” interests of the working class the answer is that it
was never designed to do so’ (1974: 247).
Class relations
McKibbin confronts the paradox of a working-class party that was unable to
attract the votes of most of the working class – despite the growth of class con-
sciousness – when he turns to the inter-war years and the Conservative electoral
hegemony which followed the introduction of universal suffrage. He is clear that
by 1918 ‘society’s relations with the working class had at last become the central
question’ (1990c: 259), and yet a reasonable estimate suggests that by 1931 around
55 per cent of the working class voted for the Conservative-dominated national
candidates while 50 per cent did so in 1935. The Conservative hegemony rested on
this ‘exceptionally high working-class vote and the tenacious social unity of the
non-working-classes’. From 1920 Britain lived under a deflationary regime which
tolerated mass unemployment in the interests of holders of money. Finance was
put before manufacturing, ‘the anxieties of one social class over those of all others’
(1990c: 267). It was the middle class which benefited most from these arrange-
ments and the working class which suffered. The middle class flocked into the
Conservative Party in the early 1920s. Its individual membership was double that
of Labour’s by 1925. The social composition of the parliamentary party was
increasingly middle class. The links seem clear. But the real strength of the Tories
was their ability to articulate the fears, prejudices and aspirations of ‘the public’.
Labour’s weakness was its identification with the organised working class, a sec-
tional interest. ‘The public’ was everyone else. The Conservative preponderance
among women is explicable in these terms. ‘The social world of the organized
working class was sectional, collectivist and masculine’. But ‘the public’ was a status
category to which women could belong, as could the unorganised workers, the
seemingly unorganisable workers, and the anti-union workers. When representa-
tives of ‘the public’ spoke of the working class they meant ‘manual workers in well
organized trades with aggressive unions’ (1990c: 271). In doing so they drew on a
reservoir of ‘ideologically determined class stereotypes and conventional wisdoms’
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which helped to mobilise nearly all those who were not working class and then
much of the working class as well.
In the excellent essay ‘The “social psychology” of unemployment in inter-war
Britain’ (1990d) McKibbin explores this issue in relation to the State’s management
of unemployment. The grim and shabby Labour Exchanges, he tells us, were
regarded by the unemployed as ‘enemy territory’. The staff were primed to find
abuse. A ‘permanently interrogatory air’ accompanied the hunt for scroungers as
the unemployed were subjected ‘to a futile and sometimes brutal ritual in which
few believed’. After 1931 the ‘means test’ intruded humiliatingly into working-class
privacy.
Thus one of the purposes, and certainly one of the consequences of unemployment
insurance legislation was to marginalize the unemployed, to divide them by newer and
ever more refined discriminations and, by a public pursuit of the scrounger, to con-
firm politically necessary stereotypes. (1990d: 252)
The stereotypes included workers who were prone to endless industrial dispute as
well as the unemployed who would not work and the scroungers who, though they
might also have jobs, made high taxes necessary by their scrounging and cheating
(1990c: 273). The dole was the preferred method for treating the unemployed
because it enabled the Conservatives to maintain a dependent workforce and keep
these stereotypes alive, while diverting the political energies of the unemployed
into the dole bureaucracy in pursuit of fair payment – localising and rendering
them harmless in the process. It was one of the ways in which the State, even
though it might not have created working-class Conservatism, helped to entrench
it.
McKibbin identifies three ways in which the State did this. First, by identifying
the Labour Party exclusively with its unionised base and identifying ‘the political
idea’ of the working class exclusively with a necessarily sectional Labour Party.
Second, by ensuring that everyone outside this sectional working class would
define themselves in opposition to it. Third, by trying to weaken and then margin-
alise the old unionised working class. The deflationary financial regime adopted in
1920 had assisted this process, as had the provocation and defeat of the General
Strike in 1926. But so too did propaganda depicting the unemployed as helpless
and incompetent authors of their own misfortune who burdened the public with
their discontents and incapacities (1990c: 288–90).
(1998)
In Classes and Cultures McKibbin further develops some of these arguments while
exploring many aspects of class culture in immense detail. The Labour Party, as I
said at the outset, drops largely out of view and there is much in the book that can
be ignored here. For my purposes it is relevant that McKibbin now recognises that
‘the First World War seriously disturbed the pattern of English class relations’
(1998: 528). The war is the origin of middle-class discontent. By 1918 the middle
class (just 13–15 per cent of the population) was defined by, more than anything
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else, its ‘anti-working class’ outlook (1998: 50). The war and its immediate after-
math eroded its money and property by inflation and taxation. At the same time
powerful and growing trade unions had emerged. The Lloyd George coalition fur-
ther inflamed middle-class hatred. It was perceived as a ‘rapacious and extravagant
plutocracy’ that was nevertheless always ready to placate the unions. The Tories
turned this situation to their advantage by giving priority to the defence of the
middle class – portrayed as the defence of the public and the constitution. The
propertied regrouped and a broad ‘anti-socialist’ coalition was created which sur-
vived into the 1930s. From as early as 1920 the balance of class power, disturbed by
the war, was ‘normalised’ by deflation and rising unemployment. But middle-class
perceptions scarcely altered in response to their improving relative position.
Embittered class relations remained a factor throughout the decade as middle-
class priorities dominated government policy. The intense fear of loss of social
esteem and relative status simply persisted as a factor in middle-class attitudes well
after the wartime conditions which first gave them substance had disappeared
(1998: 104–5). The success of Warwick Deeping’s Sorrell and Son (1925) – which
McKibbin discusses as an example of a ‘literature of conflict’, a genre popular with
the middle class in which class conflict was a central theme – is indicative of this
fear and loathing. The book went through forty-one editions and innumerable
impressions, and ‘was read and re-read long out of its time’ (1998: 481). It was dis-
tinguished by ‘its unvarnished hostility to the working class’. By the 1930s the
mood has changed, according to McKibbin; the more self-confident middle-class
tone of A. J. Cronin’s 1937 novel The Citadel is taken as indicative of the trend.
But what of the working class, constituting 78–72 per cent of the population in
the years up to 1951? For those in work living standards rose in the inter-war years,
as prices fell after 1920. But nearly all working-class men and women experienced
some period of unemployment (1998: 151). Unemployment was heavily concen-
trated by industry and region, of course, but long-term unemployment was largely
a 1930s’ phenomenon. Those affected were impoverished, marginalised and humil-
iated by the experience. The trade unions at best organised only 55 per cent of work-
ing men, 45 per cent of the workforce. Only one-quarter of eligible women joined
a union. In no year did the number of days lost through strikes even exceed days lost
by one public holiday (1998: 144). Union members complained that their leaders
were not radical enough, and McKibbin admits that they did indeed seek to avoid
strikes. Yet their public image was one of strike proneness. The working class was in
reality divided. Its experience varied by region, occupation and gender. McKibbin
depicts a working-class family that was often politically fractured. The female pro-
portion of the workforce was stable at around 30 per cent, but the proportion who
worked on a more or less equal basis with men declined and the great majority of
working women were single rather than married. Role segregation was thus
entrenched in the family and promoted different views of the world. The greater
propensity of women to vote Conservative may have something to do with this
(1998: 518). Unfortunately, McKibbin says nothing about Labour’s success in
recruiting women – they made up 40 per cent of its individual membership by 1930
– and their role in the evolution of its social and welfare policies is unexamined.
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Let us not forget, however, that the bigger issue is why the British working class
gave the Conservatives more support than Centre-Right parties elsewhere in
Europe normally received from blue-collar workers. I will not repeat the argu-
ments already employed on this issue. Suffice to say that McKibbin portrays a
defensive, introverted working class and a defeatist and fatalistic working-class cul-
ture. The workers demanded only to be left alone (1998:161). Men may have occu-
pied a public world centred on work, but collective opinion prohibited any
enthusiasm for work that may have separated the individual from the norms of the
larger group. A churlish ‘folk-Marxism’, independent of actual party-political alle-
giances, was not uncommon. Manual labour was the source of all value, in this
view, though not white-collar clerical labour or that of officialdom – both of
which, according to popular prejudice, contributed ‘nothing’ to wealth produc-
tion. Pilfering was ‘intrinsic to factory culture’ and seen as legitimate. Long mem-
ories of real or imagined grievances hung over ‘many industries’.
Though a sense of historical grievance underpinned the Labour Party itself,
grievances did not always translate into a political affirmation of working-class
interests. The working class was accustomed to being talked down to. Though
sports’ mad, it allowed almost all sporting bodies to be run by a self-selecting, all-
male, upper and upper-middle-class clique (cricket, racing, rugby union, tennis,
athletics, golf, boxing), when they were not run by local brewers, butchers and
bakers (football). McKibbin discusses some of the ways in which the authorities
sought to reinforce working-class deference. The Reithian BBC excluded the work-
ing class and treated it with a snobbish paternalism. Censorship was used against
‘anything which undermined respect for authority’ (1998: 424). Lord Tyrell, pres-
ident of the British Board of Film Censors, quoted in illustration of this point, said
in 1937: ‘we may take pride in observing that there is not a single film showing in
London today which deals with any of the burning issues of the day’ (1998: 425).
But it is fair to say that conscious manipulation of this sort – though we have
already encountered it in the ‘politically necessary stereotypes’ – occupies a minor
place in McKibbin’s argument; the structural barriers to a combative, pro-Labour
class consciousness seem far more potent in producing the Tory hegemony than
did mere propaganda, even when it had institutional reinforcement.
The only threat to the huge coalition of popular support for Conservatism
which loomed on the horizon in the 1930s was external, according to McKibbin. It
was the Second World War that ‘threw British history and, even more, English his-
tory off course’ (1998: 531). The war eroded deference and renewed the traditional
working class by restoring the old staple industries on which it depended. Full
employment was the context for trade union growth, and the growth of the north
and its political culture, at the expense of the south and its political culture. The
war universalised working-class political culture and allowed Labour to recruit
men and women who had stood outside that culture in the 1930s, as in Birming-
ham. An unprecedented politicisation took place and a social democratic defini-
tion of democracy came to prevail over the middle-class individualism that had
ruled in the 1930s. The Labour Government of 1945 failed to exploit this situation
to the full, according to McKibbin, by remaining outside the sphere of civil society
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and leaving most of its conservative bastions untouched. The old social oligarchies
in sport and education survived unscathed, as did the institutions of the State,
including its ‘ideological apparatus’. ‘Outside the realm of social services or nation-
alized industries the visitor would not have observed a social democracy’, with the
result that the political settlement of 1945 depended on the physical survival of the
industrial working class, rather than the diffusion within civil society of social
democracy as an ideology (1998: 535–6).
Concluding remarks
If our understanding of a party cannot fail to depend on our understanding of the
social classes which form its main constituency, Labour history must be rooted in
working-class history. Conservatism and liberalism necessarily loom larger in the
analysis once we examine twentieth-century working-class politics. McKibbin’s
argument sees this and realises that it involves class relationships and class cultures.
The prolonged exclusion of Labour from government also invites us to examine
the role of the State in managing class conflicts and class cultures to the party’s dis-
advantage. But it is clear that this approach assumes that it is the underlying 
historical situation of the working class, its relationship to society and its con-
sciousness that matter. McKibbin, in this mode, is arguing that the social is deter-
minant, while politics and ideology are merely reflective. The new-born Labour
Party was thus the product of the temper and situation of the working class and
the intellectuals associated with it as these had evolved during the second half of
the nineteenth century. The working class had been remade in these decades and a
distinctively new pattern of working-class culture had come into existence, char-
acterised by an introverted and defensive conservatism. The subaltern class was
conscious of itself as different and separate. This sectional or corporate self-con-
sciousness enabled it to create organisations confirming its social apartheid. Such
organisations could be aggressive in their defence of ‘the workers’, but they
accepted the conservative hierarchy of British society. There was no radical, alien-
ated intelligentsia in Britain and the working class had no use for one.
These arguments have been fashioned over the years by historians such as
Anderson (1964), Nairn (1964) and Stedman Jones (1974 and 1983), as well as by
McKibbin. Missing from them all is the sort of comparative analysis which would
seem to be essential if a case for British exceptionalism is to be sustained. Did ‘other
countries’ have stronger trades union movements, industrial establishments that
were typically bigger, workforces that were more homogenous and more engaged
in politics than the British? Was British collectivism really weaker than it was in the
relatively backward rural societies of Europe – many of which, nonetheless, had
Marxist parties? Many items in McKibbin’s list are unconvincing as ingredients of
a British exceptionalism. The ‘other countries’ which this implicit comparison rests
upon really boils down to just one – Wilhemine Germany. But close analysis of Ger-
many before 1914 demonstrates that the differences were not as great as is often
supposed. Large sections of the party were never much influenced by Marxism; the
growing power of the trade unions within the SPD was pragmatic and reformist in
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impetus; and many millions of workers lay beyond the party’s orbit (Berger 1994;
Berger and Boughton 1995). As in Britain, a deep loyalty to the State was evident in
Germany (Van der Linden 1998: 286), and it is not clear that the associational life
of the German working class was more conducive to political class consciousness
than it was in Britain. Even ‘the distinction which is commonly made between a
British party which was merely an electoral machine and a German community-
oriented party proves on inspection to have little basis in fact’, according to one
thorough analysis of the subject (Berger 1994: 142). The gap between working-class
life and the culture of the labour movement, which McKibbin makes so much of
for Britain, was on this reading common to both countries.
The relatively open, rule-based, political system may be a stronger contender for
‘special’ status, but this too can be over-drawn. Here McKibbin also concurs with
earlier analyses, such as that by Nairn (1970: 14–20), in seeing the British consti-
tution as the main institutional mechanism of conservative rule. The Conservative
hegemony was based on a paternalist authority, in this view, rather than on a coer-
cive power. It drew upon traditions and customs of deference but made significant
concessions, too, such as in tolerating free collective bargaining. The German State
and employers were undoubtedly more repressive than their British counterparts
where organised labour and the socialists were concerned in the period
1880–1914. There is a good case for believing that this was related to the fact that
Germany was experiencing the immense social stresses engendered by industrial
capitalism which Britain had already passed through in the first half of the nine-
teenth century. In that earlier period the British State had been just as repressive as
the German State was after 1870. Nevertheless, the Labour Party and the Social
Democratic Party grew up in different worlds in this respect, and it is arguable that
the more liberal State and the more conciliatory employers played a significant role
in integrating and moderating the Labour movement in Britain (Geary 1989: 3–4).
The Labour Party was born after the craft unions had already established a
modus vivendi with the British State and the employers. Labour was marked from
the outset by the outlook associated with these organisations of the working-class
elite. Both accepted the existing institutional order as the inevitable political
framework of action, and action was accordingly conservative and economistic.
Labour was joined to the unions at birth, and for McKibbin the party could not
avoid a corresponding class identity, despite the national pretensions of some of its
leaders. But in this view politics was always, in any case, marginal in most working-
class lives. Outside its narrow reaches, in the private realm, a multitude of pastimes
and hobbies, clubs and societies flourished in the working-class towns. These pro-
vided a relatively rich associational and recreational culture to which individual
historians have attached differing meanings. Thus these activities variously enter-
tained and compensated the working class, perhaps diverting and distracting it
from politics (as Stedman Jones suggests of the music hall) or (in McKibbin’s
emphasis) creatively engaged the lower orders in civil society and gave them an
identification with it.
McKibbin’s work closely engages with this culture but supplies no compelling
reasons to refute the old argument that a relatively rich associational culture
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broadly encourages political participation. Classes and Cultures supplies a mass of
interesting detail but much of it is largely divorced from the political generalisa-
tions that appear in the book’s Preface and Conclusion. The social and cultural his-
tory of a class or classes are complex matters. What counts in our attempt to
investigate class politics? Though McKibbin writes entertainingly about working-
class gambling, for example, his discussion adds nothing to the declared central
purpose of his study, which is to disclose the importance of culture in shaping
working-class political behaviour and explain why those who had authority in
1918 still possessed it in 1951. A bigger and related cultural problem is left ambiva-
lently unresolved – namely the relation of working-class culture to ruling-class
culture. We are told that ‘England had no common culture, rather a set of overlap-
ping cultures’ (1998: 527). It took the Second World War, on this account, to assim-
ilate the working class into the ruling ‘moral consensus’ (1998: 535–6).
These contentions are consistent with the portrait of the working class as set
apart, little affected by official culture, introverted, defeatist and fatalistic. But what
was the inter-war ‘public’, which I discussed earlier, if it did not contain much, if
not most, of the working class? Surely this suggests common values and beliefs
uniting millions of working-class men and women with the classes above them in
the social hierarchy? McKibbin supplies plenty of evidence of the hegemony of the
dominant culture, as I have shown. Members of the upper class are said to have had
ideological authority; the monarchy is depicted as culturally central to British life;
patriotic etiquette is widely and spontaneously observed. He also argues that the
State played a significant role in shaping the ‘ideologically necessary stereotypes’ of
the unemployed. The working class does not seem so insulated in the light of these
considerations. Indeed, it is arguable that all sorts of middle-class values perme-
ated the working class through church and chapel, work (particularly domestic
service and small-scale establishments) and leisure. The massive working-class
Tory vote is clearly related to all of this, though it is not clear whether McKibbin
sees Conservative electoral dominance as the effect or the cause of what he calls
‘the structural and ideological bases of the pre-war system’ (1990c: 290).
The realm of politics and public discourse is an unexplored continent in McK-
ibbin’s work on class cultures. Governments, parties, pressure groups, newspapers,
local government, the education and the intellectual formation of the working
class are conspicuously absent from the analysis. In The Intellectual Life of the
British Working Classes (2001), Rose makes use of numerous unpublished work-
ing-class sources, as well as published memoirs, autobiographies, diaries and sur-
veys. McKibbin’s ‘eye-witness’ sources in Classes and Cultures are by comparison
relatively narrow and predictable, and are faithfully adhered to rather than criti-
cally engaged with. This problem is not confined to Classes and Cultures. The State
is only ever the focus of McKibbins’s analysis in relation to one issue – the man-
agement of unemployment. On that subject, McKibbin concedes to the State a role
which is absent from the social determinism informing most of his writings. Yet
the period 1880–1950 was one of unprecedented tumult in political affairs, both
foreign and domestic. It must be considered a major flaw in McKibbin’s account of
the formation and evolution of the Labour Party that imperialism and foreign
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relations, the impact of the wars and many significant domestic conflicts are absent
from the analysis. Why should active politics be confined to explaining attitudes to
the unemployed?
The role of the State and the political parties has a bearing on many of the issues
raised by McKibbin’s work. The three periods of Labour governance up to 1950,
for example, clearly bear on the question of Labour’s identity as a sectional or (if
only in aspiration) a national force, but they are never considered at any length.
The exception is the essay ‘The economic policy of the second Labour Govern-
ment’ in The Ideologies of Class (1990), but this is concerned with the specific issue
of whether the Government could have reflated the economy in the circumstances
of 1929–31. There can be no doubt that Labour sought to govern in ‘the national
interest’, and it is counter-intuitive to suppose that those spells in office made no
impression on ‘the public’. Even if we root the Labour Party in the social history of
the working class we still have to ask what the party did to shape the politics of its
natural constituency?
The same question can be asked of the affiliated trade unions and the socialists.
This side of the equation receives scant attention in McKibbin’s work. For one so
interested in culture the neglect of the Labour movement’s own political discourse
is a major lacuna. For Labour – trade unionist or socialist – was in competition with
some of the dominant values discussed above. It is not at all clear that the ‘intense
class consciousness’ which McKibbin refers to was purely defensive. This is to
underestimate the extent to which even the mundane but central slogan of
labourism – ‘a fair day’s work for a fair day’s pay’ – implied a critique of the existing
order. Socialist values could be made to connect to widely held views about the
injustices of work and pay, and even the middle class was not immune to the cri-
tique of laissez-faire capitalism which existed in British politics throughout McKib-
bin’s period – as the history of the relation of the middle-class to the welfare state
shows. McKibbin sees that the economic and social experiences of the inter-war
years may have unsettled the ruling orthodoxies, but he does not pursue this insight.
The discontinuities which I referred to at the beginning of this chapter deprive
McKibbin’s work of a possible historical dynamic. So do the silences. The two
world wars supply material for assertions rather than for sustained analysis. The
industrial unrest of 1910–20 is mentioned only in passing, as is the conflict in
industry during the embittered 1920s. Class conflict is an acknowledged factor in
McKibbin’s argument but is never examined as an element in industrial conflict
and in many of the disciplinary economic and social policies exercised by both the
State and the employers. The consciousness of the working class appears largely
unaffected by such class conflict as McKibbin does discuss, if only because he does
not address the question of how the major political experiences of Britain since
1914 have made and remade working-class beliefs and values. The emergence of
socialism in relation to the formation of working-class consciousness is neglected
perhaps because of this lacuna. Socialism, indeed, is a word that McKibbin rarely
has any use for, and it is difficult to find any basis for its emergence as the domi-
nant discourse of the Labour Party after 1931 in anything that he finds important
in the previous thirty years.
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The working-class institutions which McKibbin tracks up to 1951 actually
peaked after his period closes and important features of working-class culture sur-
vived for another twenty years alongside the discourse of socialism, the party’s
dominant doctrine. If the working class was remade in the last quarter of the nine-
teenth century, it seems plausible to assume that its characteristic way of life took
some time to become embedded and generalised. Though the working class has
never been a single homogenous entity, the images associated with it in the period
1870–1950 – the urban terraced houses, the mass employees of heavy industry, the
crowds of flat-capped men at football matches – are images which reveal a nation-
alisation–standardisation of culture that was real enough. It is a pity that the sorts
of questions which McKibbin asks about the Edwardian working class are not pur-
sued in his later work. Surely we would find that at least some of the aspects of its
fractured character prior to 1914 were subjected to processes of convergence and
homogeneity? The widespread experience of unemployment, economic and other
forms of insecurity, employment in similar types of manual work, common expe-
riences of urban life, the rise of Labour in local government – surely there are
nationalising trends here to counter the localising influences which McKibbin
dwells on pre-1914?
It remains true, in the face of these trends, that Labour never managed more
than 37 per cent of the total vote prior to 1945 and that the Conservative Party
enjoyed greater working-class support. McKibbin’s work has forced us to acknowl-
edge and seek to explain these facts, and his discussion of class relations, the State’s
management of unemployment and the Conservative defence of the ‘public’ has
provided signposts for others to follow in search of answers.
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The object of this chapter is to consider the notion of the ‘progressive dilemma’ as
outlined by David Marquand in his collection of essays of the same name (Mar-
quand 1999). Marquand sought to explain Labour’s historically poor electoral per-
formance by focusing on the party’s inability to unite a sufficient number of
working-class and middle-class voters in a sustained anti-Conservative coalition.
As will be explained in more detail later, he believed Labour’s attachment to the
trade unions was too close and prevented the party making a strong appeal to those
outside the labour movement.
Marquand was by no means the first academic to alight on this as possible cause
of Labour’s disappointing electoral performance (for example, see Stedman Jones
1983). However, the particular means by which he explained Labour’s failure
enjoyed a unique purchase among students of the Party, as well as those most
responsible for the creation of ‘New’ Labour. Many of Tony Blair’s early speeches
delivered as leader owed more than a little to Marquand’s perspective. One of the
‘New’ Labour leader’s closest advisers, Phillip Gould, even used it to justify the
policy and organisational changes fostered by Neil Kinnock and Blair since 1983
(Gould 1998: 1–17). Despite Marquand’s own reservations about ‘New’ Labour,
the perspective outlined in The Progressive Dilemma obviously resonated with
those pursuing what Blair described during the 2001 election campaign as a ‘radi-
cal, modern, social democratic’ agenda. Indeed, as Marquand (1997: 78–9) con-
ceded after Labour’s 1997 landslide victory, ‘modernisers’ like Blair had gone some
way to resolving his ‘dilemma’.
The Progressive Dilemma is here taken as the exemplar of a wider ‘social demo-
cratic’ interpretation of the Labour Party. There are, in truth, few historical
accounts that explicitly employ this form of analysis – but only because it is such
an insidious a part of many leading authorities’ ‘common-sense’ view of the party
(see in particular, Crewe and King 1995: 3–26 and Williams 1979). Marquand’s
work is worthy of close attention, not the least because he is rare in foregrounding
many of that tradition’s most significant assumptions and he employs them in a
particularly lucid manner.
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It should nonetheless be borne in mind that the social democratic view of the
party, like all others, has not stood still. Thus, The Progressive Dilemma was the
product of a particular moment – after the collapse of the Social Democratic Party
(SDP) in the late 1980s but before Blair assumed the Labour leadership in 1994 –
in the history of British social democracy. Therefore, while Marquand aspired to
present an interpretation of general historical relevance, it is a product of its time.
Consequently, the chapter first historicises The Progressive Dilemma before scruti-
nising it as a piece of political analysis.
Social democrats and Labour
Before outlining the social democratic perspective, it is necessary to characterise
the outlook of those described as social democrats; in accomplishing this task the
work of Peter Clarke (1983) is particularly useful. Clarke was interested in those
intellectuals-cum-politicians who wished to gain control of the State through
democratic means so as to create a more equal society. This could be achieved, they
believed, within a reformed capitalism, one in which most of the damaging conse-
quences of a wholly free market had been curtailed by government action. While
the chapter is also concerned with those who took a leading role in formulating
this social democratic outlook, not all of its adherents, it should be stressed, were
Oxbridge-educated, academically inclined, aspiring cabinet ministers. For, while
Labour activists are regarded as drawn predominantly to radical socialism, a sub-
stantial minority taken from solidly proletarian backgrounds looked favourably on
social democracy. Thus, in the early 1960s’ fight against the Left’s attempt to win
Labour over to unilateral nuclear disarmament, the parliamentary leadership won
the support of over half of conference delegates (Hindell and Williams 1962).
During this period, social democrats attempted to give a lead to supporters in the
country by creating the Campaign for Democratic Socialism (CDS). Despite some
early success, however, they let the CDS fall into abeyance and thereby allowed the
Labour Left freedom to extend its influence within constituency parties (Brivati
1996: 359–64, 380–403).
According to Clarke, social democratic intellectuals were committed to an ulti-
mately untenable position. They saw the promotion of class conflict as an unde-
sirable, indeed unnecessary, means of achieving their ends: as the future Labour
Cabinet Minister Anthony Crosland stated in the 1950s, there was no ‘irreconcil-
able conflict’ between the classes. Social democrats looked on co-operation as the
best, if not the only, way of advancing their cause. Instead of promoting the inter-
ests of a particular social group, they wished to mobilise a communal interest that
transcended class. Despite this, for much of the twentieth century the majority of
social democrats found themselves identifying with, belonging to and sometimes
leading a Labour Party seen by many of its supporters in the trade unions as a ‘class’
party. Moreover, many such trade unionists expected it to advance their particular
interests – at the expense of others’, if necessary.
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Even so, not all social democrats worked within Labour’s ranks. In particular
when the New Liberals – Edwardian Liberal intellectuals who approved a signifi-
cant degree of state intervention to promote a more equal society – considered
leaving their disintegrating party and joining Labour after 1918, they had to ask
themselves a difficult question. Could they accept the union influence within the
party? Some answered this question in the negative: the economist John Maynard
Keynes was one of those who remained in the Liberal Party (Desai 1994: 50–2).
Indeed, whether such ‘progressive’ thinkers should join with Labour, for all its
apparent shortcomings, or stand aloof and passively contribute to the continued
success of the Conservatives, lies at the heart of Marquand’s dilemma. Clarke
claims that those social democrats working within the party resolved the contra-
diction between some of the implications of their outlook and Labour’s apparent
character by accepting the self-interested nature of the labour movement. Ingenu-
ously, however, they persuaded themselves that the unions’ claims for redress were
consistent with their own aim of social justice. On the way to a more equal society,
the demands of the unions would of necessity have to be met; as Clarke (1983:
15–16) puts it, the unions’ self-interest was conceptualised as ‘incipient altruism’.
Living with the unions
While Labour’s 1918 constitution was not considered ideal, given the extent of the
influence which it granted the unions, it still had its advantages. Writing in the
early 1950s, the leading social democratic intellectual R. H. Tawney (1966: 177)
believed the unions provided the party with ‘broad popular foundations’ that pre-
vented Labour becoming dogmatic – unlike other continental left-wing parties
which did not enjoy such close links with their indigenous labour movements.
Moreover, the constitution enabled social democrats to lead the unions in direc-
tions they might not otherwise have taken. In 1955 Bill Rodgers, who would later
help found the SDP, conceded that union dominance of the Labour Party Confer-
ence was sometimes ‘undesirable’. ‘The important thing’, however, was ‘to keep the
trade unions in politics and on the side of Labour . . . [Trade union leaders] want
to be liked: they even want to be guided’ (Fielding 1997: 45–6). If this appeared
arrogant, Rodgers’s comments echoed those of Graham Wallas, made earlier in the
century, that intellectuals like himself were charged with the ‘duty of thinking on
behalf of the working class’ (quoted in Clarke 1978: 139). This sounded more like
the assumption of an onerous responsibility and formed the basis for Hugh
Gaitskell’s opinion, that fellow-middle-class Labour MPs should observe a ‘pro-
found humility’ towards the party’s working-class supporters, as ‘we’ve got to lead
them because they can’t do it without us, without our abilities’ (quoted in Morgan
1981: 769–70). Marquand also bluntly suggested, though in more acrimonious
times, that without social democratic intellectuals, Labour would have been ‘all
brawn and no brain’: had the party achieved power without their guidance, ‘it
would not have had the remotest idea what to do with it’ (1979: 9).
As Labour’s social democrats are agreed to have attained their greatest influence
within the party at mid-century, it is especially instructive to analyse what they
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thought of their political home at this point. Their outlook is best encapsulated in
the 1960 CDS manifesto, which stated that social democrats viewed the party’s
‘central tradition’ as ‘a non-doctrinal, practical, humanitarian socialism – a creed
of conscience and reform rather than of class hatred’. The labour movement, it
went on, owed ‘its inspiration to British radicals, trade unionists, co-operators,
nonconformists and christian socialists, not to Marx or Lenin’. Moreover, the man-
ifesto asserted, Labour ‘should be a broadly-based national party of all the people
. . . A democratic socialist party must be based predominantly on working people.
But a purely sectional, one-class party would . . . be a betrayal of the ideal of a class-
less society.’ Thus, the ‘socialism’ to which social democrats adhered was not ‘an
arid economic dogma’ but one of ‘freedom, equality, social justice and world co-
operation’ based on ‘an idealistic appeal to remedy real evils by practical and radi-
cal reform’ (quoted in Fielding 1997: 61–2).
Labour never fully adhered to the CDS vision, and as the 1960s gave way to the
1970s the party seemed to move ever-further away from its ideal. Under Gaitskell’s
leadership, social democrats had relied on the brute force of the union block vote
to achieve their ends, viewing it as the lesser of two evils. Such a reliance on union
power, however, brought fewer returns after 1966. Moreover, the identification of
the unions as comprising a materially deprived working class became question-
able: many trade unionists were by any measure fairly well off. By the late 1960s, a
few social democrats came to view the unions as less like the universal-interest-in-
waiting and more as a selfish, vested interest, just like any other. This minority
began to consider that Labour’s connection with the unions – indeed, with the
working class as a whole – prevented the party achieving a socialism ‘based on co-
operation, neighbourliness and readiness to help other people’. To such eyes,
Labour’s over-reliance on working-class voters also endangered social reform, as
many workers virulently opposed black immigration, homosexuality, abortion,
divorce and the abolition of capital punishment (Mayhew 1969: 94–5).
By the late 1970s, Rodgers’s earlier confidence in the effect of his ‘guidance’ on
the unions had disappeared. Writing of those years, he criticised Labour politicians
for ‘defer[ring] uncritically’ to union demands; the unions, he stated, were locked
into a time-warp, ‘fighting a by now irrelevant “them” and “us” battle’, despite the
fact that social and economic change made class hostility irrelevant. Their influ-
ence, he asserted, undermined Labour’s ability to ‘have a mind’ – presumably a
social democratic mind – ‘of its own’ (Rodgers 1982: 167–70). By the start of the
1980s, a Labour Party that apparently allowed the unions such dominance
appeared to some as an impediment to social democracy. The unions were cer-
tainly neither help nor hindrance in stopping the party’s move leftwards. They
were also at best uninterested in issues of importance to social democrats, such as
individual freedom; opposed reforms thought necessary to revitalise the economy;
were apparently unpopular with the electorate; and, finally, believed to not even
represent their own members’ views (Jenkins, Aaronovitch and Hall 1982: 16;
Minkin 1991: 208–21). Even MPs who, like Denis Healey, were strongly influenced
by revisionism but stayed within the Labour Party broadly agreed with much of
this analysis (Healey 1990: 467–8).
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David Marquand
By the time David Marquand was helping to found the SDP he had been active in
Labour politics for about 25 years. He entered the Commons in 1966 after a short
career as a journalist. One of the second wave of Labour’s post-war revisionists 
that included David Owen and Roy Hattersley, Marquand like them became part
of Roy Jenkins’s entourage. When Jenkins left the Cabinet in 1976 to become pres-
ident of the European Economic Community, Marquand resigned as an MP and
followed him to Brussells; when Jenkins returned to establish the SDP, Marquand
assisted in the enterprise. Indeed, in 1979 he wrote – after voting Liberal in the gen-
eral election of that year – what has been described as the SDP’s ‘founding text’ in
outlining why it had become impossible for those like him to remain loyal to
Labour (Desai 1994: 178). In his essay ‘Inquest on a movement: Labour’s defeat
and its consequences’ (1979), Marquand argued that Labour had failed to develop
into the organisation desired by social democrats. Instead, during the 1970s it had
assumed the mien of an aggressive ‘proletarianism’. This asserted that Labour
should be ‘not merely a predominantly but an exclusively working-class party; that
the working class can be properly represented only by people of working-class
origin who alone understand its aspirations and have its interest at heart’. The
‘elaborate intellectual constructs’ of middle-class progressives were consequently
viewed as at best unnecessary, as ‘the party can be guided much more satisfactorily
by the gut reactions of its working-class members, and at worst positively danger-
ous, since they may lead the party away from its working-class roots’. The lesson
drawn by the party from the industrial discontent of the 1970s was, Marquand
believed, that people like him were now surplus to requirements (Marquand 
1979: 14, 16).
Following more of an academic than a political career subsequently, Marquand
became a Liberal Democrat when the SDP split between the Liberal-inclined Jenk-
insites and the go-it-alone Owenites. Like a number of other social democratic
émigrés he rejoined Labour after Blair became leader; in doing so, he announced
that ‘New’ Labour was now an ‘unequivocally social-democratic party’ located in
the ‘mainstream of North European social democracy’ (Marquand 1995: 18–19).
In contrast to certain other ex-Labour MPs who joined the SDP, Marquand con-
tinued to advocate many of the policies associated with post-war Keynesian social
democracy. It was not so much Labour’s social democratic policies which had been
at fault, he suggested: instead, the triumph of Thatcherism had derived more from
the flawed political practices employed by successive Labour Governments to
enact them. Like many of those who left Labour, Marquand became increasingly
preoccupied with the forms in which politics was articulated. If he did not ques-
tion the basic intellectual foundations of much of post-1945 social democracy,
Marquand (1988) explored different constitutional means of ensuring its success-
ful implantation in British society. Thus, on the basis of his desire for constitu-
tional change but continued faith in some of the assumptions underlying
Croslandite social democracy, Marquand became a keen critic of ‘New’ Labour.
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Publication of The Progressive Dilemma occurred at a particularly pregnant
moment in British political history. As Marquand characterises the period, the
neo-liberalism of the 1980s was on the wane, Margaret Thatcher having been dis-
placed as prime minister after the poll tax revolts. There was a ‘new mood’ stress-
ing the drawbacks of the form of capitalism engendered by the Thatcher
Governments’ neo-liberal reforms. To address these problems, a ‘new intellectual
and political paradigm’ had emerged which combined insights from ‘traditional
social liberalism’ and ‘traditional social democracy’ (Marquand 1991: 227–30). At
the same time, Kinnock’s ‘modernisation’ of Labour’s formal attitude to key areas
of policy made some observers believe that he was moving the party from ‘its dis-
tinctively British, labourist roots’ and transforming it into a ‘social-democratic
party on the European model’ (Mulgan 1989: 28–9). Such a body should have been
the ideal agency for putting the rapprochement between liberalism and socialism
into practice. Indeed, given the slump in the fortunes of the centre parties since the
SDP–Liberal merger, Labour appeared to be the only practicable means of
advance. Marquand, however, looked on that prospect with a sceptical eye. If yet
hopeful that the divided anti-Conservative majority would unite, he believed Kin-
nock’s Labour was still too much in awe of the unions to allow it to assume com-
mand (Marquand 1989: 375–8). The Progressive Dilemma was Marquand’s attempt
to think these matters through.
The ostensible focus of Marquand’s celebrated essay was Labour’s inability to
hold national office for much longer than a single term. The party, at the time Mar-
quand wrote, had only twice won a working Commons’ majority, but neither the
1945 nor the 1966 victory led to a sustained period in power. Marquand consid-
ered Labour’s inability to make a strong appeal to those beyond the manual work-
ing class as the key reason for this failure. The party, he argued, was tied too closely
to that group, to the industrial trade unions, in particular, to construct a long-term
socially diverse anti-Conservative coalition. The basic reasons for Labour’s poor
record were its ‘structure and beliefs’, its very nature – at least as codified in the
1918 constitution. Had Labour’s character been different – had the party assumed
the one outlined by Marquand – its electoral record would have been more
respectable.
According to Marquand, Labour should have emulated the model established by
the Liberal-led Edwardian ‘progressive alliance’. Indeed, he effectively argued that
it would have been better all round had Labour not sought independence but
remained within a coalition ‘reconstituted’ to take better account of the unions’
interests (Marquand 1991: 18–20). He appeared to believe that, had it not been for
the First World War, and had Labour been sufficiently patient, the Liberals would
have accommodated the working class on more favourable terms than those on
offer prior to 1914. Even so, the Liberals between 1906 and 1914 had tried to estab-
lish a ‘middle way’ between laissez-faire capitalism and the collectivist State. The
New Liberals, most notably, hoped to chart a course between capital and labour
with the aim of incorporating the labour movement within a suitably reformed
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capitalism. Marquand was not slow to suggest that such a programme anticipated
those embraced by post-war European social democrats in general and Labour fig-
ures such as Gaitskell in particular.
The appropriate political context for the enactment of these policies was, he sug-
gested, one where the unions formed part of a ‘broad-based, cross-class coalition’,
and within which they could enjoy a ‘crucial, but not dominating, part’. Marquand
suggested that this arrangement – similar to the vision of the CDS – was more than
feasible by pointing out that it had been achieved elsewhere. The Democrats in the
USA and most other European social democratic parties had built similar multi-
class coalitions. Britain was the exception, for here the labour interest dominated,
and was indeed embodied in, the Labour Party. As he asserted, Labour ‘deliber-
ately’ – and, on the basis of his analysis, perversely – chose to ‘identify itself as the
instrument of the labour interest rather than as the vehicle for any ideology’. Thus,
in a sense not true of its social democratic counterparts on the mainland of Europe, it
has been a trade union party, created, financed and, in the last analysis, controlled by a
highly decentralised trade union movement, which was already in existence before it
came into being. Above all, its ethos – the symbols, rituals, shared memories and
unwritten understandings, which have shaped the life of the party and given it its
unmistakable identity – had been saturated with the ethos of trade unionism. (1991: 17)
As Labour was so tied to the unions, reflecting their defensive ‘us-and-them’
labourist outlook to the exclusion of all others, the party enjoyed solid support in
its proletarian fortresses but could evoke little enthusiasm beyond them. Agreeing
that parties enjoy the ability to ‘shape’ voters’ attitudes and transform their appre-
ciation of their own interests, Marquand stressed how Labour’s internal character
prevented it from addressing those outside its union-dominated redoubts in lan-
guage that may have evoked a more positive response. The party’s essential reliance
on a ‘class’ appeal meant that it was incapable of making the intellectual leap nec-
essary to draw in those for whom class meant little – or something different from
what it meant to those in the heartlands. The confining ‘structure and mentality’
of the unions meant, therefore, that Labour lacked the necessary political imagi-
nation to sustain itself in office. Here the progressive alliance’s very heterogeneity
was seen as giving it a further advantage over its ‘labourist’ successor. As Marquand
wrote elsewhere, for much of the post-war period, Labour had sought to use the
State merely to protect workers in declining industries against the consequences of
economic change. As Labour had based its electoral appeal on its ability to provide
material improvement, it possessed no moral language that might have appealed
to those less dependent on that kind of protection (Marquand 1988: 19–20, 141–3,
and 1989: 375–8). It would have been so much better had Labour approached the
electorate in a different manner: it did not – could not – do so because of the kind
of organisation it was.
Marquand’s essay contains many subtle points that do not bear compression, yet
it proceeds, in effect, from the following five assumptions.
● The Liberals were not a spent force and could have fully integrated the labour
interest within a progressive alliance had it not been for the First World War.
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● Labour’s own nature, confirmed in the 1918 constitution, prevented it from
‘shaping’ non-working-class voters’ preferences.
● Had Labour assumed a different character – akin to the New Liberals’ – it
would have enjoyed a happier electoral history.
● Within continental social democracy, Labour was the exception rather than the
rule: the experience of other countries confirmed the feasibility of Marquand’s
model.
● Social democracy’s failure was due less to programmatic weakness and more to
the flawed means by which it was articulated.
Marquand’s view of Labour was influenced by considerations which feature in
accounts that could in no way be described as social democratic: hence the belief
in British exceptionalism in general and of Labour in particular,and the related
assumption that it embodied a ‘labourism’ directly traceable to the outlook of
manual trade unions. If Marquand and other social democrats saw this ‘labourism’
as blocking the development of social democracy, then socialists such as Ralph
Miliband and John Saville saw it in similar terms with regard to their own politi-
cal ambitions (Fielding 2000). Closer to home, the account was influenced also by
a keenly contested historiographical debate about the electoral viability of the Lib-
erals after 1914. In particular, Marquand was impressed by Clarke’s optimistic
account of Edwardian Liberalism’s engagement with class politics. Indeed, belief in
the viability of the Liberal Party is probably one of the two hallmarks of many late
twentieth-century social democrats. The other is that Labour was too closely tied
to the trade unions to have been a successful vehicle for social democracy. It is now
time to scrutinise those two assumptions in the light of some of the available 
historical evidence.
The progressive alliance
To test Marquand’s key historical suppositions, it is useful to concentrate on the
first quarter of the twentieth century and make particular reference to the situa-
tion in Manchester. Historians generally regard Manchester as one of the most
clear-cut examples of harmonious Liberal–Labour relations prior to 1914 and in
that partnership the Liberals are thought to have held the whip hand (Clarke 1971;
Tanner 1990: 157). It might be thought that if the progressive alliance was on the
verge of collapse in Edwardian Manchester then important questions should be
asked of its future in less favoured locations across the country.
In his study of politics in industrial Lancashire, the product of a PhD supervised
by Henry Pelling, Clarke claimed that although social class was an increasingly
important factor in determining political affiliations prior to 1914, it did not guar-
antee Labour’s rise. Rather, he argued that the Liberal Party, by adopting policies
such as old-age pensions and national insurance, and by virtue of its electoral pact
with Labour, was set for a bright future as the senior partner in a progressive
alliance. As evidence of the successful operation of this coalition, he referred to the
situation in Manchester, where Lib–Lab cooperation had transformed a Tory
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citadel into a progressive heartland. Ostensibly, the Lib–Lab understanding offered
considerable advantages to both sides, and, according to Clarke and others, was
growing stronger on the eve of 1914 (Adams 2000: 29; Tanner 1990:157). Closer
inspection suggests this to be a rather sanguine view. By looking at relations
between the parties more closely, it is clear that even in Manchester tensions were
becoming unmanageable and were boiling over well before the outbreak of the
First World War (McHugh 2002).
As early as 1907, municipal elections had become the occasion for Liberal–
Labour conflict in Manchester. While most local Liberal Associations fought shy of
standing against Labour candidates, some supported Conservatives in the hope of
defeating their putative partner. In 1908 Liberals and Conservatives went so far as
to run joint-Independent candidates in two Labour wards (Manchester Guardian,
3 November 1908; see Nuttall 1908). The Liberal Party was, then, not exactly
united in its adherence to progressivism: a significant number of its members were
very close to the Conservatives. Indeed, in the years immediately after 1918, when
their organisation had fallen into disarray, a substantial minority of Liberal coun-
cillors sat on the Conservative benches in Manchester’s municipal chamber (Man-
chester Guardian, 5 and 12 October 1920).
Many Labour activists were also unhappy about cooperating with the Liberals.
Prior to the 1910 municipal elections those wishing to make the break to inde-
pendence formed a Socialist Representation Committee (SRC) in the city. The SRC
aimed to ‘promote Socialist Representation on public bodies, and to form a
National Socialist Party, uniting all militant socialists’ (Clarion, 21 July 1911).
Within a year, the Manchester SRC had joined with others to form the British
Socialist Party (BSP), which held its foundation conference in neighbouring Sal-
ford, attracting numerous ex-Labour supporters into its ranks. It was to halt the
flow of defections to this new body that the Manchester and Salford Labour Rep-
resentation Committee (MSLRC) took steps to emphasise its autonomy by aiming
to contest Liberal seats in what would have been the 1915 general election (MSLRC
1912). This belligerence provoked a greater determination on the part of certain
Liberals to call for an end to their party’s alliance with Labour (Hertz 1912: 93;
Manchester Liberal Federation 1913).
Most Liberals hoped to avoid conflict by supporting electoral reform, princi-
pally some type of proportional system. This would allow both parties, advocates
believed, to compete in the same seats without splitting the anti-Conservative vote.
This suggests that specific ideological inconsistencies were not the main bone of
contention for most Liberals. Rather, the unwillingness of many members to con-
cede their own position to Labour owed much to the socially constructed ‘tribal-
ism’ that underpinned organised politics. More than differences in political
outlook, however, the division between Liberals and Labour rested on the con-
trasting class composition of the two parties. It had, after all, been the refusal of the
Manchester Liberal Union (MLU) to run working men candidates before 1900 that
had given impetus to the creation of the MSLRC in the first place. Dominated by
a wealthy elite, the MLU was happy to represent workers, even tailoring some of
the party’s policies to suit their needs, but members did not want to be represented
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by proletarians. As a result, the Independent Labour Party converted the Man-
chester and Salford Trades Council, which acted for skilled trade unionists histor-
ically close to the Liberals, to independent labour representation. Subsequently, the
Trades Council played a key role in the formation of the MSLRC, a development
that effectively ended the possibility of organised labour ever being subsumed
within local Liberalism (Hill 1981: 192–7).
Thus, social differences, as much as political disagreements imperilled the long-
term survival of the ‘progressive alliance’ in Manchester. Indeed, it is arguable that
it would have survived the General Election due to be held in 1915. Despite good
intentions at the national level, differences among local activists were profound
and set to end the possibility of cooperation. In this process, Manchester was typ-
ical of other towns and cities across Britain where the progressive alliance showed
signs of weakness even before 1914 and afterwards quickly unravelled (Belchem
1996; Berger 1993).
The 1918 constitution
If the continuation of the Lib–Lab coalition was in doubt even prior to the inter-
vention of the First World War, the repercussions of the European conflict made its
demise certain. The split in the Liberals and the proposal to extend the franchise to
all men and most women presented Labour with a chance to become the main
anti-Conservative alternative. Recognising this opening, the party’s leadership
devised a plan for Labour’s reorganisation, which they hoped would transform it
from a trade-union pressure group into a national independent body capable of
winning majority support. Thus, Labour’s membership had to be broadened, its
machinery made sound and the party equipped with a comprehensive programme
serving an ultimate aim (Fabian News, 29 (1918): 6; Henderson 1918).
According to Marquand, the choices made at this juncture would prove fatal.
Instead of creating a pluralistic party and furnishing Labour with a programme that
meshed ‘labourism’ with Liberalism, the leadership re-established Labour, as Gould
put it, as ‘a socialist party immutably linked to trade unionism’. Clause 4, in particu-
lar, committed Labour to pursuing public ownership as its ultimate goal, while con-
cessions to the unions confirmed their dominance over the annual conference and
the National Executive Committee. As a result, ‘discipline was gained, but flexibility
and the influence of ordinary members was weakened’. The capacity to ‘modernise
and adapt was to be the ultimate casualty’, while other ‘possible options, which were
still open at the start of the century, were closed down’ (Gould 1998: 26–7).
There is some truth in this argument. Powers granted to the unions proved cru-
cial in shaping Labour’s future path. At critical moments in the party’s history –
notably Gaitskell’s thwarted attempt to revise Clause 4 and Harold Wilson’s efforts
to reform industrial relations in 1969 – the unions vetoed moves that would have
significantly altered the course of both party and national history. Moreover, the
unions’ influence could be felt throughout the organisation: because they offered
Labour unrivalled access to money, personnel and facilities the unions often dom-
inated branches in industrial areas.
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It is doubtful that there could have been any other outcome in 1918. Those 
most responsible for change nonetheless strove to transform Labour from a union
pressure group to a party open to all classes. As Arthur Henderson, then party
chair, explained (1918: 124), the new constitution sought to make Labour ‘the
party of the producers – of the workers, in the widest sense of that noble word: of
all the people, without distinction of class or sex, who labour to enrich the com-
munity’. The adoption of Clause 4, with its references to ‘workers by hand or brain’,
was meant to further that process and was not designed to cast Labour in a class-
conscious socialist mould. Indeed, the ideological aspect of the constitution was
largely ignored at the time – although it came to attract substantially greater inter-
est in later years.
Far more important to contemporaries were the structural changes instituted by
the new constitution, and here the unions largely enjoyed their own way, if only on
a quid pro quo basis. Nevertheless, the agreement to construct a national network
of local parties, populated for the first time by individual members, was a signifi-
cant step. Indeed, some hoped that these new branches would drain power away
from the unions. Herbert Drinkwater, one of Labour’s senior organisers, claimed
(1923: 15) that ‘individual membership had in it the genesis of a revolutionary
transference of weight and power within the party’. For him, 1918 was ‘nowhere a
final and last word regarding [Labour’s] structure . . . it will adapt itself to circum-
stances as it grows’ (Drinkwater 1921: 7).
If the unions remained the formally dominant force in Labour’s organisation,
this was not necessarily meant to be a permanent state of affairs. Eventually, it was
hoped, power would be devolved to the members, a development seen to be cru-
cial if Labour was to become a truly national body. For, according to Sidney Webb
(1917: 152), it was through the provision of individual membership that ‘those
younger men who have enjoyed the advantages of a wider education than the
workman can secure, and of a training other than that of life at the forge, [will]
come into the Labour Party’. Many of these, it was anticipated, would be former
Liberals who were thought to be ‘looking longingly’ at Labour from their slowly
sinking ship (Wilson Harris 1917).
In essence, Labour’s leadership strove to achieve precisely the results that Mar-
quand has accused them of neglecting. Indeed, in some respects, the changes
implemented in 1918 represent the original ‘New’ Labour project – an attempt to
broaden Labour’s political and electoral scope by loosening the grip of the unions.
While not exactly a great success, these reforms were by no means a complete fail-
ure. After all, several commentators – in particular Lewis Minkin – believe that the
powers enjoyed in theory by the unions often amounted in practice to less. This
was, they consider, largely due to the fact that most unions did not want to dictate
to the party leadership, fearing the wider electoral consequences should they do so.
The formula defining how relations between MPs and the unions-dominated con-
ference was in fact agreed as early at 1907. This stipulated that parliamentarians
enjoyed the final power to determine the ‘time and method of giving effect’ to con-
ference decisions – a discretion they went on to exploit with some gusto (Minkin
1978: 5–6 and 1990).
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Even in the immediate wake of 1918, Ramsay MacDonald showed little concern
for union sensitivities, and during the 1920s he represented his party as a body that
sought to transcend notions of class through a commitment to create ‘community’.
In 1929 Labour achieved a level of electoral strength that suggested it was devel-
oping support both within and without its working-class bastions. Had the second
Labour Government of 1929–31 operated in more benign economic circum-
stances, MacDonald may have eventually resolved Marquand’s ‘dilemma’. The
onset of a world depression and the difficult choices that followed drew the curtain
down on that possibility. It also shifted power back to the unions – but only
because the PLP had been smashed at the 1931 general election and was bereft of
effective leadership after MacDonald defected to form a National Government
(Riddell 1999).
For much of the post-war period, Labour leaders enjoyed a near-autonomous
position within the party, one deriving from the largely unconditional support of
the largest unions. This gave Hugh Gaistkell and Harold Wilson, in particular, the
freedom to pursue electoral strategies designed to appeal to moderate ‘floating’
voters outside of the labour movement. When this autonomy came to an end, in the
1970s and 1980s, it was due largely to the demands of the party’s radicalised active
members, rather than the unions. Ironically, given Marquand’s complaints about
the party’s ‘proletarianism’ at that time, Labour’s activists were increasingly middle-
class in origin. Moreover, those working to end their leaders’ freedom of action and
supporting policies meant to serve working-class interests over all others were led
by the former hereditary peer Tony Benn (Whiteley 1983: 53–80).
No alternative?
On the whole, the 1918 constitution failed to create a greater distance between
Labour and the unions and thus, it could be argued, handicapped the party’s devel-
opment. Against that view, some final comments should be made.
First, if the 1918 constitution did not develop in the ways intended, that was not
necessarily due to the actions of Labour’s leadership. At least in part, the failing was
down to ‘the people’, who simply could not be induced to join and become active
in the party. Although it might be argued that it was because they were alienated
by the image and operation of the party machine that people did not commit to
Labour, the reasons for popular political inactivity were more deep-rooted
(McHugh 2001: 147–74).
Second, even accepting that the changes instituted in 1918 were defective, it is
doubtful that another, more attractive, course was open. While some may lament
Labour’s trade union origins, those origins remain a fact, and one that restricted
the leadership’s room for manoeuvre. Indeed, before he temporarily gave up on
Labour as a vehicle for progressive change, even Marquand accepted this. In his
biography of MacDonald (1977: 229), he conceded that ‘in the circumstances of
1918, Henderson’s constitution was probably the best obtainable’. The unions were
being asked to pay higher affiliation fees – essential if Labour was to compete in an
enlarged electorate – and ‘they were hardly likely to do so without a quid pro quo’.
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Consequently, in the context of the time, the party that emerged, although by no
means an ideal body for the promotion of social democracy, was the best on offer.
As Henderson asked Labour’s 1918 Conference delegates, while they considered
his proposed new constitution:
Should they have no longer a Federation and begin to build up from a new founda-
tion a political organisation depending only upon individual membership? Speaking
as an old electioneer he did not mind saying that if he had to begin afresh that would
be the goal at which he would aim . . . But apart from the nearness of a general elec-
tion it would be practically impossible to attempt such a course. Imagine the Execu-
tive saying to the Trade Unions upon whom the party had depended that they had no
formal use for them. He thought the Conference would give short shrift to such a
proposition. (Labour Party 1918: 99)
It is this point that is often lost on some, at least, of Labour’s social democratic crit-
ics. Eager to argue that things should have been much different, they can go too far
in asserting that things could have been much different. At least one reading of
Labour’s history, however, suggests that party leaders in 1918 had few options open
to them. The party had been established with the crucial help of the unions and
without their continued support its future was uncertain: the alternative of a truly
membership-based party appeared too much of a risk. With the unions Labour
may have been a flawed vehicle for progressive politics; but without them, as
Robert Taylor (2000: 43) has firmly put it, it would have been ‘nothing’. The history
of the SDP indicates the wisdom of the 1918 settlement. Unlike Marquand and col-
leagues in the 1980s, Henderson and Webb appreciated the electoral, financial and
organisational strengths offered by the unions, and realised that at least for the
time being it was impossible to proceed without them.
The progressive dilemma resolved?
By now it should be clear that the social democratic interpretation of the Labour
Party, as exemplified by The Progressive Dilemma, should be viewed with some cau-
tion. Its central proposition, regarding the role of the unions, was the product of a
particular political tradition with its own peculiar trajectory. In this generic sense,
the social democratic perspective is just like any other: self-interested, partial and
subject to variation over time. It should not be assumed, however, that by criticis-
ing the social democrats in such terms, we adhere to some alternative analytical
‘golden mean’, for none presently exists. It might, indeed, be ventured that if the
social democratic interpretation was flawed, it possessed fewer faults than those
propounded by Labour’s many socialist critics.
To question the social democratic perspective, two of Marquand’s central con-
tentions have been scrutinised in the light of the evidence that presently exists.
That exercise has revealed the extent to which this viewpoint was informed as
much by hopeful speculation about how the past should have been as it was by
sober analysis of real historical possibilities. Again, it would be wrong to condemn
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social democrats as uniquely unsound in this respect: many historians travel back-
wards determined to discover what they have already decided to find.
In conclusion, there is a final thought that further undermines the utility of the
social democratic approach. One of Marquand’s key propositions was that, had
Labour been able to alter its character in such a way as to make a sustained appeal
to those beyond the ‘traditional’ working class, it would have enjoyed a rosier elec-
toral history. This presumed that Labour’s gains within the middle class would not
have been offset by losses in the working class, a view sharply contradicted by
Adam Przeworski’s analysis of the electoral history of European Social Democracy.
For he discerned that as soon as Centre-Left parties reduced the salience of class in
their electoral strategies, so as to appeal to middle-class voters, they found it all the
harder to mobilise workers’ support (see Przeworski and Sprague 1986: 57–79).
Table 9.1 The Labour vote, 1964–70
1964 1966 1970 Difference 1964–70
Higher service 18 19 22 +4
Lower service 20 29 32 +12
Routine non-manual 26 41 40 +14
Petty bourgeoisie 15 20 20 +5
Foremen/technicians 48 61 56 +8
Skilled working class 70 73 63 –7
Unskilled working class 66 70 61 –5
Source: Evans, Heath and Payne (1999: 90).
British election survey data generated during the 1960s endorses Przeworski’s
pessimism over Marquand’s optimism. In the general election of 1966 Wilson
increased his party’s appeal to voters in all social classes compared to 1964 (see
Table 9.1). The result was a Labour majority in the Commons of some ninety-
seven seats, which included the newly elected MP David Marquand. In office,
Wilson’s ministers believed they would best maintain that majority by continuing
to do what they had done for some years: pitch their policies most directly at fickle
suburban voters with no attachment to the labour movement. They imagined that
the manual working class would remain that which they had always been: loyal
Labour voters (Fielding 2004: chapter 2). The result of the 1970 general election
showed the disadvantages of this eminently social democratic strategy: while
Labour held on to or even increased non-manual support won during the 1964–66
period it lost support in the working class and found itself once more in opposi-
tion (Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky 1971).
As ‘New’ Labour approached re-election in 2001, many feared the party would
suffer a similar fate. They believed Blair’s focus on the concerns of ‘middle Eng-
land’, which had helped him capture power in 1997, had to a dangerous degree
alienated the party’s working-class supporters (Fielding 2003: 85–115). In the end,
the party held on to most, not all, of its non-manual voters but lost support within
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its working-class heartlands, although perhaps not to the extent that some Jeremi-
ahs had forecast (Denver 2002). Unlike in 1970, however, Labour retained its
majority. Given the expansion of non-manual and lightly unionised occupations,
and given also the decline of the ‘traditional’ working class since the 1950s, this
trade-off in votes was evidently acceptable to certain party strategists at the start of
the new millennium. Time will tell how far this is a wise course to follow for the
rest of the twenty-first century. It is, however, unlikely – despite Marquand’s
valiant attempt to convince us otherwise – that it would have been the electoral
basis for a ‘progressive’ twentieth century.
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A central object of Labour’s re-branding as ‘New Labour’ was to distance it from
its trade union affiliates (Gould 1998: 257–8). The relationship was tense before
and after the 1997 election, when Blair reduced the unions’ formal power in the
party, and restricted employment policy initiatives largely to his predecessors’
promises (Ludlam 2001). But discontent was limited by real union gains, and ten-
sion eased markedly between Labour’s mid-term election losses in 1999 and the
2001 election campaign, in which the unions played a crucial role. After the 2001
campaign, though, bitter conflict erupted over the Government’s drive to place
more public services under private sector management, and discontent over New
Labour’s stance on EU labour market policy became more intense. To younger stu-
dents of British politics, this public conflict may have appeared novel. Since the
mid-1980s most unions had supported Labour’s organisational and policy mod-
ernisation under Neil Kinnock and John Smith. Only the occasional public refer-
ence to the allegedly ‘bad old days’ of the 1970s acted as a reminder of earlier
conflicts.
Yet in the first post-war study of the labour alliance – the unions–Labour Party
link – Martin Harrison (1960: 12) had dubbed it ‘the most controversial relation-
ship in British politics’. And thirty years later Lewis Minkin (1992: 646) echoed
Harrison, describing ‘a disputatious and controversial relationship – the most con-
tentious in British political life’. Nevertheless, the relationship has attracted little
specialist scholarship.
Between Harrison’s and Minkin’s seminal studies, just seven other monographs
appeared: Irving Richter’s studies of the politics of three affiliated unions (1973);
Leo Panitch’s study of incomes policy (1976); William Muller’s study of union-
sponsored MPs (1977); Lewis Minkin’s study of the Labour Party Conference
(1978); Derek Fatchett’s study of the first struggle over political fund ballots
(1987); Andrew Taylor’s analysis of the link during the Social Contract era and its
aftermath (1987); and Paul Webb’s study of the link’s institutional forms and of
union members’ electoral behaviour (1992).
These monographs have not generated a sustained academic dialogue about the
linkage, although Minkin’s Contentious Alliance was the result of an extended
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engagement with the ‘new and dominant myth’, from the 1960s, that it was the
unions ‘which, by finance and votes, controlled the Labour Party’ (1997: 78ff.), a
‘myth’ equally dismissed by Harrison in his earlier study (1960: 336ff.; see also
chapter 11 of the present volume, by Eric Shaw).
Of course, many shorter studies of the linkage have appeared as chapters in
more general works on trade unionism, economic policy and the Labour Party,
and in biographical studies and memoirs, and it is probably from these scattered
sources that students have mostly learned about the contentious alliance. This
wider literature does, though, contain the perspectives of two distinct schools of
thought: the liberal–social democratic pluralist perspective; and the perspective of
socialist and Marxist writers. This chapter seeks to outline key features of the two
perspectives and indicates some limitations to which they are subject. It illustrates
these limitations by discussing neglected aspects of the crucial period that falls,
roughly, between 1974 and 1983, years that cover both the collapse of the Social
Contract and the labour alliance’s subsequent civil war.
Too much pluralism . . . 
Pluralism, as political theory, celebrated the liberal democratic political system and
portrayed it as driven by the free competition of parties and interest groups, from
which preferences emerged that parliamentarians and a neutral state machine
implemented. A good starting point for understanding the post-war perspective
on the unions–party link of liberal and social democratic pluralists is the concept
of ‘pluralistic stagnation’, applied to British politics by Samuel Beer (1965 and
1982), and in a series of studies of British unions by Gerald Dorfman (1974, 1979
and 1983) and Robert Taylor (1980, 1993 and 2000). The concept of ‘pluralistic
stagnation’ depicted post-war Britain as characterised by a new producer-group
politics, in which capital, labour and the State bargained collectively on a range of
public policy issues. This pluralistic governance emerged from the war economy,
and had underpinned the post-war settlement, above all the prioritisation of full
employment. The latter implied restraint in wage bargaining. When, during the
war, William Beveridge sought reassurance over this implication, the TUC insisted
that the employment objective would have to be modified if it implied ‘methods
incompatible with the rights of workpeople and the objects of Trade Unionism’;
but it conceded that free collective bargaining might be restrained given a context
of socially progressive economic intervention (TUC 1944: 419–20; and see Taylor
1993: 20ff.). Wage restraint thus became, in Allan Flanders’s words, ‘the greatest
unresolved problem in existing relations between the trade unions and the state’
(1957: 159).
After Sterling had become fully convertible in 1958, so that governments could
no longer restrict its sale, its vulnerability, and the perception of relative decline,
pushed governments towards indicative planning and wage controls. Here the
‘stagnation’ component of ‘pluralistic stagnation’ emerged, as the TUC proved, on
this view, to have insufficient authority to police wage behaviour among its affili-
ates and permit stable economic growth. Unions appeared unable to control shop
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stewards and members in their multi-union, leap-frogging, wage drifting, work-
places. Here was far too much pluralism, and the ‘union problem’ became a central
focus of political and academic debate. Dorfman (1983: 131) summarised it thus:
Collectivist politics thus failed to work in relation to the speed at which government
took control of the economy and made consequent demands for union participation
in bargaining and implementing economic and industrial policies. By the late sixties,
the gap between government ‘demand’ and TUC ‘delivery’ had widened to a politically
unacceptable degree.
When the (eminently pluralist) recommendations of the Donovan Commission
(HMSO 1968) proved politically inadequate, Labour attempted to legislate against
unofficial strikes, but failed to overcome opposition in the TUC, the Government
and the party. Another pluralist writer echoed Flanders, commenting on this out-
come of Labour’s In Place of Strife proposals: ‘The Social Democratic dilemma –
how to contain the interests of organised labour within a broadly-based political
party, and how to combine free trade unionism with the efficient management of
the economy – remained unsolved’ (Jenkins 1970: 166).
This background gives the pluralist literature its overwhelming focus:
unions–government relations. This focus produced, in the 1970s, a burgeoning
neo-pluralist literature on ‘corporatism’, a growth industry largely shut down, like
so many others, by Margaret Thatcher. The link between affiliated unions and the
party was thus viewed very largely, and narrowly, as an aspect of the conflict over
wages and industrial relations. This perspective produces a number of problems.
In the first place, there is a tendency to conflate the appearance of union power
in the institutions of tripartism with union power in the Labour Party. With so
much constitutional weight in the party, union affiliates were portrayed as domi-
nating party policy and management. As noted above, both Harrison and Minkin
have comprehensively dismissed this portrayal on the basis of detailed analysis of
the internal unions–party linkage (see chapter 11).
A second tendency, a kind of monolithism, treats unions as a single political
entity. Students of politics, as a rule, do not make statements of the kind: ‘In 1956,
the political parties decided to invade the Suez Canal Zone’, or, for that matter ‘In
the 1980s, the political parties decided to destroy the National Union of
Mineworkers’. Yet the literature is replete with indiscriminate references to the
actions of ‘the unions’, although even in the era when the unions’ ‘praetorian
guard’ fixed party conferences, several large unions routinely defied the party lead-
ership, one reason why ‘the stereotyped image of the unions as a sort of orthodox
lump of suet pudding clogging the Party’s progress is a potentially disastrous over-
simplification’ (Harrison 1960: 238). And, indeed, scholars in this school have con-
ducted important disaggregated studies of individual unions (Richter 1973; Taylor
1980). Nevertheless, writing on the unions’ role in Labour’s civil war after 1979,
Ben Pimlott identified ‘a union decision to move into Labour Party politics more
decisively than ever before, and to throw their weight heavily against the parlia-
mentary leadership’ (1991: 217). This particular belief is demolished by Minkin
(1992: 194–5), who shows that union votes were evenly balanced on key issues.
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Needless to say, these two assessments have deeply contrasting consequences for
understanding the recent history of the unions–party link.
A third tendency is to explain the unions–party relationship in terms of a bipo-
lar conflict between union leaders and union members, again emphasising the for-
mers’ inadequate authority. In his analysis of the ‘progressive dilemma’ – how to
reconcile Labour’s working class origins with its electoral need to appeal to other
classes – David Marquand discusses the collapse of the Social Contract. Portraying
Labour ministers as slow to control wages, he asserts (1992: 196) that ‘in spite of
their assiduous servility to the union leaders, opposition from the rank and file of
the trade unions eventually made their policies inoperative too’ (see also chapter 9,
by Steven Fielding and Declan McHugh). An undifferentiated union leadership
was apparently confronted by a force from below. Yet by 1978 union leaders them-
selves were hopelessly divided over the Social Contract. In November 1978, the
TUC Economic Committee’s recommendation to re-open wage talks was dramat-
ically abandoned, with the General Council split 14 votes to 14. By then, as I will
suggest, the unions had been badly divided for some time.
A fourth tendency is to treat union leaders as mere cyphers, reactively defending
industrial voluntarism. Where they used their clout in the party, they did so defen-
sively, directing it industrially, Irving Richter (1973: 218) insisted, at ‘simply the
achievement, maintenance or restoration of “free collective bargaining”, or, within
the party, as Robert Taylor notes (1980: 100), at providing ‘the only real counter-
weight to combat the negative extremism of the constituency rank and file’. Yet
union leaders have frequently participated as activists in Labour politics, often
ignoring their unions’ policies in the process. Biographical accounts often reveal
political activists trying to drive Labour policy well beyond industrial relations’
concerns: Frank Chapple (1984) on foreign policy; Frank Cousins on nuclear arms
(see Goodman 1979); and Jack Jones (1986) on pensions.
The argument here, then, is that the pluralist focus on unions as unreliable 
partners in economic management, usually reflecting a normative commitment 
to Keynesian political economy, often neglects the full complexities of the
unions–party relationship, and of union–union relationships, and thus inhibits
full understanding of the labour alliance.
. . . not enough socialism
The other principal academic perspective on the post-war labour alliance is that of
socialist and Marxist writers, who rejected the pluralist claim that the State was
politically neutral, portraying it as overwhelmingly on the side of capital in its class
struggle against labour. Much of this perspective was inspired by Ralph Miliband’s
Parliamentary Socialism (1961; see chapter 5 of this volume, by David Coates and
Leo Panitch). This school explicitly aims to help identify viable socialist political
strategies. The starting point is Miliband’s analysis of Labour as an overwhelm-
ingly parliamentarist party, whose political function was to integrate organised
workers into parliamentary modes of action. Applied to the party–unions link, Leo
Panitch elaborated:
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The function of the Labour Party in the British political system consists not only of
representing working class interests, but of acting as one of the chief mechanisms for
inculcating the organised working class with national values and symbols and of
restraining and reinterpreting working class demands in this light.
In particular, he argued, when Labour mobilised support for the (liberal capitalist)
‘national interest’ against union ‘sectional’ behaviour, it acted ‘as a highly effective
agency of social control against the objective expression of working class dissent’
(Panitch 1976: 235–6).
Panitch’s 1976 study focused on incomes policy and hence mainly on the
party–government link. It portrayed a political economy context mirroring that of
the pluralists: an emphasis on the relative weakness of British capital, its exposed
currency, inadequate productivity and investment, and wage militancy. In this
problematical world, Labour played an ‘enhanced integrative role’, promoting
indicative planning and incomes policy. Labour’s success, and part of its electoral
appeal, ‘depended primarily on its structural ties with the trade unions’ (Panitch
1976: 240). In the clash between class and national interests, however, the
unions–party link also acted as ‘a structural constraint upon the ability of the
Labour Party to act out its integrative role’, not least when ‘the basic dilemma of
corporatism – coercion in the name of harmony – comes to rear its ugly head’
(Panitch 1976: 247; 1986: 69, 73). Nevertheless, as David Coates (1980: 215) put it,
the loyalty of key union leaders helped sustain Labour Governments when such
dilemmas ‘generated tension among the rank and file of the trade union move-
ment which, had the Government been Conservative, the trade union leadership
would have articulated more fully’.
Much of the emphasis in socialist work is thus on exposing the consequences for
the labour movement of ‘enhanced’ incorporation of unions within the institu-
tions and strategies of tripartite economic management. Socialist writers have
insisted that while unions place their key social power over wage bargaining on the
corporatist table, business keeps to itself its key power over investment. Hence
where pluralist bipolarism saw union leaders immobilised by mass militancy,
socialists saw militancy pacified by union leaders, and in some Marxist accounts
this pacifying role is portrayed as far more significant than Left-Right factionalism
inside unions (Cliff and Gluckstein 1988).
The socialist school sometimes shares the pluralist tendency to monolithism.
Not that the role of factionalism – generalised internal political struggle – in the
labour alliance is ignored: the school’s founding purpose was to engage with such
factionalism, and recent work is in this vein (Panitch and Leys 1997). Abstract
opposition of Labour to ‘the unions’ is nevertheless sometimes characteristic. In an
early essay Panitch (1986: 74) wrote: ‘The result [of the party’s integrationist ide-
ology] is conflict between the unions and Labour Party over the very integrative
character of the party and over party policy towards the economy and industrial
relations’. Coates commented (1989: 96):
Between 1974 and 1979 the historic connections binding Labour politicians and
union officialdom, the positive commitments of union leaders to the Labour Party,
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and the close links that they enjoyed with Labour politicians, all left union leaders par-
ticularly prone to subordinate trade union demands to the general drift of govern-
ment policy.
Such shorthand may be unavoidable – certainly Coates himself has warned that it
is ‘always a mistake to treat the national trade unions as a homogeneous and undif-
ferentiated bloc’ (1980: 212) – but it should be treated with caution by students of
labour, and it may divert attention from insights that a disaggregated approach can
produce, as I suggest below.
A second tendency of the socialist school is its emphasis on national industrial
policy, a focus linked to identifying underinvestment in British industry as a prin-
cipal explanation for relative economic decline, an alternative to the pluralist focus
on labour militancy. This can divert attention from other policy conflicts. In his
discussion of the political power of trade unionism in 1974–79, Coates concludes
(1980: 226) that unions and the Labour Government were not ideologically
divided over economic policy: ‘On the contrary, with the exception of left-wing
pre-occupation with free collective bargaining, both groups operated within
roughly similar definitions of the causes and consequences, the necessities and
policy options that the crisis generated.’ It is suggested below that a disaggregated
approach to the economic policy conflicts in the period reveals serious union divi-
sion along another crucial dimension of the ideologically integrative role of
Labour, namely the promotion of a residualist or productivist ideology in respect of
public, and sometimes private, service sector work at a time of the neo-liberal
assault on the welfare state. ‘Productivist’ here means the designation of some
forms of work as economically productive, and others as unproductive; ‘residual-
ist’ means the perception of public service spending as being limited to the
resources left over after the needs of productive economic activities have been met.
The suggestion here then, is that accounts from the socialist perspective, for all
the scholarship and passion it brings to the understanding of the labour alliance,
can share with the pluralists some tendencies to what are here being termed mono-
lithism and bipolarism, and a focus on industrial policy that underestimates the
significance of sectoral divisions over fiscal policy within the alliance for both
unions–government and unions–party relations.
The last but one Labour Government
To put into historical context the criticisms made above, the focus of this chapter
is the decade after 1974, not because the criticisms are applicable only to this
period, but because this was when the corporatist dilemmas identified by both
schools as straining the labour alliance were most intense. This was a period, his-
torically, of the closest integration of the alliance in the programme and institu-
tions of the Social Contract, notably the new TUC–Labour Party Liaison
Committee, in which the TUC, the party’s National Executive Committee (NEC)
and the parliamentary leadership/Government were equally represented. It was a
period of accelerating international inflation and currency instability, massive
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deflation in the industrial states whose wealth was being redistributed to oil-pro-
ducers and the return of mass unemployment. The period also witnessed the rise
in ideological influence of neo-liberal political economy, incorporating a new
assault on state spending for, allegedly, ‘crowding out’ the ‘wealth-creating’ sec-
tors. A Marxist political economy of this ‘fiscal crisis’ (Gough 1979; O’Connor
1973) suggested new fractures within labour movements (Offe 1984), but was
little pursued at the time in relation to the British movement (exceptions were
McDonnell 1978; Fryer 1979). Fractions of capital proved much more interesting
to Marxist academics than did fractions of labour. Responding to these economic
and political crises, the Labour Government introduced ‘the largest cuts in real
public expenditure that have occurred in the last fifty years’ (Jackson 1991: 73).
These cuts, it should be emphasised, largely pre-dated the over-mythologised
International Monetary Fund (IMF) deal of 1976 when, in a highly public
manner, the Government was forced to announce more public spending cuts 
in return for loans to stabilise the Sterling exchange rate (Ludlam 1992). The
social and industrial policy trade-offs in the Social Contract, supposed to reward
wage restraint, were hit hard in the process, as, consequently, was the unions–
party link.
A final justification for the emphasis on this period is its relative absence from
the monographs. Even in Minkin’s monumental studies the late 1970s receive less
attention than, arguably, they deserve. They feature in the epilogue to the second
edition of The Labour Party Conference, and more extensively in The Contentious
Alliance, where divisions over fiscal policy are noted, but are treated only to a few
suggestive paragraphs. Andrew Taylor’s study (1987) contained the first detailed
examination of TUC–government relations over fiscal policy in the 1970s, but did
not directly address the sectoral division that, I argue, emerged at the time.
Three arguments are presented here about the unions–party link in this period,
addressing the limitations of monolithism, of a bipolar counterposing of union
leaders to members, and of overemphasis on industrial policy. Firstly, it is sug-
gested that the period witnessed an under-analysed union division along
public–private sectoral lines which revealed the presence within labourist ideology
of a profoundly capitalist commitment to the primacy of ‘productive’ labour – the
productivism or residualism referred to above. Secondly, this division is presented
as central in understanding the collapse of the Social Contract. And, thirdly, it is
argued that the hostilities thus generated help explain factional realignments
within the unions–party link between 1979 and 1983.
Deserving versus undeserving workers: productivism and residualism
Over half the TUC’s membership worked in the public sector by 1974. But public
sector unions were grossly under-represented on senior TUC economic commit-
tees. The National and Local Government Officers’ Association (NALGO) and the
National Union of Public Employees (NUPE), the fourth and fifth largest unions,
were excluded until 1977–78. This mattered because the TUC generally endorsed
fiscal policy in 1975–76, as the biggest spending cuts and the non-inflation-
proofed ‘cash limits’ on spending were introduced.
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Anti-cuts motions were routinely adopted at TUC Conferences, but frustration
at the TUC General Council’s reluctance to act on them led NUPE and NALGO to
picket the 1976 TUC and Labour Conferences, lead a huge national demonstration
against cuts in November 1976 and then launch the National Steering Committee
Against the Cuts (NSCAC). This unprecedented sectoral union pressure group was
‘the official body established by eleven public sector trade unions and associations
to combat the cuts in public expenditure’ (NSCAC 1977: i). Like the TUC General
Council, the giant general unions – the Transport and General Workers’ Union
(TGWU) and the General and Municipal Workers’ Union (GMWU) – declined to
support the pickets or the mass demonstration. A public service union’s research
officer wrote: ‘The issue of cuts brought about a major split within the trade union
movement in the mid-1970s . . . cuts were the primary union issue from 1975 to
1977’ (Hall 1983: 10–11). The new sectoral cleavage may have been cross-cut by
older factional loyalties, but its emergence is beyond dispute.
A major factor producing the public sector alliance was the need to confront the
alarming new ideological discourse, the neo-liberal assault on public spending,
that echoed older discourses on the ‘unproductive labour’ question (see Boss
1990). Contemporary socialist analysis of the ‘fiscal crisis of the state’, a ‘good rid-
dance’ version of the neo-liberal analysis, offered anti-cuts unions little ammuni-
tion (Gough 1979; O’Connor 1973). The Left’s AES did not break cleanly from
liberal political economy on this point. As one union research officer put it: ‘The
way the AES treats public services is heartbreaking. They remain a problem of
financing, a residual in the arithmetic of capitalism’ (Hall 1983: 96). And the new
Cambridge group of Keynesians, whose analysis of import controls appealed to the
unions’ Left, prescribed even deeper cuts than the Treasury (Crosland 1982: 342).
The labour movement echoed to the sound of residualist arguments, most dra-
matically from Hugh Scanlon at the TUC’s 1976 Special Congress on economic
policy. The Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers’ (AUEW) leader backed
spending cuts because, ‘if Britain is to get out of her undoubted economic diffi-
culties, she can only do it on the basis of a viable, efficient manufacturing industry
with emphasis on those who make and sell and, if necessary, somewhat less empha-
sis on those who serve’ (TUC 1976a: 28). Of the ‘crowding out’ line (that a bloated
public sector was asphyxiating free enterprise), NSCAC noted: ‘This argument has
been used by the Government to divide the trade union Movement. Cut back on
the public sector, argues the Chancellor, and there will be more investment and
therefore more jobs for trade unionists and the unemployed in the private manu-
facturing sector’ (1977: 18). The records of unions in different economic sectors
amply confirm this perception, though more often in the relative privacy of their
journals and conferences (Ludlam 1991, 1995). The position in the giant general
unions was more complex. Both had significant memberships in the public sector.
In the TGWU the authority and political loyalty of Jack Jones moderated open
protest, but public sector anger surfaced in the union’s newspaper as soon as Jones
was succeeded by Moss Evans. The GMWU’s traditional loyalty to Labour leaders
similarly constrained official expressions of anger until its leader, David Basnett,
became alarmed at the mass employment that followed fiscal deflation. At its 
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conference in 1976, the GMWU’s public services officer succinctly addressed the
sectoral division and the resulting political dilemma for general unions:
The policy is intended to channel resources away from consumption and into pro-
ductive investment. So those unions whose membership lies wholly in industry find
no conflict whatsoever here between the public interest and their private interest. On
the other hand those unions whose membership lies wholly in the public sector have
an obvious interest in opposing the cuts . . . the real dilemma is forced on unions like
our own who have a membership interested in both camps and which can either lose
or gain. (GMWU 1976: 522)
A disaggregated approach to the unions–party link in this period, then, reveals the
limitation of monolithism, and a dimension of Labour’s ‘integrative ideology’
lying beyond corporatist industrial policy. This dimension reflects a fundamental
tenet of capitalist ideology: the absolute primacy of traded commodity produc-
tion, and an associated prejudice against the burden of ‘unproductive’ labour. The
following sections consider the effects of this sectoral cleavage on union–govern-
ment relations and on power relations within the party.
Sectoral division and the fate of the unions–party-in-government link
The Social Contract’s disintegration in the ‘winter of discontent’ is blamed, con-
ventionally, on the wage policy that inflicted the most serious real wage cuts in
living memory and squeezed skilled workers’ differentials (Ludlam 1999). This
explanation neglects the impact of fiscal policy on union tolerance of wage
restraint, and the related impact of the TUC’s loss of cohesion as a bargaining part-
ner, arising from the sectoral division noted above.
Wage restraint had been sold as part of a ‘wider Social Contract’ that included
industrial relations’ reform, industrial intervention and democracy, and, above all,
social policy commitments – the ‘social wage’. Demanding wage restraint at the
1974 TUC Conference, future Prime Minister James Callaghan insisted: ‘The
Social Contract was devised as a whole, and it will stand or fall as a whole. No one
. . . is entitled to say that he accepts the part that pleases him but rejects the rest’
(TUC 1974: 396). The Government’s inability to maintain its end of this package
deal progressively undermined the Social Contract wage deal.
Following early education cuts, the TUC’s General Council threatened that
‘restoration of the cuts must be regarded as part of the Social Contract’ (TUC
1975: 167). The unexpected introduction of new cash limits on public spending
almost reversed the TGWU Conference’s approval of the 1975 incomes policy
(Jones 1986: 297), and the 1975 TUC Conference passed an anti-cuts motion
declaring that, ‘further cuts in public expenditure . . . will be regarded as . . . a fun-
damental breach of the social contract’ (TUC 1975: 483, 462). The TUC statement
The Social Contract 1976–77 subsequently accepted cuts already announced, but
insisted that avoiding further cuts was central to the contract’s progress (TUC
1976a: 40). In the wake of the IMF crisis, the TUC’s 1977 Economic Review (1977a:
10) warned that unions could not oversee further wage restraint until the fiscal
policy issue was settled. When Callaghan, as prime minister, appealed to the 1977
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TUC Conference to maintain wage controls, the miners’ spokesperson retorted:
‘We have a mass of cuts in the social services that we were told would not take place
if we accepted the Social Contract. I believe that this is the biggest con trick that
has ever been pulled’ (TUC 1977b: 459–60).
Larry Whitty recalled how opinion shifted in the conferences of the ultra-loyal
GMWU:
By [19]77 from being pretty docile, they suddenly turned into quite substantial attacks
on the union, attacks on the party and so on . . . you couldn’t actually see the social
policy being delivered. We know aspects of it were being delivered, but also publicly,
and to a large extent in real terms, the Government’s direction was to cut public
expenditure covering those aspects of the social wage. (Interview)
Jones’ successor as TGWU leader, Moss Evans, held a similar view:
The principle cause of undermining any sort of hope in a Social Contract with the
government or any sense of understanding were the terms agreed by Denis Healey
with the IMF . . . in layman’s terms it would appear that the quid pro quos for the
Social Contract could not be met by the Government because of the terms of the IMF
loan . . . This disillusioned lots of people. (Interview)
NUPE’s 1977 economic review Fight Back!, the most savage official union attack
on the Social Contract, concluded:
Because the Government has failed to meet the expectations it raised among workers
when it entered into the bargain, the Social Contract has been transformed, in the 
eyes of trade unionists, from an agreement about economic and social priorities into
a vehicle for implementing a policy of wage restraint – and nothing more. (NUPE
1977: 9)
TUC General Secretary Lionel Murray recalled (in interview): ‘In the end, it was
the decision to batten down the hatches in the public sector that led to the upris-
ing, to the so-called winter of discontent. That was the strongest thing.’ Crucially,
the frustration of public service unions at the TUC leadership’s initial acceptance
of Labour’s fiscal policy, manifested in the formation of the sectoral NSCAC and
its mass demonstrations described above, had, by 1978, undermined the cohesion
of the TUC as a peak organisation. By the time the Social Contract collapsed, in
1978, distrust among unions over the top-table bargaining with Labour had made
the TUC’s core negotiating machinery unworkable. Moss Evans (in interview)
recalled: ‘[T]here was so much suspicion that the whole of the General Council
would have to turn up to meet the prime minister and the chancellor of the
exchequer and the secretary of state for employment. The suspicion that had
emerged had to be seen to be believed.’
If monolithism is abandoned, then, there is overwhelming evidence that sectoral
division produced a catastrophic loss of cohesion within the TUC, rendering it
impossible for the Social Contract negotiations to continue past 1977–78. So, did
this less well-known dimension of labour movement politics produce new fac-
tional alignments that contradict the tendency, noted above, to treat union leaders
as mere cyphers? Did it have implications for the cohesion of the party itself?
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Realignment in Labour’s civil war: the unions–party-in-opposition link
This section addresses two main questions. Was there a Hard Left–Soft Left divi-
sion in the unions in the mid-1970s, related to sectoral divisions, that in any way
prefigured the realignment in the party associated with the 1980s? And, if so, what
impact did it have on the trajectory of the Labour Left in the late 1970s and early
1980s?
By the Soft Left–Hard Left split is meant the division that is conventionally dated
from 1981 when Neil Kinnock led a group of Left – Tribune Group – MPs in oppo-
sition to Tony Benn’s challenge for the party’s deputy leadership. This realignment
was crucial to Kinnock’s construction of the Centre-Left block that gave him a
clear run at the policy and party reforms that built the foundations for New
Labour (Kinnock 1994). This conventional periodisation needs modification, irre-
spective of whether it was prefigured among the unions. We know that Michael
Foot and Tony Benn had split over the party’s 1973 public ownership programme,
that Foot did not mobilise against Benn’s sacking as industry secretary in 1975, and
about Foot’s estrangement from the Tribune Group in the mid-1970s (Castle 1980:
469; Hatfield 1978: 211; Jones, M. 1994: 358). Is there evidence of a similar Hard
Left–Soft Left union split in the mid-1970s?
Firstly, the realignment of Jones and Scanlon is noted by academics, by cabinet
diarists and by both men themselves (Benn 1989: 46, 61, 166; Castle 1980: 469–71,
679; Jones 1986: 304, 325; Minkin 1992: 163–182; Wickham-Jones 1996: 150 et
passim; Scanlon 1979: 394; Scanlon interview). The reasons were straightforward:
fear of hyperinflation; and a determination to keep Labour in office and Thatcher
out. The divergence was occasionally very public, as when Jones attacked veteran
Left MP Ian Mikardo at the 1975 annual Tribune rally, for suggesting that the
unions were failing to protect workers. For Benn, this episode ‘ended the pretence
of a Left fighting a Right’. As Larry Whitty put it (in interview): ‘Jack and Hughie,
by that time, 1975–76, from being on the Left of the general council, had become
the anti-public sector element.’ Jones, Scanlon and GMWU leader David Basnett
blocked calls for a TUC Special Congress on rising unemployment in January
1976, and lambasted Tribune Group MPs who voted against the March 1976 public
expenditure White Paper – the most deflationary of the whole government (Tri-
bune 19 March 1976).
The three leaders also called for a TUC–Labour Party Liaison Committee state-
ment to override existing TUC and party policies, producing more factional ten-
sions. In the early 1970s, the balance of political forces in the Liaison Committee
had favoured NEC and trade union members of the Tribunite Left. By 1976, with
Jones and Scanlon defending wage controls and public spending cuts, NEC Tri-
bunites were outgunned by an alliance of TUC and government representatives
(Minkin 1978: 480; Taylor 1987: 71–2). Liaison Committee minutes in 1976 reveal
a bitter struggle, lasting several months, over the wording of Treasury drafts on
public spending for the key Social Contract statement The Next Three Years and the
Question of Priorities (TUC 1976b: 416–24; see Liaison Committee Minutes of 26
April, 24 May, 21 June and 26 July 1976). Left-wing NEC members then published
a report comparing this statement with Labour and TUC Conference policies,
160 Too much pluralism, not enough socialism
ITLP_C10.QXD  18/8/03  10:01 am  Page 160
demonstrating how far the Liaison Committee was abandoning the latter. Such
disputes highlight a struggle by the NEC-based Labour Left against a Soft Left
alliance of Foot with Jones and Scanlon.
So where, if anywhere, is a realigned union Hard Left emerging? The argument
here is that two wings of the union left resisted the Liaison Committee line. Com-
munist Party-influenced unions, and allied unions in the contemporary Broad
Left, promoted a hard-line version of the ‘Alternative Economic Strategy’ (AES).
After 1974, these unions systematically attacked the Social Contract and pushed
the AES. What was new from 1975 was the Broad Left’s alliance with newly-radi-
calised public service unions, behind resolution-mongering against the cuts and
deflation, and for Hard Left versions of the AES. Murray’s view (in interview),
some years later, was that these two groupings ‘did coalesce for the purposes of the
campaign – very often for very different reasons. And I don’t think there was a clear
ideology underlying the joint action.’ Murray had warned the Government of this
alliance, fearing it might carry an anti-Social Contract motion at the 1975 TUC, if
more cuts were announced.
However, although this Hard Left realignment was real, it was not easily sus-
tained. From 1976 onwards softer versions of the AES were passed at the TUC, and
to some of the anti-cuts’ unions the argument seemed to have been won. Previ-
ously excluded unions were gradually admitted to the TUC’s top committees, and
the benefits were outweighing the costs of continued factionalism (NSCAC was
wound up by 1981). And although 1976–78 saw the worst impact of pre-IMF deal
cuts and ‘cash limits’, budgets after the IMF deal were all reflationary (if more by
tax cuts than by restoration of spending cuts). Furthermore, the AES did not pro-
vide a very firm platform. Union versions of the AES differed widely in scope and
radicalism (Sharples 1981). The Treasury worked hard to convince union leaders
that retaliation against AES protectionism would be devastating. And the Social
Contract years took a toll: the more service cuts and closures went through with-
out successful resistance, the harder it became to mobilise (Neale 1983).
If the realignment of the union Left was relatively limited within the TUC,
though, did it carry into the Labour Party? Apart from its NSCAC work, NUPE
greatly intensified work inside the party. It increased its national affiliation to the
party, and thus its conference vote, from 150,000 to 600,000 between 1974 and
1980. This has even led some, ignoring other unions’ changed affiliations, to argue
that NUPE’s increased vote led to the party leadership’s defeats over constitutional
reforms (Healey 1989: 470; Minkin 1992: 199). NUPE, TGWU and the Association
of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs (ASTMS) routinely supported all
three of the constitutional reformers’ key demands: automatic reselection of MPs;
widening the leadership election franchise; and giving the NEC the final word over
election manifestos. The first two were adopted. The unions en bloc did not, as
noted above, force reforms through after 1979, but, as Minkin (1992: 194–5) makes
clear, enough did to get two of the demands through. But NUPE went further,
becoming an early affiliate, along with other unions in the new leftist alliance, of
the CLPD. Between 1975 and 1979, unions grew from 6 per cent to 49 per cent 
of CLPD affiliates. NUPE’s Research Director Bernard Dix became CLPD vice-
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president, and permitted his staff to devote union resources to the cause (Dix in
interview). Dix and other NUPE officers became important union contacts in the
proto-Bennite movement of the last years of the Labour Government (Benn 1989:
258; Kogan and Kogan 1982: 108).
The threat of Thatcherism was, however, acute by 1981, when Benn’s deputy-
leadership challenge against Denis Healey split the parliamentary Tribunites, caus-
ing consternation on the union Left. Bill Keys, a pivotal union left-winger on the
party NEC, the TGWU’s Evans and ASTMS’ Clive Jenkins all opposed Benn’s can-
didacy. NUPE held a branch ballot, which Healey won. The TGWU first backed
Soft Left ‘spoiler’ John Silkin, then voted for Benn in the second round. In the first
round Benn took 36.5 per cent of the union vote to Healey’s 61.2 per cent. At the
same conference, NEC election results revealed that a revived union Right had
removed five left-wingers, which, combined with the Soft Left shift of some MPs,
gave Foot an anti-Bennite NEC majority for the first time. Key unions now
imposed a truce inside the party, in the so-called ‘Peace of Bishop’s Stortford’ bro-
kered at the ASTMS training college.
So there was realignment on the union Left in the 1970s, and it was the newly
radicalised public service unions, seeking allies as sectoral division in the TUC 
left them vulnerable to Labour’s fiscal deflation, that gave it a reach beyond the 
traditional Broad Left. And it did prefigure the Hard Left–Soft Left division of
the 1980s. It was not a coherent force within the TUC for long, more a tactical
alliance. There was intensive activity in 1975 and 1976, but much less thereafter, as
the TUC as a whole became more critical of economic policy, and the outsider
public service unions were permitted to come inside. The realignment did help to
precipitate party divisions, by promoting the CLPD and providing enough block
votes to give the reformers their victories. But, facing electoral disaster and anti-
union legislation, key unions called it a day as far as generalised factionalism 
was concerned.
Conclusions
This chapter has suggested some limitations of the two main interpretative
schools, and has demonstrated historically that important dimensions of the
unions–party link need additional perspectives and more disaggregated methods
of study if we are to deepen our understanding. It suggests, above all, that analysis
should avoid both monolithism, treating the unions as Harrison’s ‘orthodox lump
of suet pudding’, and bipolarism, treating the labour alliance as a simple combina-
tion of ‘the unions’ with ‘the party’. The existence of virtually permanent cross-cut-
ting factionalism, in which individual unions take up opposing positions alongside
distinct groups of party members and leaders, must be recognised. It is certainly
difficult otherwise to make sense of the link in the New Labour era – for example,
in relation to key issues on which unions are divided, such as the Private Finance
Initiative (PFI) for the private financing and management of public services,
employment law reform and European monetary union. The fact that the cross-
cutting organised Labour Left of old has been less in evidence in the New Labour
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era does not mean that there are no alliances on key issues between different
unions and distinct groupings of party activists and leaders.
This chapter also suggests that analysis of the dynamics of the role of the unions
in the labour alliance should also include a disaggregated perspective that pays
attention to sectoral factors. Certainly union divisions in the face of New Labour’s
reform of the funding and management of public services has once again revealed,
among Britain’s merged super-unions, the contours of the sectoral divisions that
were so significant in the 1970s. A most striking example was the support of the
manufacturing union AMICUS–AEEU for PFI, a policy despised by public service
unions. And, in that same area of dispute under New Labour we can see compelling
evidence of the need to study union leaders as independent political actors, in par-
ticular as political agents within the party, rather than simply as political cyphers,
or as subordinate bureaucrats, in the behaviour of the leadership of the General,
Municipal and Boilermakers’ union (GMB). In 2001, the GMB withdrew £2m of
funding from Labour and launched an advertising campaign bitterly critical of
PFI.
All interpretative approaches can benefit from a large dose of the sort of con-
temporary historiographical methods that Minkin’s work exemplifies, combining
documentary and interview-based materials with the study of values and ideas
among union leaders and activists and the study of party constitutional and policy
issues. In this last respect, what is suggested is specifically the extension of the ‘inte-
grationist’ argument – on the ideological subordination of the labour movement
to national capitalist economic policy strategies – to a discussion of subordination
to more fundamental and abstract assumptions of liberal political economy,
notably about the centrality to prosperity of the production of traded commodi-
ties as opposed to the provision of human services.
Analysing the unions–party link is not easy. Important aspects are hidden from
scholarly view unless, like Minkin, the scholar is a lifelong participant observer.
The political complexities of the important unions are subject to a variety of influ-
ences, both personal and constitutional, and above all to the unpredictable impact
of economic change. In one decade, one of the most powerful and political of
Labour’s affiliated unions, the NUM, all but disappeared. But without attempting
an understanding of Britain’s unique and complex labour alliance, a complete
understanding of Labour in Britain is not possible.
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‘For over 80 years’, Minkin declares in his magisterial survey The Contentious
Alliance (1991: xii), the Labour Party–trade unions link ‘has shaped the structure
and, in various ways, the character of the British Left’. His core proposition can be
encapsulated simply: trade union ‘restraint has been the central characteristic’ of
the link (1991: 26). This constitutes a frontal challenge to received wisdom – end-
lessly repeated, recycled and amplified by Britain’s media – that, until the ‘mod-
ernisation’ of the party, initiated by Neil Kinnock and accelerated by Tony Blair, the
unions ran the party. So ingrained is this wisdom in British political culture that
no discussion of party–unions relations in the media can endure for long without
some reference to the days when ‘the union barons controlled the party’. This view,
Minkin holds, is a gross over-simplification and, to a degree, downright mislead-
ing. The relationship is infinitely more subtle and complex, and far more balanced
than the conventional view allows. The task Minkin sets himself in The Contentious
Alliance is twofold: on the one hand to explain why and how he reached that con-
clusion; and, on the other – the core of the book – to lay bare the inner dynamics
of the party–unions connection.
What is most distinctive and enduring about Minkin’s work? In what ways has
it most contributed to our understanding of the labour movement? Does it still
offer insights for scholars of Labour politics? In the first section of this paper, I
examine how Minkin contests the premisses underpinning the orthodox thesis of
trade union ‘baronial power’; in the second, I analyse the ‘sociological’ frame of ref-
erence he devised as an analytical tool to uncover the roots and essential proper-
ties of the party–unions connection; in the third section, I address the question of
the relevance of Minkin today.
The ‘baronial power’ thesis
I call the received wisdom about party–unions relationship the thesis of ‘baronial
power’. It can be stated simply. ‘In a sense not true of its social democratic coun-
terparts on the mainland of Europe’, Marquand (1991: 25) contends, Labour, ‘has
been a trade union party, created, financed and, in the last analysis, controlled by a
11
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highly decentralised trade union movement’. The link has been widely held
responsible for Labour’s post-1979 long sojourn in the wilderness, because the
concessions needed to rally the union leaders behind the parliamentary leadership
in the 1970s were ‘so substantial . . . that they helped to undermine the leader’s
stature and the Party’s credibility’ (Harrison 1996: 199). Kitschelt, in a much-cited
work (1994), concludes that the Labour Party affords the closest approximation to
what he calls the unions-control model. In a neat distillation of the conventional
wisdom he writes that not only are they ‘the major party financiers, but [they] con-
trol the Conference Arrangement Committee, which sets the agenda at national
party conferences, and the bulk of the conference votes, which are cast in blocks by
the leaders of individual unions’. Moreover, the unions elected a majority of the
party’s National Executive Committee, enjoyed a powerful role in the selection of
parliamentary candidates, and sponsored a large number of MPs (1994: 251; see
also Barnes and Reid 1980: 222). These organisational characteristics can surely
admit to no other conclusion than that the unions will naturally ‘dominate the
party elite by controlling key appointments and placing their own leadership in
important executive and legislative party offices’ (Kitschelt 1994: 225).Yet this con-
clusion Minkin shows, in the most heavily researched and meticulous survey of the
party–unions connection yet published, to be wrong on all counts.
The Contentious Alliance – building in a number of respects on Minkin’s path-
finding first study The Labour Party Conference – provides chapter and verse in
explaining why it is wrong. At one level it is, like its predecessor, an indispensable
source book on Labour, chronicling the history of the relationship between (what
were once called) the two wings of the movement. But its purpose is much more
ambitious, for it seeks to understand why established orthodoxy is wrong. This
greatly extends and deepens its intellectual horizon, for Minkin is, in effect, asking
a most challenging question: why do political actors – and especially those who
wield power – behave as they do?
Minkin began systematically exploring the nature of the party–unions relation-
ship in the period of the 1974–79 Labour Government (Minkin 1978a). In these
years the baronial power thesis was taken for granted. Few queried the judgement
that Jack Jones, head of the largest union, the TGWU, had become ‘arguably the
most powerful politician within the Labour Party’ (Barnes and Reid 1980: 191–2),
and it was generally accepted that Labour ministers exhibited a ‘pervasive defer-
ence to the trade union movement’ (Artis and Cobham 1991: 276).
Minkin was one of the few who dissented. In 1978 his definitive study The
Labour Party Conference was published. Given the massive role the unions played
in the party’s policy machinery it was inevitable that the nature of the
party–unions relationship would be one of its major concerns. Having conducted
extremely detailed and exhaustive empirical research – a hallmark of the Minkin
style – what struck him was the complexity and dialectical quality of that relation-
ship. On the one hand, anticipation of the reaction of the major unions, on issues
that impinged directly on their own functions, was an integral feature of the policy
process. Thus, with employment and industrial relations’ matters, the unions
expected, indeed insisted, that policy-making should be a joint party–unions 
Eric Shaw 167
ITLP_C11.QXD  18/8/03  10:02 am  Page 167
exercise and reacted with hostility and deep resentment in the period of the
1964–70 Labour Government, when major initiatives were taken unilaterally over
incomes policy and trade union legislation (in the famous White Paper In Place of
Strife). On the other hand, the unions were prepared in all other policy sectors to
give the parliamentary leadership very substantial latitude: indeed they believed
that it should have overall primacy (Minkin 1978b: 317).
A more methodical investigation of the nature and roots of the party–unions con-
nection was the natural next step after the Labour Party Conference. ‘I write’, Minkin
noted,‘with glacier-like speed; architect, bricklayer and painter’ (Minkin 1991: xi). In
fact, the dozen years he spend compiling the work involved undertaking a consider-
able research programme, conducting a large number of interviews, inspecting a
mound of documentary material, and interweaving and fusing the empirical, the
analytical and the explanatory. He has elucidated how he set about the task:
Primarily, I aim to construct a coherent and adequate conceptual framework
grounded in the repeated occurrences found in my empirical investigations. This
framework is always analytical in the attempt to establish a pattern which makes sense
in describing and categorising relationships and developments across time, but it also
aspires to be explanatory, organising the material in such a way as to indicate solutions
to the core problem (or problems) and related questions under investigation, seeking
to account for all cases within a particular historical and cultural setting. (Minkin
1997: 173)
The ambition – to produce a definitive work – was realised. This made his conclu-
sion – a direct challenge to ‘baronial power’ thesis – all the more compelling. What-
ever the formal organisational structure of the party would seem to suggest, he
stated emphatically, it was ‘virtually always misleading to say that the unions “run
the Labour Party”’ (Minkin 1991: 629). Minkin’s concern is not simply to demon-
strate, through methodical empirical analysis, that the ‘union control’ model is
wrong, but to explain why it is wrong. The book accomplishes two major goals.
Firstly, it exposes to the most rigorous and exacting scrutiny the features of the
party–unions link, chronicling its evolution since the party’s founding in 1900.
Secondly, it offers an explanation of the forces governing ‘the contentious alliance’.
What this chapter seeks to do is to lay bare the nature of his conceptual framework,
his analytical categories and his explanatory mode. But to do this adequately I need
to place Minkin’s interpretation in a broader intellectual context.
Minkin’s sociological frame
Homo economicus
Elster (1989: 99) has written that
one of the most persistent cleavages in the social sciences is the opposition between
two lines of thought conveniently associated with Adam Smith and Emile Durkheim,
between homo economicus and homo sociologicus. Of these, the former is supposed to
be guided by instrumental rationality, while the behaviour of the latter is dictated by
social norms.
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The popularity curve of the former in the study of political organisations has for a
number of years been steadily rising with the increasing use of ‘rational choice’
models. ‘Rational choice theories’, the noted scholar Aaron Wildavsky commented
(1994: 132), ‘have been among the most successful in the social sciences.’ Homo
sociologicus, in contrast, though at present languishing in political science as a
whole, lies at the centre of Minkin’s explanatory universe. In considering the value
of Minkin’s approach we are also, implicitly, making judgements of the relative
heuristic merits of economic and sociological perspectives on human behaviour. I
would go further: Minkin’s work, most notably The Contentious Alliance, is per-
haps the best example (in terms of its thoroughness, depth of thought and analyt-
ical sophistication) of the value of homo sociologicus to the study of political
parties.
Rational choice theory, in essence, involves the application of neo-classical eco-
nomic models to the study of political phenomena (its proponents claim that is
provides the rigour so often lacking in the academic study of politics). As one
scholar has recently observed, ‘in contemporary social science, rational-choice
theory is perhaps the most coherent and best known approach based on principles
of methodological individualism’ (Sil 2000: 362). The kernel of this methodology
is the belief that ‘the elementary unit of social life is individual human action. To
explain social institutions and social change is to show how they arise as the result
of the action and interaction of individuals’ (Elster 1989: 13).
More specifically, it makes two claims. All social action is reducible to individual
action. There are, of course, other major forces, public and private institutions,
voluntary associations, and so forth, but, in the last resort, they aggregate the
behaviour of individuals. It follows that ‘all general propositions about the inter-
actions or relations among individuals can be reduced without loss of meaning to
the qualities, dispositions and actions of individuals themselves’ (Sil 2000: 361).
Acting rationally entails selecting the most economical means to achieve given
ends. The theory of instrumental rationality stipulates that social actors are utility
maximisers, motivated by a desire to promote their own interests. They are goal-
directed, in that they consistently follow courses of action that will afford them
greater personal satisfaction. Applied specifically to political parties, this means
that political influentials will ‘act solely in order to attain income, prestige and
power which comes from being in power’. They will seek power either for the pleas-
ure it affords (in terms of personal self-esteem or gratification) or as the means to
procure valued goods, such as office, status or material benefits. Hence securing
power is, for the rational actor, the overriding objective (Downs 1957: 27–8).
Rational choice institutionalism, which has applied the theory to the study of
political organisations, accepts that actors operate within frameworks of rules and
arrangements. But their role is limited to providing the stage – the parts, scripts,
props and so forth – on which individual actors strive for personal advancement.
Institutions provide the strategic context in which optimising behaviour takes
place by determining the identity of the key players, the power resources available
to them, the rules to which they must adhere and the type of strategic calculations
they make (Shepsle 1989: 135).
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So the key rational choice postulates (for our purposes) are as follows:
● decision-making is ultimately reducible to conscious, deliberate individual
action;
● behaviour is driven by desire to maximise personal or institutional advantage;
● preferences are fixed and consistent, and derive from an accurate awareness of
interests; and
● political action is strategic: that is, it involves utilising all available power
resources, within set institutional contexts to achieve given goals.
If we apply this approach to the unions–party relationship, the following propo-
sitions will naturally emerge (here, for purposes of exposition, I concentrate on the
unions):
● Action will be primarily motivated by the aims, interests and calculations of
individual union leaders.
● They will be self-interested, that is they will seek to maximise their own inter-
ests, those of their organisations and (to the extent that it benefits them) those
of the people they represent.
● An identifiable and consistent pattern of preferences – reflecting an informed
understanding of where their interests lie – will underpin their choices.
● They will behave strategically by utilising all available resources taking account
of costs and benefits of the various options open to them within given institu-
tional settings.
In operational terms, it follows that union leaders would routinely use their
entrenched position within the party structure to determine its policy. Two propo-
sitions are relevant. Firstly, the party was heavily reliant on union funding, con-
stantly circulating the begging bowl, and this gave unions a lever to influence
policy decisions. Secondly, the unions directly elect the trade union section of the
NEC (historically over 55 per cent of the total), and would act to push union inter-
ests. Minkin subjects both these propositions to detailed scrutiny.
Controlling the purse strings
Drawing on a most impressive body of research, Minkin shows that unions’ money
was not used as leverage to procure favourable policy outcomes. Indeed, any
attempt to do so was regarded as improper: ‘there were and remain unwritten pro-
hibitions against open threats of financial sanctions, and there were and are inhi-
bitions and constraints which limit the implementation of such sanctions’
(Minkin 1991: 626). As Ben Pimlott expressed it: ‘He who paid the piper merely
played the tuba and the big bass drum’ (quoted in Minkin 1991: 626).
Controlling the votes
With a battery of examples, Minkin demonstrates that, far from operating as a
trade union bridgehead, the NEC’s trade union section (with only minor and tem-
porary exceptions) afforded successive Labour leaders a solid block of loyalists.
Throughout most of Labour’s history (and it remains largely true to this day) ‘the
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historic role the Trade Union Section of the NEC has been to act as a loyal base
responding to the initiatives of the “politicians”, particularly the Parliamentary
leadership’ (Minkin 1991: 626).
Let’s explore another rational choice postulate: that trade union leaders will
have a 1set and stable pattern of preferences derived from their union interests. If
we apply it the 1974–79 Labour Government, when the unions’ power reached its
peak, we do indeed find that they used their weight to secure the repeal of the Con-
servatives’ Industrial Relations Act and the enactment of series of measures
designed to augment the individual and collective rights of labour (e.g. the Trade
Union and Labour Relations Act, the Equal Pay Act). In the early years of the Gov-
ernment many of the pledges hammered out in negotiations between the parlia-
mentary and TUC leadership prior to the 1974 election were fully implemented –
often in the teeth of opposition from business and elements within the civil 
service.
But this is only part of the story. In his searching analysis of ‘left-wing unionism’,
which rehearses the role of Jack Jones and Hugh Scanlon of the AUEW – the left-
wing ‘terrible twins’ – Minkin uncovers portraits of Scanlon and Jones that diverge
quite radically from the figure of the ‘instrumentally rational’ power-maximising
‘baron’. In some areas (as noted) they had a clear set of preferences that they con-
sistently pursued. But elsewhere their stance was characterised by uncertainty, flux,
lack of confidence and a general willingness to accommodate to the Government.
Indeed ‘Jones and Scanlon had no particularly distinctive economic position’
(Minkin 1991: 169). Trade union officials were frequently to be seen stalking
(sometimes to the dismay of the denizens) the corridors of power, but the outcome
was less straightforward than is usually supposed. While ministers displayed an
unprecedented degree of sensitivity to union preferences those preferences were,
in turn, altered, sometimes markedly, in response to the new reference groups and
pressures to which their holders were exposed. Both Scanlon and Jones were
increasingly persuaded of the validity of the Treasury’s definition of the UK’s eco-
nomic policies (though not always of their prescriptions) producing a growing gap
between the TUC policies to which the two leaders were officially committed and
their real views. More generally, while Minkin agrees that union access to and
influence over legislation was indeed greater during the 1974–79 Labour Govern-
ment than in any other peacetime administration, he holds that the orthodox view
has exaggerated its scale, ignores its variability and understates its limits (Minkin
1991: 176). Thus the unions played a very prominent role in the shaping of indus-
trial relations and employment legislation, though their influence in other policy
sectors was much more modest and, in a number of areas (such as defence policy),
negligible.
But the political trajectory pursued by the two by no means ran in parallel. The
one-time Marxist Scanlon moved significantly to the Right as he came to accept
the so-called Bacon–Eltis thesis, ‘heavily pushed by economic journalists and by
the Treasury at this time . . . high levels of public expenditure were starving the
market sector of resources, causing deindustrialisation and weakening the econ-
omy’, and, for that reason, largely acquiesced in the Government’s shift to a more
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monetarist orientation in economic policy (Minkin 1991: 170). Jack Jones, in con-
trast, remained a (cautious) proponent of higher public spending. How can we
account for this?
Rational choice could provide part of the explanation. The AUEW’s member-
ship base was in private manufacturing industry, and, therefore, could be seen as a
potential beneficiary of cutbacks in public spending (though only on the much-
contested assumption that the Bacon–Eltis thesis was correct). The TGWU mem-
bership, in contrast, straddled both public and private sectors, manufacturing and
services (see Steve Ludlam’s discussion in chapter 10). But, equally important – as
Minkin stresses – were the two men’s differing views on politics and on their
respective industrial roles. Scanlon always strictly compartmentalised ‘the indus-
trial and the political’ and moved increasingly to the Right (he was eventually to be
ennobled). Jones’s trade unionism, in contrast, was much more infused ‘with ide-
ological values of democratic and economic egalitarianism’ – a difference reflected
in the quite disparate views of the two men on the issue of industrial democracy –
and was a relentless campaigner against poverty, especially that of the elderly
(Minkin 1991: 165). He was to spend two decades after his retirement as a tireless
crusader for higher pensions.
More fundamentally, Minkin challenges the notion that the key motive-force of
union leaders, in their relationship with the Labour Party and government, is pri-
marily defined by their desire to maximise their personal and institutional inter-
est. This implies that the unions and the Labour Party constitute two quite separate
units. In reality, Minkin shows, union leaders regarded themselves not as outsiders
but as insiders, members of the party they helped to found: they were as much part
of the party as MPs or constituency organisations. Although the issue of the degree
of power the unions possessed – as manifested, for instance, in the size of the
unions’ vote at the Labour Party Conference – was, as they came to acknowledge,
a legitimate ground for concern, they insisted that they had as much right as any
other unit within ‘the labour movement’ to participate in the party’s affairs. This
party–unions alliance was, in part, instrumental, a matter of interest and power;
it was, however, no less ideological (a shared inventory of values and goals),
and expressive and solidaristic (common origins, history and experiences).
But this brings us out of the territory of homo economicus into that of homo 
sociologicus.
Homo sociologicus
Homo sociologicus is grounded in a notion of ‘social action’ which differs markedly
from that of homo economicus, both conceptually and methodologically. It repudi-
ates the notion that all social interaction is explicable in terms of individually
driven behaviour, insisting instead on the irreducibility of specifically social facts:
phenomena that exist outside the minds of individuals – though which are inter-
nalised by them (Durkheim 1982). This key methodological premiss derives from
Durkheim’s understanding of society as ‘not a mere sum of individuals; rather the
system formed by their association represents a specific reality which has its own
characteristic’ (quoted in Lukes 1973: 19). Only individuals can act, but how and
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why they act as they do is explicable only in terms of the social milieu they inhabit,
their upbringing and their social experiences and relationships. What some have
called ‘methodological collectivism’ (or ‘holism’) contends that collectivities of one
sort or another (including society itself) have their own properties, their own reg-
ularised patterns which imprint themselves on individuals and shape the way in
which they act. Social action is not simply a function of calculated self-interest –
since selves themselves are social constructs; and notions of self-interest are there-
fore contingent upon how the self is constructed (Wildavsky 1994: 140).
Minkin draws heavily from this tradition in developing his three central con-
cepts: ‘rules’, roles and relations. In a core proposition Minkin contends (1991: 27)
that ‘it is impossible to understand the trade union–Labour Party relationship
(and much else about the Labour Movement) without understanding the power-
ful and long-lasting restraints produced by adherence to [the] “rules”’. Minkin’s
concept is put within inverted commas to distinguish it from formal rules, for they
are unwritten codes and are only rarely given constitutional status: in effect, they
constitute norms and conventions. Norms can be defined as precepts stipulating
socially prescribed and acceptable behaviour, ‘ideas about how classes or categories
ought to behave in specified situations’ (Haas and Drabek 1973: 110–11). Here we
have a clear contrast between homo economicus and homo sociologicus. March and
Olsen (1984: 741) illustrate the point in comparing the ‘choice metaphor’ and the
‘duty metaphor’:
In a choice metaphor, we assume that political actors consult personal preferences and
subjective expectations, then select actions that are as consistent as possible with those
preferences and expectations. In a duty metaphor, we assume that political actors asso-
ciate certain actions with certain situations by rules of appropriateness. What is appro-
priate for a particular person in a particular situation is defined by the political and
social system and transmitted through socialisation.
Minkin follows the ‘duty metaphor’.
We must be cautious about over-dichotomous thinking here. Homo sociologicus
does not (or should not) discount the role of self-interest and ambition – of vanity,
status-seeking, greed, even – whose part in the politics of labour receives, from
Minkin, its due attention. The point is that such action is ‘embedded in an institu-
tional structure of rules, norms, expectations, and traditions that severely limited
the free play of individual will and calculation’ (March and Olsen 1984: 736).
For Minkin, the key to understanding why the trade unions have not dominated
the Labour Party lies in the ‘playing of different roles’ in a system of functional dif-
ferentiation (Minkin 1991: 26). Along with the ‘rules’, role is a central organising
concept in Minkin’s work. A role comprises ‘a cluster of norms that applies to any
single unit of social interaction’ (see Haas and Drabek 1973: 110–1). In other
words, the role of, say, a trade union member of the NEC comprises the various
norms and conventions attached to it. Role theory posits that role-holders will
behave in accordance with role requirements – as formally laid down, as conceived
by themselves and as expected by others in the organisation. Thus Minkin con-
tends (1991: 396) that the fundamental flaw of conventional wisdom, with its
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image of the ‘union baron’, is that it takes no account of ‘the crucial inhibitions
involved in trade union role-playing and their obedience to “rules” of the relation-
ship’.
Roles, in turn, mould relationships by shaping the way in which members inter-
act, laying down sets of mutual expectations and anticipations. Established rela-
tions between political and trade union role-holders comprised the superstructure
of understanding that knits the party together. Conversely, the belief that roles
were being transgressed could rupture relations and cause acute internal dissen-
sion. Those who refused to enact their roles in the appropriate manner – Arthur
Scargill of the National Union of Miners being a classic example – would always be
outriders. Understanding purposive conduct within an organisation, then, is not
simply a matter of analysing how power-and interest-maximising individuals nav-
igate institutional rules, constraints and opportunities the better to satisfy their
goals, for those very goals, and the choice of means to realise them, are shaped by
the ethos of the organisation.
Roles and ‘rules’
Minkin applies these analytical categories by considering the roles that trade union
and party leaders play: ‘How and when did it happen that union leaders adopted
particular rules? What agency or processes continued to socialise new union lead-
ers into the codes of conduct?’ (Minkin 1997: 283). The main organising motif in
the conceptual structure of The Contentious Alliance is his painstaking elaboration
of the ‘rules’. These ‘rules’ are akin to Durkheim’s conscience collective: ‘the beliefs,
tendencies and practices of the group taken collectively’ and, by virtue of their col-
lective provenance, ‘invested with a special authority’ (Durkheim 1982: 55).
Minkin’s central proposition (1991: xiv) is that power relations between the unions
and the party ‘cannot be fully understood without appreciating the inhibitions,
restrictions and constraints that the “rules” produced’. These rules ‘acted as bound-
aries producing inhibitions which prevented the absolute supremacy of leadership
groups in either wing of the relationship’.
What are these ‘rules’? Minkin enumerates the following: freedom, democracy,
unity and solidarity, to which is coupled, slightly awkwardly, priority – ‘the opera-
tive principle of trade unionism’.
● Freedom is defined in terms of autonomy: ‘the collective capacity to promote
the industrial freedom of workers and the right to realise this with minimum
interference from political bodies’. By extension this came to encompass
mutual respect for the independence and institutional integrity of the labour
movement’s industrial and political wings, a respect which, in turn, was inter-
preted to bar the application by trade unionists of party sanctions to bring
party policy into line with that of the TUC – ‘a conscious self-restraint in the
use of potential levers of power’ (Minkin 1991: 28, 30). Irrespective of the pre-
cise wording of the formal rules, neither political nor industrial leaders were
expected to encroach upon the territory of the other, defined by its functional
responsibilities.
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● By democracy was meant a commitment to collective majoritarian decision-
making – though firmly qualified by respect for the autonomy of the PLP and
the frontbench over the prioritising and method of implementing Labour
Party Conference decisions.
● Unity referred to the striving after maximum consensus and the containing of
disagreements, and was associated also with an ingrained belief that parlia-
mentary leadership should be pre-eminent on the NEC.
● Solidarity was an application of the ‘fundamental ethics of trade unionism’,
which prescribed ‘loyalty to the collective community [and] the sacrifice, if
necessary, of immediate sectional interest’. In the context of party–unions rela-
tions it took the form of trade union leaders assuming a ‘parental obligation to
the Party to play a stabilising role’ (Minkin 1991: 37–8). These emotional and
moral compulsions of solidarity with party and (when in office) Government
could ‘ be so great times to produce a denial of immediate interest’ (1991: 178).
An interesting example of this was the position – or, rather, the reluctance to
take a position – of trade union leaderswhen the Labour Cabinet engaged in its
prolonged struggle over whether to accept the harsh conditions of the IMF
loan in 1976. Tony Crosland proved a formidable and lucid critic of the severe
cutbacks in public spending – which were to lead an actual fall in health spend-
ing – demanded by the IMF (and its controllers in Washington), but trade
union leaders like Scanlon and Jones, historically and formally still well to
Crosland’s Left, kept quiet. The survival of the Labour Government, they
believed, was at stake and it was not the role of union leaders in such circum-
stances to rock the boat.
● These values are supplemented by the principle of priority (Minkin 1991:
40–2). While the unions had policies on a very wide range of issues, not all are
actively promoted. Lifetime immersion in collective bargaining encouraged ‘a
pragmatic approach to problem-solving, a reliance on experience as a guide to
appropriate response and a stress on the best available outcome’. Conceptions
of realism and practical politics fused with a focus on those matters which
impinged most forcefully on the institutional needs of unions, and which were
uppermost in the minds of their members to determine those goals and poli-
cies that were accorded priority. Thus in practice the willingness of union lead-
ers to assert their power was shaped and constrained by a range of factors: the
relevance of particular issues to their unions; the extent to which they were
bound by unequivocal union mandates; the preferences of the parliamentary
leadership; and the need to sustain the unity and the electoral appeal of the
party.
How did the ‘rules’ and the performance of the roles they engendered operate to
form regular and discernible patterns of behaviour? Let us return to the compari-
son between homo economicus and homo sociologicus. For the former the relation-
ship between subject and object, between actor and the external environment, is
relatively unproblematical. If actors are ‘rational’ – that is, if understanding is
informed and open-minded, interests clearly and precisely identified, and ‘realities’
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dispassionately appraised – a cool assessment can be made as to how their ends can
be most efficiently achieved. As events are observed, feedback allows experience to
guide judgement and amend behaviour accordingly (March and Olsen 1988: 343).
The analyst, accordingly, can (in a way broadly comparable to that of the natural
scientist) observe, classify, explain and perhaps even predict patterned behaviour.
Homo sociologicus, however, construes the relationship between actor and setting
quite differently. Social and natural phenomena differ fundamentally because in
the former conscious actors invest with meaning the events they experience.
Accordingly, since ‘the distinctive trait of human behaviour is . . . that there are
connections and rules that can be interpretively understood’, the task of the social
scientist is decipher them – to explore how people make sense of the situations
they encounter (Weber quoted in Eckstein 1996: 483). This is the task Minkin sets
for himself.
His first step is to determine the process by which the ‘rules’ emerged. It is char-
acteristic of Minkin’s method (first elaborated in The Labour Party Conference) to
explain institutions by tracing their development historically. The evolution of the
‘rules’ he sees as ‘in the main, an organic process’, the products of the ‘fundamen-
tal values of trade unionism’, derived ultimately from the encounter between insti-
tutional needs and industrial experience. In a way typical of the institutions of
labour in Britain, it took the form of ‘unwritten understandings and a strong sense
of the protocol of rule-governed behaviour’ (Minkin 1991: 27). The content of the
‘rules’ stemmed from functional differentiation, the growing division of responsi-
bilities between what came to be labelled the industrial and political wings of ‘the
movement’: each had its own needs, tasks and interests, with the relationship reg-
ulated by common norms. Each new generation was inducted into the culture by
organisational socialisation, that process by which ‘the beliefs, norms and perspec-
tives of participants are brought into line with those of the organisation’ (Etzioni
1965: 246). Minkin (1991: 46) writes:
Trade union leaders were socialised into understanding role responsibilities and con-
straints. General Council definitions of ‘appropriate behaviour’ became a measure of
what was perceived as ‘political maturity’. This socialisation process was enforced pri-
marily by normative pressures, by‘embarrassment, guilt and group hostility’ rather
than by sanctions though these . . . were available.
He charts how new left-wing members of the NEC’s trade union section were
encouraged to ‘integrate within “the union group” and play the loyal game as it had
been played in the past’ (1991: 404–5). Tom Sawyer, who rose to prominence as a
senior official of NUPE (the National Union of Public Employees) in the late
1970s, and joined the NEC as a keen ‘Bennite’, gradually evolved into a stalwart of
the trade union section (and, indeed, eventually became general secretary of the
party) as he increasingly conformed to expectations as to how the role of a trade
union NEC member should be properly discharged. More generally, Minkin
uncovers the process by which left-wing leaders – notably Jack Jones and Hugh
Scanlon – who initially queried some of the ‘rules’, increasingly came to subscribe
to them. They became more loath to challenge the policy-making prerogative of
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the parliamentary leadership (outside of those areas designated as appropriate
objectives for joint party–unions determination) and increasingly adopted a ‘pro-
tective’ role.
All this explains persistence – recurrent and stable patterns in party–union rela-
tions: the ‘rules’ were ‘essentially rules of anchorage’, locating ‘a base and moorings
from which it was dangerous to move too far’ (Minkin 1991: 42). But how do we
then account for conflict and change? Minkin’s purpose is not only to characterise
the parameters which were shaped by the party–unions connection but to identify
the forces that allowed it to develop; equally, not only to explain what held it
together but what pulled it apart. What, above all, imparted the dynamic to the
alliance was that it was, Minkin stresses throughout, always a contentious one
defined not only by normatively regulated co-operation but by clashes of interest,
priorities and aspirations. ‘To understand fully the relationship between trade
unions and the Labour Party’, he observes (1991: 628), ‘we have to appreciate both
its consistencies and its variabilities.’ His perspective can best be defined as ‘inter-
actionist’, one that envisages norms, roles and relationships coming into conflict
and being perpetually revised as circumstances, pressures, political alignments all
mutate. From this perspective, organisations can be conceived as arenas charac-
terised by the on-going processes of negotiation and bargaining, where ‘rules’, roles
and relationships constantly evolve in response to shifts in the balance of power, in
the pattern of political alignments, and in the face of conflicting interests and pri-
orities and environmental shocks. Thus there is always a disparity between, on the
one hand, role prescriptions and expectations (not least from the rank and file) and,
on the other, leaders’ role performances, with the latter influenced by multiple
forces ranging from role demands, personal role definitions (and idiosyncrasies)
and the sheer pressure of events and conflicting demands. This disparity often sur-
faced in accusations (with varying degrees of credibility) by disillusioned rank-
and-filers that a union leader had ‘sold-out’ and had been ‘bought’
Minkin also notes that the ‘rules’ were not immutable. They were always ‘clearer
in what they excluded than what they prescribed’, supplying abundant room for
interpretation and reworking. There was sufficient plasticity to allow for trade
union diversity, the shifting balance of Left and Right political traditions, and dif-
ferent views as to how role responsibilities could best be discharged (Minkin 1991:
43). One instance of this plasticity was ‘multiple-role playing’. As already noted the
relations of Jones and Scanlon with former allies on the party’s Left deteriorated
after 1974 and, at times, became quite strained. Notwithstanding, when casting
union votes, at the Labour Party Conference or for the women’s section of the
NEC, they continued to back left-wing candidates. What was appropriate conduct
in one forum was not necessarily appropriate in another.
The continued relevance of Minkin
The aforementioned account allows for and helps to explain incremental change
in the relationship – but what if the change was qualitative? The ‘rules’ – the whole
labourist culture – have since the election of Tony Blair to Labour’s leadership been
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under sustained assault. Blair, it has been noted, has ‘no sympathy, enthusiasm or
concern for the collective values of trade unionism such as solidarity and feels no
need to identify himself with them’ (Taylor 2000). The fact that the party–unions
relationship ‘had changed in quite fundamental ways’ (Howell 2000: 34) is a judge-
ment from which few would dissent. The party–unions connection acquired many
of its defining properties, it has been seen in this chapter, from a process of func-
tional differentiation. But this notion implies the existence of a common organ-
ism, a system each of whose inter-related parts had a distinct function to discharge
but which operated for the survival and advancement of the whole. But is this any
long true – has functional specialisation and differentiation metamorphised into
separation?
Minkin identifies four variables determining the extent to which harmony char-
acterised the relationship:
● ideology registers the degree to which there was ‘general ideological agreement
on aims and values’;
● interest registers the degree of correspondence between unions’ definitions of
the interests of the workforce and the party leadership’s notion of the national
interest;
● social affinity registers the degree of social affinity between the leaderships of
the two wings; and
● strategic convergence registers the degree of strategic compatibility between the
party and the unions.
To the extent that there was sufficient overlap in these four areas, unity of pur-
pose could be sustained. There was enough commonality to sustain the alliance,
though ‘there was also enough divergence to engender permanent tensions’
(Minkin 1991: 9).
As a preliminary to exploring the argument further I want to point to what
seems to me to be a weakness in Minkin’s account. He suggests that the ‘rules’, and
the role responsibilities they engendered, related to political as much as industrial
leaders of the movement. Though there were ‘some important variations in defi-
nition and emphasis’, he held that the ‘rules’ enmeshed both parliamentary and
trade union leadership in ‘mutual expectations and obligations’ (1991: 286–7, 47).
But is this claim really substantiated? He himself acknowledges (1991: 45) that the
‘“rules” laid down a network of obligations, mutual in form but most restrictive in
effect, upon the potentially omnipotent trade unions and their senior leaders’. I
think we need to take this further. There was always much greater variation in the
degree to which the outlook of political leaders was permeated by the ‘rules’. This
has been taken much further with the emergence of ‘New Labour’, which is char-
acterised as a whole (there are individual differences) by a wariness towards any-
thing that smacks too much of (what the ‘New’ chooses to label) ‘Old Labour’. For
some, indeed, proximity to the unions seems to cause profound discomfort. Invo-
cation of ‘This Great Movement of Ours’ (TIGMOO) was a staple of the Confer-
ence’s rhetoric, but for many reflected a real sense of common traditions, loyalties
and symbols. For many within New Labour circles, TIGMOO belongs to the dark
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days, an old skin now cast off. It may well be that one of the most profound changes
signalled by New Labour is the rapid dwindling among the parliamentary leader-
ship of any real feeling of involvement in a shared movement.
Weakening if not terminating the alliance, Chris Howell argues, is ‘the defining
core of the [Blairite] modernisation project’. He adduces as evidence the following
points: that both in setting the new minimum wage and in reshaping industrial
relations legislation closer attention was paid to the concerns of business than to
those of the unions. The overwhelming bulk of Conservative industrial relations
legislation remains in force, and has been endorsed by New Labour, including
strict regulation of, and limits upon, industrial action and the survival of a highly
flexible labour market. Procedurally, business is far better represented in the
numerous government task forces than by the unions, while union influence is
heavily reliant on informal and personal contacts (Howell 2000: 33).
Nevertheless, as Ludlam (2001) has pointed out, the alliance has displayed unex-
pected resilience. Though there is no doubt that the influence and access the
unions possess now is much less than under any previous majority Labour Gov-
ernment, they are still appreciably greater than under the Tories – and that is
unlikely to change. In some major areas of policy – notably the growing private
sector involvement in the delivery of public services and the enthusiasm for ‘labour
market flexibility’ – the gap between the Government and the unions is now
alarmingly wide, though in other areas the balance sheet for the unions is much
more positive. North-European-style corporatism will not be introduced, one can
confidently predict, under New Labour, but at least the unions are once more
‘insiders’. Conversely, though the party is much less reliant on trade union money
than in the past, it is still heavily dependent for the effective conduct of election
campaigns on the unions’ resources – manpower, office space and equipment.
Indeed, as evidence mounts that the number and commitment of constituency
activists is rapidly shrinking – the grass is coming away at the roots – that depend-
ence will almost certainly intensify. Equally, trade union organisations and net-
works have proved invaluable allies for New Labourites (Blairites and Brownites)
– whether in terms of promoting leaders (there have been setbacks here!), secur-
ing parliamentary nominations, or competing for places in party organs such as
the NEC, the Policy Forum and the Scottish, Welsh and London Executives (Shaw
2001). And ‘parental obligation to the Party to play a stabilising role’ continues to
manifest itself mainly in protective loyalty to a Labour Government in the face of
left-wing criticism – as demonstrated by the behaviour of the trade union section
of the NEC (Davies 2001). It is noticeable that calls from New Labour circles for a
loosening of the connection are now more muted.
There are, however, warning signs. For the first time, union funding is being
used as an instrument of pressure, though largely due to demands from an increas-
ingly disenchanted rank and file within the public sector unions. In July 2001 the
GMBU (General Workers’ and Boilermakers’ Union) – an organisation which has
never been associated with the Left – decided to cut £1 million over four years from
its funding of the party. In the public service union UNISON, rank and file pres-
sure forced the passage of a motion calling for a review of the party–unions link
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(Guardian, 18 July 2001) Indeed, some commentators have suggested that the
unions should consider giving priority to representing their members’ interests
‘rather than being expected to dance to the tune of a piper they pay’ (Kevin
Maguire in Guardian, 26 June 2001). The party–unions connection is entering
upon its most turbulent phase yet.
Conclusion
Minkin has demolished the image of the ‘bullies with the block vote’, of ‘union
barons’ lording it over the party. By a relentless accumulation of detail he punc-
tures one myth after another. But he goes well beyond correcting the historical
record: he explains why the baronial power thesis is wrong. In so doing, he uncov-
ers the limits of rational-choice-style theories of political behaviour. Political
actors are role-players and their roles combine into complexes and are enshrined
in organisational forms. Roles comprise norms and conventions, or the ‘rules’, and
these, he convincingly establishes, have profoundly affected power- and policy-
making within the party. Above all, they have structured the party–unions con-
nection. Minkin argues (1991: 27):
The role playing, the ‘rules’ and the protocol which went with them produced a syn-
drome of inhibition and self-control which was the most remarkable feature of a rela-
tionship in which all the potential levers of power appeared to lie in the hands of the
unions. But they also provided a network of mutual restraint specifying obligations
which were a duty on both sides of the relationship.
And role-playing, we see, was a matter of constant renegotiation and mutual
adjustment – a creative exercise, and a source of change and of conflict as well as
of persistence. Parties, he shows, are social as well as political systems, intricate fab-
rics of positions, roles, rules and relationships, as well as a forum for competing
ideas and interests.
But is Minkin the historian of a movement that is reaching the end of its natu-
ral life? The degree of general ideological agreement on aims and values between
‘New’ Labour and the bulk of the affiliated unions has substantially diminished.
Equally significant is the fraying of the functional and solidaristic bases of cohe-
sion: the old ‘ties of sentiment and loyalty and agreed ideological commitment’, as
Robert Taylor (2000) has put it, are now fading away. The Labour Party, certainly,
is undergoing a process of transformation. Is the link (as a growing number within
the unions are beginning to argue) now a handicap for the unions and their mem-
bers? Has the party’s metamorphosis into ‘New’ Labour fundamentally altered the
rules and norms governing the relationship? We do not know the answers. But only
by studying the changing norms, conventions, role conceptions and aspirations –
the cultural fabric of organisational life – can we commence the search for answers.
In short, homo sociologicus, as The Contentious Alliance demonstrates so well, still
has much more to offer than does homo economicus.
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The political analysis and the political economy of the British Labour Party have
tended to concern themselves principally with the concrete and the substantive.
This is both unremarkable and entirely legitimate. Yet something is potentially
lost. For while an aim of the present collection is to discuss the principal positions
of some of the leading exponents in this literature, it cannot be doubted that the
literature rests largely on rarely acknowledged and generally unstated assumptions
about basic analytical questions. If we are to encourage dialogue between compet-
ing interpretations of Labour, we might benefit from rendering such assumptions
explicit. Moreover, the present is a particularly opportune time for such reflec-
tions, as contemporary political analysis is perhaps more conscious than it has ever
been of its most fundamental analytical assumptions (see Hay 2002a).
In what follows four core themes are identified, each of which can be associated
with what might tentatively be termed the ‘new political science of British politics’.
Each serves to highlight a distinctive aspect of the issue of causality; and each has
a special relevance to labour studies in general and to the political science and the
political economy of Labour in particular. They are:
● the relationship between structure and agency, context and conduct;
● the relationship between the discursive and the material, between the ideas
held about the world and that world itself;
● the relative significance of political, economic and cultural factors; and
● the relative significance of domestic, international and transnational factors.
Before considering each of these themes in more detail, it is important to enter
a few cautionary remarks. Arguments such as that presented here are unavoidably
controversial and they need to be handled with care: after all, political scientists
are, by convention, wary of analytical prescription. It is important, then, at the
outset that to clarify the aims and intentions of what follows, while cautioning
against certain potential misinterpretations.
First, although the argument presented here has important implications for the
conduct of labour studies more generally, and although the chapter does make the
general case for reinserting labour within the analysis of the Labour Party, the sub-
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stantive contribution of this chapter is more limited. Given constraints of space I
confine my observations to writings on the political science and the political econ-
omy of the British Labour Party published since the 1980s. Second, and crucially,
while the argument will not be entirely neutral in respect of interpretations of
Labour, I do not aim to champion a particular interpretation (for that, see Coates
and Hay 2001; Hay 1999). This chapter is not so much concerned with the sub-
stantive detail of particular accounts of recent Labour history as it is with the com-
patibility of specific interpretations with the theoretical assumptions which
ostensibly inform them. Consequently, what follows is consistent with a range of
diverse descriptive accounts, substantive interpretations and theoretical positions
– positions the author does not necessarily share. The chapter is a call for greater
theoretical reflexivity, clarity and internal consistency rather than a more partisan
appeal for a particular approach.
My aim is, in essence, two-fold. First I highlight a series of key analytical issues.
These divide the protagonists in what at first appear to be substantive disputes that
might be adjudicated empirically (such as the roles of political volition and eco-
nomic imperatives in the trajectory of Labour’s economic policy since the mid-
1980s). Frequently, in such controversies, it is not so much the empirical evidence
as the selection of what counts as evidence in the first place and the interpretation
placed on it that divides analysts. Here the trading of empirical claim and counter-
claim may serve only to institutionalise a dialogue of the deaf. The result is that
underlying disagreements in fundamental theoretical or analytical assumptions
remain unacknowledged and unexamined. Drawing attention to the implicit and
often intuitive assumptions on which such contemporary disputes so frequently
hinge, may serve to, first, promote greater analytical clarity; second, facilitate the-
oretical dialogue and reflexivity; and, finally, encourage analysts to render explicit
the core analytical assumptions on which their work is premissed and of which one
might legitimately expect a degree of internal consistency.
This is part and parcel of an approach to the conduct of theoretical and empir-
ical debate which judges accounts by the standards they themselves propose rather
than those foisted upon them externally. It places a premium on theoretical con-
sistency, but is largely neutral with regard to the substantive content of accounts
consistent with a given set of (acknowledged) analytical assumptions. Of course,
this is not to suggest that in evaluating contending accounts we should restrict our-
selves to judgements based purely on criteria of theoretical consistency. Work that
draws freely on implicit but nonetheless incommensurate analytical assumptions
should be exposed as doing so. This, however, is much easier if we can make such
issues as explicit as possible in the first place.
The second objective is perhaps rather more prescriptive. I seek to highlight a
range of issues which, though perhaps characteristic of a ‘new political science of
British politics’, have arguably tended to be overlooked or, at least, are insufficiently
developed in the political analysis and the political economy of Labour. Three
issues in particular might here be noted as structuring much of the discussion in
the sections that follow. They relate to the needs to:
Colin Hay 183
ITLP_C12.QXD  18/8/03  10:02 am  Page 183
● contextualise contemporary political dynamics economically and contempo-
rary economic dynamics politically;
● transcend the artificial distinction between domestic, comparative and inter-
national or transnational analysis and develop further the capacity to relate
political and economic dynamics at a variety of spatial scales; and
● exercise greater sensitivity to the role of ideas as causal variables in the analysis
and interpretation of political and economic processes.
As may already be clear, the agenda of this chapter is informed by a growing
sense of the emergence of a more reflexive, more modest and more consciously
theory-informed political analysis. It is with this ‘new political science of British
politics’ that I should perhaps begin.
A new political science of British politics?
Some might think it premature to suggest there is now a ‘new political science of
British politics’ – and the label is undoubtedly one that few would volunteer as a
badge of self-identification. Moreover, the political science of British politics has
always been characterised by diversity and intellectual pluralism. Nonetheless, a
series of common and consistent themes has emerged in recent work that reflects
a new sprit of analytical reflexivity among more theory-inclined analysts. While
such themes are by no means confined to studies of British politics, their effects are
now filtering into more substantive analyses, including contemporary work on the
political development of Britain (see, for instance, Bevir and Rhodes 1998, 1999;
English and Kenny 1999; Kerr 2001; Marsh, Buller, Hay, Johnston, Kerr, McAnulla
and Watson 1999; Smith 1999). What is perhaps most interesting about this emer-
gent political science is the extent to which its distinctive analytical concerns are
shared by an unlikely assortment of authors defending a variety of otherwise
antagonistic theoretical approaches. Though divided by the absence of a common
theoretical perspective, self-styled behaviouralists, philosophical realists, neo-
institutionalists, constructivists and interptetivists increasingly appeal to a
common set of core analytical concerns.
In summarising these concerns (Hay 2002b: 11), it can be said that there is
● a tendency to place contemporary dynamics in their historical (that is tempo-
ral) and national (or spatial) context;
● a desire to emphasise how institutions and ideas mediate the political process,
along with a related concern to track change from inputs (intentions and con-
text) to outcomes (whether intended or unintended);
● a greater willingness to recognise the uncertainty of outcomes and hence to
acknowledge the significance of unintended consequences;
● the more open acknowledgement of the need to locate events in Britain in rela-
tion to those in comparable countries;
● a recognition of the blurring of a once rigid demarcation between domestic
and international politics and a growing recognition of the significance of
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institutional forces, such as the European Union, that operate above the lone
nation state;
● a broadening of what might legitimately be studied by political analysts. This
is reflected in a greater recognition, say, of the role of cultural or economic fac-
tors in determining what might appear to be purely political developments;
and
● a greater appreciation of the contribution to political outcomes of ideational
variables (such as values, paradigms, ideology and rhetoric).
Taken together these closely related concerns constitute, just as they also reflect, a
challenge to the modes of analysis that have hitherto dominated the political sci-
ence and political economy of post-war British politics. They have implications for
the analysis of the Labour Party and for labour studies more generally. It is to these
that I now turn, beginning with factors specific to the political analysis of Labour,
before turning to those that might be thought to apply more generally to contem-
porary political analysis.
Revisiting the political analysis of labour/Labour
It is tempting to suggest that while the new political science of British politics, ten-
tatively outlined above, has important implications for political analysis in general
it has no specific implications for the political analysis of Labour. For the analysis
of Labour is, in the end, an exercise in analysis like any other. In so far as the new
political science poses challenges, it does so largely independently of the specific
object of their analytical attentions.
This is undoubtedly the case. However, there is perhaps one exception that fol-
lows directly from the above. It can be stated simply: labour studies should not be
regarded, as sometimes it is, as a separate or independent sphere of analysis. This
is, in fact, a specific implication of a more general point. The new political science
identified above is distinctly post-disciplinary in its outlook. It is deeply suspicious
of arbitrarily imposed boundaries and the associated apportioning of primary
variables (party variables to political science, macro-economic variables to eco-
nomics, interactive variables to sociology, and so forth). It has, if anything, even
less sympathy with sub-disciplinary sectarianism. While labour studies can, then,
be seen as a sub-field of political economy, political science or political history, it
can also be more progressively presented as a post-disciplinary arena in which the
tools appropriate to the analysis and interpretation of labour – whatever their ori-
gins – can be brought together. In so far as this describes the practice of contem-
porary labour studies, it might be seen to herald the emergence of the new political
science of British politics; in so far as it does not, it can only benefit from such a
development.
If there are few, if any, specific implications of the new political science for the
political analysis of Labour, then there are nonetheless a series of points which,
though potentially generalisable, might be regarded as having particular purchase
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for a post-disciplinary labour studies. The first of these is, again, stated simply,
though its implications are more involved. It concerns the place of labour within
labour–Labour studies: labour, in terms of the organised or disorganised working
class, needs to be reinserted into the analysis of Labour the political organisation.
It might seem strange to associate such a claim with contemporary currents in
British political science. It would be perverse indeed to suggest that there is any-
thing terribly original or innovative about putting the ‘L’ back into labour studies.
Yet, though not, perhaps, immediately obvious, there are clear links between the
latter’s more reflexive and integrated approach to political analysis and the return
to labour in labour studies.
At this point it is important to note that there are plenty of analysts of both
Labour (Party) and labour (movement) who need no reminder of labour studies’
erstwhile object of analysis. The point, however, is that here new political science
and traditional labour studies might speak with one voice. For, in their attempts to
scrutinise and interrogate its previously unacknowledged and intuitive assump-
tions, exponents of the new political science have tended to broaden their concept
of ‘the political’ and to reject the pervasive and corrosive legacy of pluralist
assumptions (Marsh 2002). The result has been:
● a rejection of input-loaded models of political processes (such as pluralism
and elitism);
● an associated reconnection of political inputs and outcomes;
● a far greater emphasis upon the uneven distribution of strategic resources; and,
● a related concern with a range of distributional asymmetries (such as class,
gender and ethnicity).
Each serves to reposition the analysis of labour at the heart of labour studies –
where it rightly belongs.
A second observation also chimes with traditional labour studies. We should be
careful to interrogate assumptions we may be tempted to internalise relating to
Labour’s highly mythologised past (see also Fielding 2000a, 2000b). With a Labour
prime minister currently resident in Downing Street, a fact attributed by many to
the party’s ability to distance itself in opposition from a particular construction of
a previous incarnation (‘Old Labour’), it is more important than ever that we scru-
tinise such constructions. It is perhaps equally imperative that we acknowledge the
significance of such popular fictions as potential causal factors in their own right
(a point to which we return). Thus, the appeal of such constructions should itself
be of interest. The point is, however, that there is world of difference between inter-
nalising such convenient fictions as baseline assumptions that might inform analy-
sis of the present and examining their conditions of emergence, diffusion and
persuasion. Collectively, students of Labour need to engage in rather more of the
latter and rather less of the former. The pressures on political analysts of all per-
suasions to incorporate an ever-greater range of variables in a (supposedly) ever-
more complex and interdependent world are considerable and growing. Arguably,
they make analysis of the present increasingly difficult. Yet in such a context, it is,
if anything, more important that we refuse to trade in our historical sense for the
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mistaken promise of achieving a greater purchase on the present by concentrating
on more obviously immediate factors (for useful attempts to locate recent devel-
opments in a historical context, see Brivati and Bale 1997; Brivati and Heffernan
2000; Tanner, Thane and Tiratsoo 2000).
Third, it is important (as arguably it always was) to examine and re-examine
Labour’s complex associations with the highly distinctive European tradition of
social democracy, a distinctiveness we overlook at our peril. The term social democ-
racy has become increasingly slippery as it has become ever-more-loosely invoked
and ever-more-intimately connected to discussions of the future of Centre-Left
political parties across Europe.What this suggests is the value of comparative labour
studies. Important points follow from an attempt to locate contemporary British
political dynamics comparatively. In particular, Labour’s connection to European
social democracy was always somewhat tenuous and indirect (see, for instance, Clift
2001; Drucker 1979; George and Haythorne 1996; Minkin 1991). It is surely telling,
for instance, that Jose Harris’s exhaustive survey (2000) of Labour’s social and polit-
ical thought for the centenary history of the party makes no reference, explicit or
implicit, to the European tradition of social democracy. The influence of continen-
tal social democracy on Labour’s thinking has been modest indeed.
Additionally, by any institutional definition of social democracy which looks at
outcomes rather than merely at articulated aspirations, Labour’s much-vaunted
post-war social democratic past looks rather different. Such a definition of social
democracy (as a regime-type as distinct from a political ideology or ethos) is con-
ventional in comparative political economy, though rare in British labour studies.
For the authors who deploy such a conception (for instance, Berman 1998; Garrett
1998; Pontusson 1992), Britain is – and throughout the post-war period always has
been – the European archetype of market liberalism, not of social democracy.
Moreover, as Mark Wickham-Jones (2000) has persuasively argued, Labour’s
early ‘modernisation’ process under Kinnock and Smith – a process more conven-
tionally seen as a slow march from social democracy – was in fact animated, per-
haps for the first time in the party’s history, by a genuine attempt to embrace the
European social democratic tradition (see also Clift 2001; George and Haythorne
1996; Sassoon 1998; and, for evidence of this kind of thinking among Kinnock’s
closest advisors, Eatwell 1992). Of course, this abortive strategy was never more
than aspirational – and, as aspirations go, a rather optimistic one at that. Certainly
the completion of the modernisation process under Blair represented a systematic
repudiation of such a vision and an attempt, instead, to project a ‘Third Way’,
‘renewed’ or ‘post’-social democratic alternative. Ironically, in recent years, this has
increasingly come to be re-packaged for export as a modernised ‘European social
model’, appropriate, where the European tradition of social democracy was not, to
the new competitive environment summoned by an era of globalisation.
As this perhaps suggests, whether Labour is seen as a party with a social demo-
cratic past, a party with a social democratic present but not past, or a party that has
never been nor is ever likely to become social democratic depends on one’s defini-
tion of social democracy. Yet if it is accepted that Labour’s origins do not reside in
the continental European social democratic tradition, but in a rather more Anglo-
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phone ‘labourism’ (as, for instance, in Drucker 1979; Minkin 1991), then whether
New Labour represents a reclaiming, disavowal or betrayal of that tradition is not
especially significant. For what it is worth, my own opinion is that it is wrong to see
Labour as part of the European social democratic tradition; and at a time when the
current Government claims to offer a ‘renewed’ social democratic model for Euro-
pean export, it may well be appropriate to say so.
A final consideration may serve as an important point of departure for the con-
cluding section of this chapter. It is stated simply, though its implications, if taken
seriously, are considerable. As political analysts and, perhaps especially, as political
economists of Labour, we should be extremely careful not to confine ourselves
only to holding opinions on matters in which we might present the Labour Party
or movement as an obvious or significant agent. There is, understandably, a certain
tendency in labour studies to restrict the analytical enterprise to the description of
processes and the elucidation of causal mechanisms in which Labour and labour
feature as prominent agents. The result may be a certain tendency to silence on the
key question of the exogenous constraints invariably held to circumscribe the
realm of feasible political agency for such actors. In an era of putative globalisa-
tion, in which the logic of non-negotiable external economic constraint is fre-
quently invoked, self-declared political economists of Labour–labour cannot but
afford to have an opinion on the empirical content of such claims. If that entails a
temporary suspension of their analyses of Labour, until such time as they are better
informed as to the nature of Britain’s external economic exposure, then so be it.
Towards a post-disciplinary political analysis of Labour
The preceding section identified some of the principal substantive issues that any
balanced assessment and evaluation of Labour’s recent history must surely con-
sider. The rest of the chapter moves from factors specific to the political analysis
and political economy of Labour to those that are more general. To reiterate, the
argument here echoes that of an earlier collaborative study of the post-war period,
Postwar British Politics in Perspective (Marsh et al. 1999), and it is that the princi-
pal positions in debates which characterise labour studies today, like those on the
periodisation of political development in post-war Britain, rest on generally
unstated assumptions about a core set of basic analytical questions. Rendering
these explicit should clarify the nature of the debate and the precise character of
the specific positions adopted by the principal protagonists, thereby contributing
to what otherwise threatens to become a dialogue of the deaf.
In making this argument, we should return to the four central issues introduced
at the opening of the chapter, each of which serves to highlight a distinct aspect of
the question of causality. Before considering each in turn, however, it is perhaps
important to emphasise that what unites these issues in the new political science of
British politics is a common emphasis on interconnectedness and what is some-
times termed ‘complex interdependence’. Thus, the remainder of the chapter aims
to trace the implications of such a condition of interdependence for the practice of
political analysis – and of labour studies as an exercise in political analysis.
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Interconnectedness and interdependence
It is tempting to argue, as many have, that the world we inhabit is more complex,
interdependent and interconnected than ever before.Yet for present purposes what
matters is not whether contemporary levels of interdependence are unprecedented
historically but that we inhabit an interdependent world which must be analysed
as such.
Alarmingly, conventional approaches to the social sciences, based on rigid dis-
ciplinary demarcations, do not prepare us well for a world of interdependence.
Political scientists deal poorly with economic variables, just as economists deal
poorly with political variables. Moreover, domestically focused analysts deal
poorly with international dynamics, just as international analysts deal poorly with
domestic dynamics. In a world of spatial and sectoral independence, these defi-
ciencies do not amount to a problem. Yet that is not the world we inhabit. In short,
in an interdependent world that does not respect spatial and sectoral divisions of
analytical work such divisions will simply not suffice.
This is the challenge to which the new political science of British politics is a
response, and it has important implications for labour studies. First, it points to
the obvious occupational hazards of disciplinary and sub-disciplinary boundaries
which are, arguably, present in a most acute way in labour studies. Stated most
bluntly, in a world of (acknowledged) interdependence, discipline- or sub-disci-
pline-specific approaches to social, political and economic analysis will tend to rely
on assumptions – the validity of which they are incapable of adjudicating – gener-
ated by other disciplinary or sub-disciplinary specialisms. This is nowhere more
clear than in the literature on the political economy of New Labour and the imper-
atives globalisation supposedly summons. Here the debate circles endlessly
around, without ever closing in on, the nature and the degree of negotiability of
the constraints that Britain’s external economic interdependence is seen to imply.
Opinions vary wildly. Yet what is almost entirely absent from such discussions is
any attempt to describe empirically, let alone to evaluate, the precise nature of
Britain’s external economic relations – with respect to trade, finance and foreign
direct investment. Indeed, in the vast majority of accounts, a crude, simplistic and
never more than anecdotally empirical business-school or hyper-globalist ortho-
doxy is simply internalised and assumed to reflect the limits of our knowledge on
such matters, with scant regard to the now substantial empirical evidence. That
evidence, for what it is worth, shows if anything a consistent de-globalising of the
British economy over the last forty years associated with the process – almost
wholly absent from the existing debate – of European economic integration (Hay
2002c).
This is but one example. What it, and others like it, suggest is that, as political
analysts and political economists of Labour, we simply cannot afford, if ever we
could, to get by without a rather more thorough grasp of the cognate disciplines
on whose assumptions we have increasingly come to rely. Yet it is not only the
interdependence of different spatial scales to which the new political science draws
attention. Increasingly central to its analytical concerns has been the interdepend-
ence of political conduct, political discourse and political context – in short, the
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thorny perennials of structure and agency, the discursive and the material. It is to
these that I now turn – drawing, for illustrative purposes, on the modernisation of
the Labour Party and an argument first outlined in The Political Economy of New
Labour (Hay 1999: chapter 1).
Structure and agency, context and conduct
The debate on the modernisation of the Labour Party provides yet further evi-
dence of an academic truism: when engaged in abstract reflections of a theoretical
kind, social scientists are keen to extol the virtues of a complex view of the rela-
tionship between actors and their context; yet, when it comes to more substantive
concerns, the allure of actor-centred or context-centred positions often proves
overwhelming. It is perhaps all too easy, then, to simply call for a more complex
view of the relationship between structure and agency than that exhibited in much
of the existing literature.
It is nonetheless important to contextualise political conduct, on the one hand,
and consider the mechanisms by which political context is constantly shaped and
re-shaped, on the other. To make such an appeal is not to imply that all previous
accounts were guilty of one or other oversight: it would be fairer to suggest that
they posit some relationship (however skewed or inconsistent) between conduct
(for example, that of the party leadership) and context (say, that of the global polit-
ical economy). It is, however, to emphasise the benefits of reflecting explicitly on
the specific relationship between conduct and context; and to caution against the
consequences of the structuralist and intentionalist positions to which many
authors seem drawn. It is only by so doing that we can resist the tendency, charac-
teristic of actor-centred accounts, to view Labour as being so radically uncon-
strained by its environment that pragmatic and contextual (as distinct from
normative ethical) considerations simply did not enter into the equation when
charting a course for the party’s modernisation.
Similarly, it is only by so doing that we can resist the equally problematical ten-
dency, characteristic of more context-centred positions, to imply such a rigidly
delimited realm of political autonomy that the trajectory of the party’s moderni-
sation might almost be derived from a consideration of the environment in which
it took place, independently of the actors involved. This latter view, it was earlier
suggested, is closely associated with the uncritical acceptance of the ‘hyper-global-
ist’ thesis. Worse still, perhaps, is the vacillation between the two which allows New
Labour to be presented, simultaneously, as the unwitting agent of the ‘harsh eco-
nomic realities’ of the context in which it finds itself and yet as a principled expo-
nent of a consistent, ethical, ‘new’ social democracy, freely chosen.
Such extremes are now thankfully rare. Indeed, even those approaches that
tended to place their emphasis principally on structure–context or on
agency–conduct have tended to do so without exclusively privileging the one over
the other. Thus, for example, those analyses which sought to account for Labour’s
trajectory in recent years in terms of a strategic struggle for its soul (as reflected in
the shifting balance of power within the party) have generally felt the need to
introduce a range of contextual and structural factors – the balance of power itself
190 How to study the Labour Party
ITLP_C12.QXD  18/8/03  10:02 am  Page 190
at any given moment in time, the strategic resources at the disposal of particular
actors, the constitution and the institutionalised practices of the party, and so
forth. Similarly, accounts privileging the (invariably) harsh economic realities of a
newly globalised political economy have nonetheless had to invoke some concep-
tion of agency – if only as the immediate mechanism by which the party’s com-
mitments might be brought in line with a new external environment. It might
seem tempting at this stage to suggest some middle ground, or even a potential
rapprochement, between these contending structural and more agency-centred
accounts. Yet we should be extremely wary of any suggestion that essentially inter-
pretive disputes over the assessment of Labour’s modernisation can simply be
adjudicated by importing abstract considerations of structure and agency. Empir-
ical disputes cannot be resolved by theoretical fiat. In the end, choices must be
made – about what’s going on (empirically) and about how what’s going on should
be accounted for in terms of structural and agential factors. The best that can be
asked is that, having made such choices, analysts seek to defend and develop them
in terms of a consistent and explicit view of the relationship between the actors
involved and the context they inhabit.
Rhetoric and reality: the discursive and the material
Equally significant, though the subject currently of less theoretical reflection, is the
question of the relationship between political discourse and the environment in
which that discourse is formulated and, arguably, on whose development it
impacts (though see Berman 1998; Blyth 1997; Campbell 1998). The significance
of the ideational (the realm of ideas) can easily be traced from the question of
structure and agency itself. For, if we accept that actors inhabit an environment
external to them, it is no large step to suggest that their conduct is influenced by
the ideas they formulate about that environment. What is more, as we know from
(often painful) experience, no one-to-one correspondence can be assumed to
obtain between the ideas we formulate about our surroundings (immediate or
more distant) and those surroundings themselves. If we want to understand how
actors behave, it is essential that we give due consideration to their understandings
of the context in which they are situated and the means by which they formulate
and revise such understandings.
Consider the ‘class dealignment’ thesis (Franklin 1985; Särlvik and Crewe 1983).
During the 1980s, a number of prominent psephologists claimed to identify a sec-
ular trend in the relationship between social class and voting behaviour – it
appeared that a smaller (and an ever-diminishing) proportion of the electorate
was voting for its ‘natural’ class party. Critics claimed that this conception of
absolute class voting did not explain, but merely re-described, Labour’s predica-
ment. Any shrinkage in the size of the vote of a party like Labour, they protested,
would result in an absolute drop in class voting. All that could be concluded, then,
from such a measure was that Labour was not doing very well. What was required,
to adjudicate the claimed weakening of the relationship between class and voting
behaviour, was a measure of relative class dealignment. Moreover, such a measure
showed no such secular trend (Heath, Jowell and Curtice 1985).
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The influence of the dealignment thesis, however, did not wane in response to
such criticism – far from it. This presents a certain difficulty in assessing its valid-
ity in the light of more recent evidence. For, since the mid-1990s a decline in rela-
tive class voting has come to be observed. We are presented with a stark choice
between two rather different explanations in accounting for this phenomenon.
The first is simple, intuitive, entirely conventional and gives no consideration to
ideational factors. It is that proponents of class dealignment were right all along
and have merely been vindicated by events subsequent to their initial hypothesis
(Sanders 2002). The second, a more discursive explanation, would point to the
direct influence of the dealignment thesis (as a thesis) on Labour’s strategic think-
ing. Labour, in the early 1990s, became convinced of the validity of the thesis
(whatever the relative class voting figures may have suggested). Consequently, it
ceased to make a class-based electoral appeal, re-projecting itself as a catch-all
party studiously courting the median voter. On this alternative reading, any subse-
quent evidence of dealignment might then be taken less as evidence of the validity
of the thesis than of its influence. Quite simply, if Labour behaved as if the thesis
were true (by abandoning its class-based electoral appeal), the predictions of the
thesis would be confirmed. Moreover, this would be the case whether or not work-
ing-class voters would be inclined to respond to a more genuinely class-based
appeal, should one have been made.
On the basis of the evidence it is impossible to adjudicate finally between these
two contending and mutually incompatible explanations – with very different
implications for electoral strategy and the prospects for class-based appeals. Never-
theless, while it remains plausible that recent evidence of both absolute and relative
class dealignment may be a consequence rather than a cause of Labour’s moderni-
sation, it would seem dangerously presumptuous to conclude that socio-economic
change has consigned class-based electoral politics to psephological history.
Similar arguments may be made about the impact of globalisation – and ideas
about globalisation – on New Labour’s perceptions of the limits of political and
economic feasibility (for a further elaboration of the argument, see Hay 2001). Has
globalisation constrained the parameters of political autonomy or has Labour
come to constrain itself on the basis of its perceptions of such constraints? Or,
indeed, has Labour come, somewhat duplicitously perhaps, to legitimise otherwise
unpalatable social and economic reforms with respect to globalisation’s conven-
ient logic of non-negotiable external economic constraint?
What these two examples serve to highlight is that, convenient though it may be
to do so, we ignore the realm of political discourse at our peril. Most social scien-
tists now seem happy to concede that we do indeed make history, though not in cir-
cumstances of our own choosing. Perhaps it is now also time to concede that, very
often, we make our history in the image of the theories we construct about it or –
as perhaps in the case of New Labour – in the image of the theories deemed most
convenient to justify specific strategic goals.
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Political, economic and cultural factors
Political analysts should not restrict themselves to narrowly political variables. Yet
neither should they seek to incorporate each and every conceivable explanatory
variable to produce a saturated model in which no variance is left unaccounted for.
Parsimony, given the choice, is no bad thing. Thus, although it is important to
argue for the significance of political, economic and cultural factors and, above all,
the complex nature of the interaction between them, it is perhaps equally impor-
tant to caution against a crudely ‘additive’ conception of theoretical sophistication.
The political, the economic and the cultural are not independent arenas. Accord-
ingly, we should be careful to avoid the implicit theoretical one-upmanship of the
claim that politicism is one-dimensional, political–economic explanations are
two-dimensional, and that only an integration of the political, the economic and
the cultural can provide the ‘complete’ picture – a three-dimensional view (of a,
presumably, three-dimensional reality).
That having been said, it is equally important to caution against the dangers of
politicism and economism, and to suggest that they may be countered by a con-
sideration of the political conditions of economic dynamics and the economic
conditions of political dynamics. Politicism, in the literature on the renaissance
and the subsequent history of the Labour Party, tends to be associated with the
blithe optimism which comes with intentionalism and a benign neglect of the
external (above all economic) environment. Politicist accounts thus tend to
emphasise the inherent contingency of the modernisation process, often as a
means to celebrate the considerable foresight, conviction and strategic nôus of the
modernisers.
Economism is no less problematical. At its worst, it tends to view the political as
either altogether irrelevant or as a pale shadow of immutable and inexorable eco-
nomic processes (such as globalisation). Not only does this frequently imply that
there is simply no alternative to the policies that have been pursued (a dangerous
and, as already argued, seldom defended assertion), it also fails to acknowledge the
political ‘authoring’ of processes such as economic integration. For, as a growing
number of authors have demonstrated, contemporary processes of economic inte-
gration owe their origins to a series of highly political decisions – associated with
the deregulation of financial markets, the liberalising of capital flows, and so forth
(Helleiner 1995). Once this is acknowledged, the logic of inevitability, which pat-
terns of economic interdependence are so frequently seen to imply, appear some-
what less imposing. This is made very clear in the technical literature on financial
re-regulation – a literature sadly unnoticed by mainstream political science (see,
for instance, Akyüz and Cornford 1995; Eichengreen, Tobin and Wyplosz 1995; Ul
Haq, Kaul and Grunberg 1996;Watson 1999).
If we are serious about resisting tendencies to privilege either the actor or the
context it is imperative that we also resist the narrow privileging of the economic
and the political with which they have become so intimately connected.
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The domestic, the international and the transnational
Finally, I return to the complex question of the relationship between the domestic,
the international and the transnational. It is tempting, as in the preceding discus-
sion, to argue that we need to consider each moment, and each moment in its
articulation with every other moment. In one sense, though glib, that is true. How-
ever, as in the previous discussion, it will not suffice. For, ultimately, the relative
weight we should assign to the domestic, the international and the transnational,
is both an evaluative and an empirical matter. If we are interested in Labour’s eco-
nomic and industrial policy the international may be of greater significance than
if our principal concern is with the prospects for a democratically elected second
chamber to replace the House of Lords. No meta-theoretical invocation to balance
the domestic and the international can then be posited.
Yet, if we are to reach an even-handed assessment of New Labour’s modernisa-
tion or, indeed, of its conduct to date in office, it seems plausible to suggest that we
can begin to do so only by locating the party in some kind of international and
comparative context. If we are to move beyond the twin poles of economism and
politicism it is important to acknowledge the domestic conditions of existence of
international political and economic dynamics and the international conditions of
existence of domestic political and economic dynamics. That is easy to write,
somewhat more difficult to say, and altogether more difficult to deliver. Nonethe-
less, political analysts are seemingly rather more prepared, these days, to accept
that this is the nature of the task at hand. That is no bad thing if we are to rectify
the still-glaring disparity between what we know we ought to do and what, for the
most part, we still continue to practise.
In this chapter the aim has been to establish the potential contribution to labour
studies of an emerging ‘new political science of British politics’ that is more reflec-
tive about its core analytical assumptions. The argument is stated simply, though
its implications, if accepted, are more involved. Positions on the question of struc-
ture and agency, the ideational and the material, and the relative significance of
political, economic and cultural variables on the one hand, and domestic and
international factors, on the other, are implicit in all political explanations. Labour
studies is no exception. While there is no single ‘correct’ answer to any of these
questions, it is important that we strive for a high degree of internal coherence. A
condition of so doing is a far higher consciousness of and greater reflexivity
towards such analytical assumptions. If this can be achieved labour studies will be
far better placed to focus attention on the strategies most appropriate to study
labour and Labour alike.
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the Communist Party), R. Samuel’s series in New Left Review, 154, 156, 165, published in
1985–87. J. Lawrence and M. Taylor (eds) Party, State and Society (Aldershot, 1997) provides
the best guide to the ‘new political history’. Studies which develop some of these themes and
approaches for the Left include: S. Fielding, P. Thompson and N. Tiratsoo, England Arise!
The Labour Party and Popular Politics in 1940s Britain (Manchester, 1995); L. Black, The
Political Culture of the Left in Affluent Britain, 1951–64 (2003); and I. Favretto, The Long
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Weinstock (eds) Out of Apathy (1989) and M. Kenny, The First New Left (1995). Among the
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The interpretation in this chapter is developed more fully in M. Newman, Ralph Miliband
and the Politics of the New Left (2002) which also includes a full bibliography of Miliband’s
works. The Socialist Register: Why Not Capitalism? (1995), contains several articles on
Miliband, including L. Panitch, ‘Ralph Miliband, socialist intellectual, 1924–94’ and J. Sav-
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following: The State in Capitalist Society (1969); Parliamentary Socialism (1972); Marxism
and Politics (Oxford, 1977); and Socialism for a Sceptical Age (Cambridge, 1994).
Chapter 5
For a fuller introduction to the approach discussed here, see D. Coates (ed.) Paving the Third
Way: The Critique of Parliamentary Socialism: A Socialist Register Anthology (2003). On the
Bennite Left and its aftermath, see L. Panitch and C. Leys, The End of Parliamentary Social-
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of the New Labour Government. For an important exploration of the socialist alternative
and its attainment, see L. Panitch, Renewing Socialism (Boulder, CO, and Oxford, 2001); and
the series of essays in L. Panitch and C. Leys (eds) The Socialist Register 2000 (2000). For an
introduction to the understanding of political economy associated with the Milibandian
approach, see D. Coates, Models of Capitalism (Cambridge, 2000).
Chapter 6
The original key texts by Tom Nairn and Perry Anderson are contained in the collection P.
Anderson and R. Blackburn (eds) Towards Socialism (1965). Anderson’s historical overview
is reproduced again, along with other papers, in his 1992 collection English Questions.
Overviews of the Nairn–Anderson theses are contained in L. Chun, The British New Left
(Edinburgh, 1993), G. Elliot, Perry Anderson (1998) and M. Kenny, The First New Left
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(1995). For a sympathetic, if polemical, application to Labour history, see G. Elliott,
Labourism and the English Genius (1993).
Chapter 7
There is an interesting video of Henry Pelling interviewed by Ross McKibbin, made in 1988
and available from the Institute of Historical Research. Clearly, the central work to consider
is H. Pelling, The Origins of the Labour Party, 1880–1900 (Oxford, 1954), which was so thor-
oughly researched and clearly presented that it remains a classic reference point. Pelling’s
further pursuit of the issues of the regional and ideological fragmentation of the working
classes was published in Social Geography of British Elections, 1885–1910 (1967) and Popu-
lar Politics and Society in Late Victorian Britain (1968). His approach has been influential on
more recent work such as D. Tanner, Political Change and the Labour Party, 1900–1918
(Cambridge, 1990), and many of the essays in E. F. Biagini and A. J. Reid (eds) Currents of
Radicalism. Popular Radicalism, Organised Labour and Party Politics in Britain, 1850–1914
(Cambridge, 1991).
Chapter 8
The interested reader should start with McKibbin’s own books – The Evolution of the Labour
Party (Oxford, 1974); The Ideologies of Class (Oxford, 1990); and Classes and Cultures
(Oxford, 1998). McKibbin’s treatment of the ‘exceptional’ development of working-class
politics in Britain might be compared with Tom Nairn’s earlier expositions of this argument
in ‘The English working class’, New Left Review, 24 (1964) and ‘The fateful meridian’, New
Left Review, 60 (1970). The argument is systematically questioned in Stefan Berger, The
British Labour Party and the German Social Democrats (Oxford, 1994). McKibbin’s treat-
ment of the relationship between working-class culture and working-class politics is use-
fully compared with Gareth Stedman Jones’s ‘Working class culture and working class
politics in London, 1870–1900’, Journal of Social History, 7:4 (1974) and the same author’s
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formation of ‘New’ Labour. P. Gould, The Unfinished Revolution (1998), sketches out how
‘New’ Labour has appropriated the debate.
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Of the monographs on the unions–party link, Lewis Minkin’s The Contentious Alliance
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Leo Panitch’s Social Democracy and Industrial Militancy (Cambridge, 1976), and in David
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Unions and the Labour Party (1987).
Chapter 11
Top of the list are Minkin’s two magisterial studies The Labour Party Conference (1978) and
The Contentious Alliance (Edinburgh, 1991. These are towering works which no serious stu-
dent of the Labour Party can afford to ignore. Minkin’s earlier treatments of the
party–unions connection can be found in: `The British Labour Party and the trade unions:
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tion: divergence and convergence in the British labour movement’, Government and Oppo-
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unions: the end of the contentious alliance?’ in S. Ludlam and M. J. Smith (eds) New Labour
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and D. Marsh and G. Stoker (eds) Theory and Methods in Political Science (2002). For an
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